Abstract
Around the end of the ninth century, Ibn al-Rīwandī wrote a book entitled Adab al-jadal. About a generation or so later, Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī, known as al-Kaʿbī, also wrote a book on jadal in which he purported to correct errors that Ibn al-Rīwandī made in his work. This work was in turn refuted by al-Ashʿarī, the great theologian, who took up Ibn al-Rīwandī’s cause against al-Kaʿbī’s criticisms. So too another great theologian, al-Māturīdī defended Ibn al-Rīwandī. But of the works just mentioned, none survives.
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Notes
- 1.
For information on the above works, see J. van Ess, “Disputationspraxis in der islamischen Theologie. Eine vorläufige Skizze,” Revue des Études Islamiques 44 (1976): 31–2. I. Baghdatli, Hadīyat al-ʿĀrifīn, ed. R. Bilge and I. Inal, 2 vols. (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 1951–55), vol. 2, p. 36, line -2. For information on Ibn al-Rīwandī, see A. al-Aʿasam, History of Ibn al-Rīwandī the Heretic (Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīda, 1975), and his Ibn al-Rīwandī in the Modern Arabic References (Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīda, 1978–9), 2 vols. For information on the other authors, cf. F. Sezgin, Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums 8 vols. at present (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1967-), vol. 1. For al-Kaʿbī, pp. 622–3; for al-Ashʿarī, pp. 602–6; for Ibn al-Rīwandī, pp. 620–1.
- 2.
K. al-Anwār wa-l Marāqib, ed. L. Nemoy (New York: Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundation, 1939–43). Vajda and van Ess argue for this while Makdisi believes that he copied from Abū ʿIsā al-Rummānī (d. 994). But since al-Rummānī seems to have lived much later, it would appear that the former hypothesis is better. See G. Vajda, “Études sur Qirqisānī V,” Revue des Études Juives 122 (1963): 9. Van Ess, “Disputationspraxis,” pp. 31–2, G. Makdisi, “Dialectic and Disputation: The relation between the texts of Qirqisānī and Ibn ʿAqīl,” Mélanges d’Islamologie, Volume dédié à la mémoire de Armand Abel par ses collègues, ses élèves et ses amis, ed. P. Salmon (Leiden:E. J. Brill, 1974): 201–6.
- 3.
Muṭahhar b. Ṭāhir al-Maqdisī, Kitāb al-bad’ wal-ta’rīkh, ed. and trans. C. Huart, 6 vols., (Paris: Ernest Leroux Editeur, 1899–1919), vol. 1, p. 18 ff. On him cf. Sezgin, GAS 1, p. 337.
- 4.
Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm al-Kātib , K. al-burhān fī wujūh al-bayān, ed. A. Maṭlūb and Kh. al-Ḥadīthī (Baghdad: Jāmiʿat Baghdād, 1967), pp. 222 ff. It is translated by Vajda in “Études,” pp. 54 ff.
- 5.
ʿAlī Ibn Ḥazm, Kitāb al-taqrīb li-ḥadd al-manṭiq wal-madkhal ilaihī, ed. I. ʿAbbās (Beirut: Dār al-ʿIbād, 1959), p. 182 ff. In my edition pages 179 and 189 have been reversed.
- 6.
Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad maqālāt al-shaikh Abī Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, fol.141b: 14ff., MS.253 (tauḥīd), Maktabat Shaikh al-Islām ʿĀrif Ḥikmat, Medina. See, Sezgin, GAS 1, p. 611. For a detailed description of the text, see D. Gimaret, “Un document fondamental pour l’histoire de l’Ashʿarisme,” (unpublished paper delivered at Orientalist Conference, Japan, 1983). Professor Gimaret is planning to publish an edition of the entire text.
- 7.
For the evidence, see van Ess, “Disputationspraxis,” p. 31, note 4.
- 8.
Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.142a: 20. al-Kātib , al-Burhān, p. 225, line 5 ff.; p. 235, line 2 ff. al-Maqdisī, al-Bad’, p. 50, line 5 ff. This was evidently a topos of the early interconfessional debate literature. Cf. G. Bardy (ed. and trans.) “Les trophées de Damas: controverse judéo-chrétienne du VIIe siècle,” Patrologia Orientalis 15,2 (1920) p. 192, line 10. B. Voss, Der Dialog in der frühchristlichen Literatur (Munich: W. Fink, 1970), pp. 47, 50, 195. Van Ess, “Disputationspraxis,” p. 45 ff.
- 9.
Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.142a: 17.
- 10.
Ibid., fol.142b: 10–12; 142a: 5–11; 142a: 18–19. The problem of whether the world is eternal or not is Aristotle’s classic example of a dialectical problem. Top.104 b8. Vajda and van Ess have pointed out several instances in which theological jadal may have borrowed from Aristotle’s teaching on dialectic. However, they conclude that there has been no direct borrowing. Vajda, “Études,” 8 ff. Van Ess, “Disputationspraxis,” p. 52–3. We agree with this position.
- 11.
Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.142b: 16 ff. Cf. al-Baghdādī, al-Faqīh, vol. 1, p. 229, line −4 ff.
- 12.
al-Kātib , al-Burhān, p. 224, line -1 ff. Cf. Ibn Ḥazm, al-Taqrīb, p. 182, line 9. Van Ess, “The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology,” Logic in Classical Islamic Culture, ed. G. von Grunebaum (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz, 1970), p. 25.
- 13.
al-Kātib , al-Burhān, p. 225, lines 3–4.
- 14.
Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.154b: 1–2. Cf. al-Juwaynī , al-Kāfiya fī al-jadal , ed. F. Ḥusain Maḥmūd (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat ʿIsā Ḥalabī, 1979), p. 529, lines 4–5. This testimony adds support to van Ess’s thesis that this slogan played an important role in justifying the theological missionaries who held disputations in order to convert the non-believers. Van Ess, “Disputationspraxis,” pp. 50–1.
- 15.
See above note 9. Cf. Ibn Ḥazm, al-Taqrīb, p. 185, line 20 ff. al-Baghdādī, al-Faqīh, vol. 1, p.230, lines 1–6; vol. 2, p. 25, line -1 ff.
- 16.
Could this distinction ultimately derive from Aristotle De Anima 433b29 where he distinguishes between two types of phantasia: aisthētikē and logistikē?
- 17.
al-Māturīdī, Kitāb al-Tauḥīd, ed. F. Kholeif (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1970), p. 7, lines 7–8, says that “It is agreed that one should not argue with those who reject evidence of the senses (ʿiyān, lit. seeing).” He calls these people munkir or mukābir . On the latter term, cf. the signs of defeat below.
- 18.
al-Maqdisī , al-Bad’, p. 48, line 4 ff; trans. 44, line 2 ff. Cf. text 20, line -2 ff; 32, line 2 ff; trans. 17, line 17 ff. and 19, line 24 ff.
- 19.
Aristotle APo . 72b13-15 in Arabic translation from A. Badawi , Manṭiq Arisṭū, 3 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Qalam, 1980), vol. 2, p. 338, lines 3–5. Cf. APo. 75b5 ff. Cf. M. Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, al-Manṭiq, ed. M. Dānishpazhūh (Tehran: Anjuman-i Shāhanshāhi-i Falsafah-iīrān, 1357), p. 67, line 9 ff.: “Some people contentiously objected (shaghaba) against what Aristotle said that…nothing is known except by syllogism (ṣanīʿa).” Cf. Yaʿqūb b. Isḥāq al-Kindī, Rasā’il, ed. M. Abū Rīda, 2 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 1950–3), vol. 2, p. 302, bottom.
