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Sovereign Risk Indicators

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Country Risk

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Abstract

Starting in the mid-1970s, an increasing number of economists began using the term “country risk” to refer to “sovereign risk” (see Chap. 1). At the time of this writing, that confusion has not yet completely dissipated and so the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably. This chapter focuses on what is known as “type-3 country risk” (CR3)—in other words, the risk that a sovereign borrower might fail to fulfill its financial obligations to a foreign creditor. This emphasis is motivated by the high likelihood of sovereign risk exacerbating all the other risks that affect international investors.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Gaillard (2014c) for an overview of sovereign risk.

  2. 2.

    Poor’s and Standard Statistics merged in 1941 to form Standard & Poor’s (S&P).

  3. 3.

    Author’s calculations based on moodys.com and spglobal.com.

  4. 4.

    In the rest of this book, Moody’s and S&P ratings refer to Moody’s and S&P long-term FC ratings.

  5. 5.

    For a more detailed analysis of the sovereign rating process, see Gaillard (2011, Chap. 4) and Nye (2014, Chaps. 4 and 5).

  6. 6.

    The ratings assigned to European Union (EU) members must be reviewed at least once every six months, per Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 as amended by Regulation (EU) No. 462/2013.

  7. 7.

    For instance, economic strength is based mainly on GDP per capita, the economy’s size and diversification, and long-term economic trends.

  8. 8.

    Institutional Investor, September 1999, pp. 197–200.

  9. 9.

    See for example Institutional Investor, September 1984, p. 293; September 2002, p. 167; and September 2016, p. 104. For more information, readers may refer to https://www.conference-board.org/bio/index.cfm?bioid=3099.

  10. 10.

    See http://www.euromoney.com/AboutUs.aspx?copyrightInfo=true.

  11. 11.

    Euromoney, October 1979, p. 130.

  12. 12.

    Euromoney, September 1982, pp. 71–74.

  13. 13.

    Euromoney, September 1986, p. 364.

  14. 14.

    The economic indicators consisted of three ratios: debt service to exports, balance of payments to gross national product (GNP), and external debt to GNP.

  15. 15.

    Euromoney, September 1988, p. 233.

  16. 16.

    See https://www.euromoneycountryrisk.com/Methodology.

  17. 17.

    Of the total sovereign debt in default in 1984 (resp., 2013), 100% (resp., 68%) had been issued by emerging and developing countries (resp., eurozone members). Author’s calculation based on Beers and de Leon-Manlagnit’s (2019) database.

  18. 18.

    See Friedman (1977) and Wilson (1979) for a presentation of the country risk rating systems established by Citicorp and Bank of America, respectively. For an overview, see Heffernan (1986).

  19. 19.

    L. Rout and J. Salamon, “Bankers Tentatively Agree to Let Mexico Delay Repayment of Some Debt Principal,” Wall Street Journal, 23 August 1982.

  20. 20.

    Based on Beers and de Leon-Manlagnit’s (2019) database.

  21. 21.

    It is worth mentioning that Venezuela was the only defaulting borrower rated by Moody’s and S&P. The country was ranked in the triple-A category by these CRAs both in 1981, which indicates that the ratings assigned by Institutional Investor and Euromoney were reasonably accurate. See Moody’s (1981) and S&P (2013b).

  22. 22.

    The countries removed from the Institutional Investor sample are Bolivia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Iran, Jamaica, Liberia, Nicaragua, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, and Zaire. Those removed from the Euromoney sample are Bolivia, Honduras, Jamaica, Romania, Senegal, and Turkey.

  23. 23.

    Author’s computations based on Gaillard (2011, apx. 1 and 3).

  24. 24.

    See Gaillard (2011, p. 78).

  25. 25.

    The second bailout of Greece, implemented in 2012, is not accounted for here.

  26. 26.

    Greece’s and Cyprus’s defaults on their FC bonds have been estimated at $312.4 billion and $1.7 billion, respectively (Beers and de Leon-Manlagnit’s 2019 database).

  27. 27.

    Unless otherwise stated, Euromoney ratings are rounded to the first decimal place to facilitate comparisons with Institutional Investor ratings.

  28. 28.

    The Institutional Investor and Euromoney ratings used here are their original scores (i.e., on the 0–100 scale).

  29. 29.

    Saint Kitts and Nevis defaulted on its FC bond debt in 2011 but is excluded from the sample because it was not evaluated by any of the four raters.

  30. 30.

    When a country is in default for at least two consecutive years, only the first year is considered.

  31. 31.

