Abstract
This chapter sets the foundation for the analysis of GPP on a regional level. The EU’s regulatory framework for public procurement contains the most comprehensive GPP elements. Since the EU is a signatory to the GPA, the question is raised how this elaborate GPP framework is compatible with the EU’s non-discrimination obligations under the GPA. This chapter starts answering this question by providing a brief overview on the development of (and the rationale behind) the EU’s public procurement framework regulation, embedding it into the context of the EU’s general non-discrimination requirements. Moreover, it discusses questions of impact, direct effect and equivalence of the GPA and the EU public procurement regulations.
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Notes
- 1.
According to Article 26(2)TFEU, the internal market “shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties.”
- 2.
COM/85/310 final, 24.
- 3.
Thresholds vary according to contract’s qualification as “work”, “service” or “supply”. They can be checked on the Commission’s website, available at: www.simap.europa.eu.
- 4.
See below, Chap. 8.
- 5.
See below, Sect. 7.4.
- 6.
Council Directive 71/304/EEC of 26 July 1971 concerning the abolition of restrictions on freedom to provide services in respect of public works contracts and on the award of public works contracts to contractors acting through agencies or branches and Council Directive 71/305/EEC of 26 July 1971 concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts.
- 7.
Gordon / Rimmer / Arrowsmith, 29.
- 8.
COM/85/310 final, 23; Bovis 1998, 220–222.
- 9.
COM/85/310 final, 24.
- 10.
Bovis 2016, xv.
- 11.
The “Coordination Directive” 2004/18/EC was replaced by the new “Public Procurement Directive” 2014/24/EU and the former “Utilities Directive” 2004/17/EC was replaced by new “Utilities Directive” 2014/25/EU.
- 12.
For an overview of the three directives as the main source for EU public procurement law see below in Sect. 7.4.2.
- 13.
COM/2011/896 final, passim.
- 14.
COM/2017/0572 final, 3.
- 15.
According to COM/2017/0572 final, 4, 23% of the value generated in public procurement contracts is achieved by cross-border procurement.
- 16.
COM/2017/0572 final.
- 17.
Article 1(2) Directive 2014/24/EU, Article 1(2) Directive 20144/25/EU.
- 18.
This thesis will refer to the main public procurement directive 2014/24/EU and only refer to the other two relevant directives (2014/23/EU and 2014/25/EU) in case of deviations.
- 19.
Nevertheless, Recital 10 of Directive 2014/24/EU stresses that a “body” with predominantly commercial character cannot be deemed to be a contracting authority within the sense of EU law.
- 20.
- 21.
See Sect. 6.1.
- 22.
See above, Sect. 6.2.
- 23.
The EU counts as one Signatory Party to the GPA, although all 28 EU Member States are Parties.
- 24.
Blank / Marceau, 122; Casavola calls the EU “the GPA’s chief promoter”, 294; Gordon / Rimmer / Arrowsmith, 160; Arrowsmith 1998b, 13; for an embedment of the EU’s dominant role in GPA negotiation within the theoretical framework of the “EU as a global actor” literature see Ladi / Tsarouhas, passim.
- 25.
Ladi / Tsarouhas, 399.
- 26.
See for example Gordon / Rimmer / Arrowsmith, 160; Arrowsmith 1998b, 13; Casavola, 295.
- 27.
Casavola, 295.
- 28.
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
- 29.
For a more detailed illustration of the surveillance and monitoring by the GPA Committee see Arrowsmith 2003, 406–409.
- 30.
The opportunity to comment on other Parties implementing laws is frequently used within the forum of the GPA Committee meetings, see GPA/32 from 12 January 2000. This report, however, dates back to the year 2000 and does not concern the most current EU legislative package from 2014. Newer reports are not available.
- 31.
See also Semple 2015, xxxviii; GPA/W/341, 21.
- 32.
Semple 2016, 62.
- 33.
Oesch 2019, 806 with reference to Case C-84/95, Bosphorus v Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications and Others [Bosphorus], ECLI:EU:C:1996:312.
- 34.
Oesch 2019, 811; Kaddous, 301.
- 35.
Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. [Kupferberg], ECLI:EU:C:1982:362.
- 36.
Oesch 2019, 813 et seqq.
- 37.
Joined cases 21 to 24-72, International Fruit Company NV and others v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit [International Fruit Company], ECLI:EU:C:1972:115, para. 27.
- 38.
See for example Case C-69/89, Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council of the European Communities [Nakajima], ECLI:EU:C:1991:186.
- 39.
In two cases, namely Case 70/87 Fédération de l’industrie de l’huilerie de la CEE (Fediol) v Commission of the European Communities [Fediol], ECLI:EU:C:1989:254 as well as in the Nakajima case, the CJEU recognized that EU law could be subject for a compatibility test with WTO law if the measure at issue referred expressly to WTO law (Fediol exception) or if the measure at issue was adopted expressly to ensure compliance with the EU’s obligations under WTO law (Nakajima exception).
- 40.
As pointed out by Kaddous, 312, the CJEU has shown the tendency to follow a more open approach with regard to the questions of direct effect and interpretation of the EU’s international obligations in favor of individuals.
- 41.
Casavola, 302.
- 42.
See above, Sect. 6.2.2.
- 43.
Bradley, 103; Oesch 2019, 405.
- 44.
Article 6(1) TEU states that the CFREU “shall have the same legal standing as the Treaties”. For a detailed analysis of the inclusion of human rights within the framework of the various public procurement instruments (such as exclusion grounds, labels or award criteria) see Sanchez-Grael, passim.