    Moody’s and S&P ratings are as of September 1. Institutional Investor and Euromoney ratings are those published in their respective September issues. For a country that defaulted in year y, the ratings studied are those published on September 1 of years y−3, y−2, and y−1.

  32. 32.

    Here an observation is the evolution of a rating between year y and year y+1.

  33. 33.

    See also the debt sustainability assessments (DSAs) of low-income countries undertaken by the IMF and the World Bank since 2005 (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/lic.aspx).

  34. 34.

    Author’s computation based on Moody’s data.

  35. 35.

    These two risks were leading causes in the default of emerging economies (e.g., Indonesia in 1999 and Argentina in 2001). Yet the 2008–2012 financial turmoil in Iceland and the eurozone demonstrated that they could trigger a solvency crisis in developed countries as well.

  36. 36.

    Author’s calculations based on World Bank’s World Development Indicators.

  37. 37.

    It is interesting that Greece’s former Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis, who opposed German Chancellor Angela Merkel regarding the austerity measures imposed on his country, admitted that a “Grexit” would be too hazardous (Varoufakis 2016, pp. 205–206).

  38. 38.

    Author’s calculations based on World Bank’s World Development Indicators.

  39. 39.

    Author’s calculations based on Beers and de Leon-Manlagnit’s (2019) database.

  40. 40.

    See Beers and de Leon-Manlagnit’s (2019) database.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. NG Consulting, Paris, France

    Norbert Gaillard

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  1. Norbert Gaillard
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Appendix: Ratings Assigned by Institutional Investor, Euromoney Country Risk, Moody’s, and S&P as of 1 September 2016

Appendix: Ratings Assigned by Institutional Investor, Euromoney Country Risk, Moody’s, and S&P as of 1 September 2016

Country

Institutional Investor rating

ECR rating

Moody’s rating

S&P rating

Abu Dhabi

N.R.

N.R.

Aa2

AA

Afghanistan

14.2

26.63

N.R.

N.R.

Albania

41.0

36.28

B1

B+

Algeria

46.6

38.37

N.R.

N.R.

Andorra

N.R.

N.R.

N.R.

BBB–

Angola

32.5

32.62

B1

B

Antigua and Barbuda

N.R.

29.13

N.R.

N.R.

Argentina

35.1

36.47

B3

B–

Armenia

35.2

43.32

B1

N.R.

Aruba

N.R.

N.R.

N.R.

BBB+

Australia

90.5

81.17

Aaa

AAA

Austria

87.2

80.29

Aa1

AA+

Azerbaijan

45.3

42.89

Ba1

BB+

Bahamas

57.1

49.51

Baa3

BBB–

Bahrain

50.5

49.39

Ba2

BB

Bangladesh

33.2

30.63

Ba3

BB–

Barbados

48.1

41.76

Caa1

B

Belarus

26.0

26.04

Caa1

B–

Belgium

83.3

74.19

Aa3

AA

Belize

32.0

35.12

Caa2

B–

Benin

26.8

23.25

N.R.

N.R.

Bermuda

71.2

56.92

A2

A+

Bhutan

30.0

21.89

N.R.

N.R.

Bolivia

42.0

39.54

Ba3

BB

Bosnia and Herzegovina

33.9

25.20

B3

B

Botswana

58.8

58.25

A2

A–

Brazil

55.7

51.20

Ba2

BB

Brunei

N.R.

57.32

N.R.

N.R.

Bulgaria

55.2

52.26

Baa2

BB+

Burkina Faso

20.6

28.20

N.R.

B–

Burundi

15.5

12.05

N.R.

N.R.

Cambodia

29.6

21.14

B2

N.R.

Cameroon

29.4

30.75

B2

B

Canada

93.3

82.31

Aaa

AAA

Cape Verde

25.5

37.07

N.R.

B

Cayman Islands

N.R.

N.R.

Aa3

N.R.

Central African Republic

10.5

10.21

N.R.

N.R.

Chad

15.3

10.66

N.R.

N.R.

Chile

78.0

75.80

Aa3

AA–

China

75.9

58.15

Aa3

AA–

Colombia

62.9

58.10

Baa2

BBB

Comoros

17.7

N.R.

N.R.

N.R.

Congo

22.7

32.65

B3

B–

Cook Islands

N.R.

N.R.

N.R.

B+

Costa Rica

54.8

47.10

Ba1

BB–

Croatia

52.3

49.34

Ba2

BB

Cuba

20.8

19.60

Caa2

N.R.

Curacao

N.R.

N.R.

N.R.

A–

Cyprus

37.8

58.30

B1

BB–

Czech Republic

78.7

71.53

A1

AA–

Democratic Rep. of Congo

15.0

26.71

B3

B–

Denmark

91.3

84.28

Aaa

AAA

Djibouti

28.0

5.72

N.R.

N.R.

Dominica

N.R.

30.80

N.R.

N.R.

Dominican Republic

43.1

37.13

B1

BB–

East Timor

23.4

N.R.

N.R.

N.R.

Ecuador

29.7

34.20

B3

B

Egypt

32.3

33.14

B3

B–

El Salvador

38.7

40.74

B1

B+

Equatorial Guinea

24.4

21.24

N.R.

N.R.

Eritrea

13.2

10.47

N.R.

N.R.

Estonia

76.5

68.38

A1

AA–

Ethiopia

22.7

35.42

B1

B

Fiji

28.9

23.88

B1

B+

Finland

90.3

81.06

Aa1

AA+

France

85.0

68.66

Aa2

AA

Gabon

36.0

43.54

B1

N.R.

Gambia

18.2

28.69

N.R.

N.R.

Georgia

40.2

44.97

Ba3

BB–

Germany

94.6

82.22

Aaa

AAA

Ghana

31.9

36.01

B3

B–

Greece

27.1

33.93

Caa3

B–

Grenada

20.7

34.31

N.R.

N.R.

Guatemala

41.8

39.79

Ba1

BB

Guernsey

N.R.

N.R.

N.R.

AA–

Guinea

12.3

20.84

N.R.

N.R.

Guinea-Bissau

14.7

32.95

N.R.

N.R.

Guyana

31.5

33.59

N.R.

N.R.

Haiti

16.0

16.60

N.R.

N.R.

Honduras

31.2

35.78

B2

B+

Hong Kong

83.9

80.28

Aa1

AAA

Hungary

57.4

51.93

Ba1

BB+

Iceland

61.0

63.88

A3

BBB+

India

62.3

53.91

Baa3

BBB−

Indonesia

56.9

50.69

Baa3

BB+

Iran

26.3

31.97

N.R.

N.R.

Iraq

21.4

28.37

N.R.

B−

Ireland

74.6

66.59

A3

A+

Isle of Man

N.R.

N.R.

Aa1

N.R.

Israel

71.2

66.29

A1

A+

Italy

66.2

55.98

Baa2

BBB−

Ivory Coast

35.6

37.24

Ba3

N.R.

Jamaica

32.1

33.90

Caa2

B

Japan

80.5

69.36

A1

A+

Jersey

N.R.

N.R.

N.R.

AA−

Jordan

41.5

44.26

B1

BB−

Kazakhstan

49.3

46.85

Baa3

BBB−

Kenya

32.6

34.93

B1

B+

Kiribati

25.1

N.R.

N.R.

N.R.

Kuwait

73.7

67.96

Aa2

AA

Kyrgyzstan

28.8

23.97

B2

B

Laos

23.4

19.37

N.R.

N.R.

Latvia

69.0

57.68

A3

A−

Lebanon

29.8

31.95

B2

B−

Lesotho

30.0

27.22

N.R.

N.R.

Liberia

17.7

34.70

N.R.

N.R.

Libya

27.7

22.58

N.R.

N.R.

Liechtenstein

N.R.

N.R.

N.R.

AAA

Lithuania

69.5

60.17

A3

A−

Luxembourg

93.3

84.54

Aaa

AAA

Macau

N.R.

66.04

Aa3

N.R.

Macedonia

43.3

38.68

N.R.

BB−

Madagascar

22.0

33.00

N.R.

N.R.

Malawi

20.2

33.50

N.R.

N.R.

Malaysia

67.2

61.32

A3

A−

Maldives

N.R.

22.97

N.R.

N.R.

Mali

19.7

24.98

N.R.

N.R.

Malta

71.3

69.14

A3

BBB+

Marshall Islands

N.R.

5.21

N.R.

N.R.

Mauritania

17.9

21.57

N.R.

N.R.

Mauritius

53.5

48.07

Baa1

N.R.

Mexico

70.6

61.10

A3

BBB+

Micronesia

N.R.

1.00

N.R.

N.R.

Moldova

24.8

28.77

B3

N.R.

Mongolia

39.4

33.72

B3

B−

Montenegro

39.9

33.28

B1

B+

Montserrat

N.R.

N.R.

N.R.

BBB−

Morocco

50.2

46.96

Ba1

BBB−

Mozambique

18.0

30.64

Caa3

CCC

Myanmar

25.3

30.06

N.R.

N.R.