- 45.
Semple 2015, 1.10, Bovis 2016, 37; for a more detailed analysis on “sub-dimensional” public procurement see Dragos, passim.
- 46.
See e.g. COM/2006/C 179/02 final, passim.
- 47.
Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC.
- 48.
Directive 2014/25/EU on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC.
- 49.
Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts.
- 50.
Directive 2007/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts.
- 51.
Bradley, 100.
- 52.
Bovis 1998, 228; Casavola, 299.
- 53.
Bovis 1998, 229.
- 54.
Casavola, 301.
- 55.
Cantore / Togan, 144.
- 56.
Cantore / Togan, 144.
- 57.
The rules on the respective public procurement instruments are further detailed in the context of GPP below, in this chapter.
- 58.
This is stipulated in Article 1 of all three directives.
- 59.
Cantore / Togan, 149; Semple 2015, 1.18.
- 60.
See above, Sect. 6.2.
- 61.
Semple 2015, 1.10.
- 62.
Article 5 Directive 2014/24/EU, Article 16 Directive 2014/25/EU and Article 8 Directive 2014/23/EU.
- 63.
Article 6 Directive 2014/24/EU, Article 15 Directive 2014/25/EU and Article 9 Directive 2014/23/EU.
- 64.
Unlike the Utilities and the Procurement Directive, the pertinent provision in the Concessions Directive is entitled “Principle of equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency” and is thus more specific as to which principles are referred to.
- 65.
Semple 2015, 2.18.
- 66.
Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville [Dassonville], EU:C:1974:82. The Dassonville formula in para. 5 states that “all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be regarded as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions (emphasis added).”
- 67.
Case C-359/93, Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of the Netherlands [Commission v Netherland], EU:C:1995:14; see also below, Sect. 8.3.
- 68.
Case C-3/88, Contse and others v Ingesa [Contse], EU:C:2005:644.
- 69.
Case C-272/91, Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic [Re Data Processing], ECLI:EU:C:1994:167.
- 70.
Re Data Processing, Recital 1.
- 71.
See below, Chap. 8.
- 72.
Article 24 Directive 2014/24/EU.
- 73.
Article 22 Directive 2014/24/EU.
- 74.
Preamble of Directive 2014/24/EU, Recital 53.
- 75.
Article 40 Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 58 Directive 2014/25/EU.
- 76.
See Preamble of Directive 2014/24/EU Recital 93 or Preamble of Directive 2014/25/EU Recital 98.
- 77.
An analogous provision can be found in Article 43 Directive 2014/25/EU.
- 78.
Analogous provisions can be found in Recital 103 Directive 2014/24/EU and in Recital 65 Directive 2014/23/EU.
- 79.
Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen GmbH v Gemeinde Brixen and Stadtwerke Brixen AG [Parking Brixen], ECLI:EU:C:2005:605, para. 26; Cottier / Oesch, 145.
- 80.
Cottier / Oesch, 145 with reference to Case C-292/97, Kjell Karlsson and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2000:202; Ehring, passim, however, argues that the WTO jurisprudence has turned the non-discrimination obligation into an equal treatment obligation.
- 81.
Joined cases C-21/03 and C-34/03, Fabricom SA v Belgian State [Fabricom], ECLI:EU:C:2005:127, para 27.
- 82.
Arrowsmith 2010c, 130.
- 83.
See above Sect. 6.4.
- 84.
Ibid.
- 85.
This was at the center of the dispute in Fabricom; Semple 2015, 2.26.
- 86.
Arrowsmith 2010c, 131 with reference to Case C-16/98, Commission of the European, Communities v French Republic [Commission v France], ECLI:EU:C:2000:541.
- 87.
Ibid., with reference to Case C-87/94, Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium [Walloon Buses], ECLI:EU:C:1996:161; see also below, Sect. 7.6.
- 88.
Cottier / Oesch, 155–156.
- 89.
The principle of unwritten justifications was first acknowledged in Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [Cassis-de-Djion], ECLI:EU:C:1979:42.
- 90.
See e.g. Case C-209/03, The Queen, on the application of Dany Bidar v London Borough of Ealing and Secretary of State for Education and Skills [Bidar], EU:C:2005:169 or Case 333/13, Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig [Dano], EU:C:2014:2358.
- 91.
Cottier / Oesch, 158; for a detailed interpretation of the Chapeau see above, Sect. 6.8.1.
- 92.
Casavola, 317.
- 93.
Arrowsmith 2010c, 288.
- 94.
Semple 2015, para. 8.02.
- 95.
See also discussion on the direct applicability of the GPA in the EU above, Sect. 7.3.3.
- 96.
The text states that “for contracts covered by [the GPA] (…), contracting authorities should fulfil the obligations under those agreements by applying this Directive to economic operators of third countries that are signatories to the agreements.”
- 97.
Matei, 358.
- 98.
Casavola, 313.
- 99.
See Ladi / Tsarouhas, passim.
- 100.
As will be seen in the case of Switzerland in Chap. 10.
- 101.
Casavola, 295.
- 102.
Casavola, 317; Cottier / Oesch, passim, compare the general non-discrimination principle of the WTO and the EU. They reach the conclusion that the EU non-discrimination principle is stricter and more differentiated, 166.
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Koch, R. (2020). Regional Public Procurement Regulation and Implementation of the GPA. In: Green Public Procurement under WTO Law. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(), vol 9. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48214-5_7
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