Namibia

47.0

51.20

Baa3

N.R.

Nepal

24.2

24.06

N.R.

N.R.

Netherlands

90.8

84.98

Aaa

AAA

New Caledonia

N.R.

4.00

N.R.

N.R.

New Zealand

87.1

80.73

Aaa

AA

Nicaragua

24.4

30.93

B2

B+

Niger

16.6

31.29

N.R.

N.R.

Nigeria

35.6

37.20

B1

B+

North Korea

7.2

7.77

N.R.

N.R.

Norway

93.8

88.62

Aaa

AAA

Oman

62.2

60.03

Baa1

BBB−

Pakistan

29.3

31.26

B3

B−

Panama

59.6

55.67

Baa2

BBB

Papua New Guinea

28.4

30.46

B2

B+

Paraguay

41.3

43.60

Ba1

BB

Peru

65.5

59.47

A3

BBB+

Philippines

61.7

54.04

Baa2

BBB

Poland

72.5

63.70

A2

BBB+

Portugal

56.6

55.66

Ba1

BB+

Qatar

76.3

72.18

Aa2

AA

Ras Al Khaimah

N.R.

N.R.

N.R.

A

Romania

57.2

53.22

Baa3

BBB−

Russia

54.4

45.70

Ba1

BB+

Rwanda

29.9

29.40

B2

B+

Saint Lucia

N.R.

34.49

N.R.

N.R.

St Vincent and the Grenadines

N.R.

35.11

B3

N.R.

Samoa

N.R.

16.31

N.R.

N.R.

Sao Tome and Principe

14.0

21.05

N.R.

N.R.

Saudi Arabia

71.1

59.24

A1

A−

Senegal

33.7

37.44

B1

B+

Serbia

41.0

42.81

B1

BB−

Seychelles

30.6

43.03

N.R.

N.R.

Sharjah

N.R.

N.R.

A3

A

Sierra Leone

15.9

30.06

N.R.

N.R.

Singapore

93.2

86.62

Aaa

AAA

Sint Maarten

N.R.

N.R.

Baa2

N.R.

Slovakia

73.6

69.22

A2

A+

Slovenia

66.8

63.37

Baa3

A

Solomon Islands

27.6

13.82

B3

N.R.

Somalia

5.7

13.85

N.R.

N.R.

South Africa

51.9

52.26

Baa2

BBB−

South Korea

83.5

70.70

Aa2

AA

South Sudan

7.5

N.R.

N.R.

N.R.

Spain

65.9

58.33

Baa2

BBB+

Sri Lanka

34.5

44.96

B1

B+

Sudan

8.3

20.83

N.R.

N.R.

Suriname

32.5

36.01

B1

B+

Swaziland

20.8

23.44

N.R.

N.R.

Sweden

93.6

83.75

Aaa

AAA

Switzerland

95.4

87.86

Aaa

AAA

Syria

8.7

15.24

N.R.

N.R.

Taiwan

81.6

71.49

Aa3

AA−

Tajikistan

21.7

21.07

N.R.

N.R.

Tanzania

29.7

36.38

N.R.

N.R.

Thailand

62.0

54.32

Baa1

BBB+

Togo

22.6

31.68

N.R.

N.R.

Tonga

27.9

15.09

N.R.

N.R.

Trinidad and Tobago

58.9

55.05

Baa3

A−

Tunisia

41.8

40.88

Ba3

N.R.

Turkey

51.0

51.92

Baa3

BB

Turkmenistan

29.3

26.76

N.R.

N.R.

Turks and Caicos Islands

N.R.

N.R.

N.R.

BBB+

Uganda

30.4

34.27

B1

B

Ukraine

24.0

28.04

Caa3

B−

United Arab Emirates

76.1

68.50

Aa2

N.R.

United Kingdom

85.8

71.49

Aa1

AA

United States

93.3

77.06

Aaa

AA+

Uruguay

57.8

56.01

Baa2

BBB

Uzbekistan

27.5

27.91

N.R.

N.R.

Vanuatu

28.2

26.59

N.R.

N.R.

Venezuela

16.5

24.65

Caa3

CCC

Vietnam

48.6

43.43

B1

BB−

Yemen

17.5

21.65

N.R.

N.R.

Zambia

31.4

34.19

B3

B

Zimbabwe

8.3

15.82

N.R.

N.R.

  1. Notes: N.R. = not rated
  2. Sources: Institutional Investor (September 2016), Euromoney (September 2016), moodys.com and spglobal.com

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Gaillard, N. (2020). Sovereign Risk Indicators. In: Country Risk. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45788-4_4

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