- 20.
al-Qirqisānī , al-Anwār, p. 70, line 4 ff. He reports the argument of al-Maqdisī’ s sophists and rejects it since we know naẓar and qiyās per se. Qiyās is the “reducing of a thing to its equal (radduhū ilā naẓīrihī ),” and is in accord with necessary knowledge. Later (92, line 2 ff.) he notes that qiyās is based upon uṣūl that are not the result of qiyās. “Thus there is no infinite regress. This argument is similar to the one used with respect to acts of knowledge and intellectual analogy (i.e., syllogism) which are based on acts of knowledge derived from the senses.” In commenting on Aristotle, Ammonius notes, “One cannot bring syllogisms about either the noēta or the objects of sense; instead they are about the things that are neither the one nor the other (ta mesa). For the theologian is not able to prove the noēta through syllogisms, but he uses analogy and this is reasonable. For syllogisms prove from the cause to the effects and from the more general to the more particular. But the noēta are more universal and prior to everything else….Similarly we do not prove by syllogism the objects of sense—e.g., that milk is white, since we know them per se. In Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum Librum I Commentarium, ed. M. Wallies (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1899) Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, vol. 4, pt. 6, p. 25, line 12 ff.
- 21.
Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.139a: 15–17.
- 22.
Aristotle APo. 99b35 ff. Cf. A. Long, “Aristotle and the History of Greek Scepticism,” Studies in Aristotle, ed. D. O’Meara (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1981): 79–106.
- 23.
E.g. al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, ed. McCarthy, p. 63, line 18.
- 24.
E.g., al-Kātib , al-Burhān, p. 225, line 16 ff.
- 25.
al-Maqdisī even titles this section “Discussion of the stages of speculation (marātib al-naẓar ) and its rules (ḥuḥudūdihī),” in al-Bad’ p. 50, line 11.
- 26.
Ibid., 50, line 13. This word is used in the Arabic translation of Aristotle to translate Greek duskolainein at Top. 160b3. In Badawi, Aristū, vol. 3, p.750, line 1.
- 27.
Cf. Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.143a: 3 ff., “He said the meaning and essence of questioning (al-su’āl) are asking for information (istikhbār) .” Ibn Fūrak notes that this definition only applies to “dialectical questioning” since “questioning” has a much broader meaning. (It could mean “to beg.”) Cf. Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, al-Furūq fī al-lugha, 2nd ed.(Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīda, 1977), p. 28, line -8 ff. al-Juwaynī , al-Kāfiya, p. 70, line l.
- 28.
Cf. Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.143a: 12–13: “the first question is about the opinion. It is asking ‘What do you say about that?’“
- 29.
Ibid., fol.143a: 12-3: an yuṭāliba bil-dalāla ʿalayhī .
- 30.
Ibid., fol.143a: -1: al-muṭālaba bi-wajh al-dalāla . Cf. Abu ʿAli ʿUmar al-Shakuni, ʿUyūn al-munāẓarāt, ed. S. Ghurab (Tunis: 1976), p. 25, #26.
- 31.
Al-Bāqillānī in his Tamhīd illustrates this question when he argues against certain Muslims who maintain that events are influenced by the heavens in that God made them signify [dalāla] what would come about in the world during their various conjunctions. “This is nonsense [khabaṭ wa-takhlīṭ]. For if the sign [dalīl] is connected with the signified [madlūl] then the manner that it is connected [wajh al-taʿalluq] must be well known, as for instance in the way that the art of writing is connected with the writer and that the person who produces a piece of writing be [at that time] knowledgeable. Or as novel events signify what is unprecedented… and miracles the veracity of their authors and all such things where the manner of the connection between sign and signified is known.” This is not the case in astrology. Ed. McCarthy, p. 57–58. Cf. p. 209–210 [hādhihi ḥīra wa-qillat dīn wa-īthār lil-takhlīṭ].
- 32.
The reference to the “manner of the connection” of the sign to the signified refers to this third “question” and is frequently found in reports of debate or even theological arguments of the kalam style. Thus the Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār argues that Scriptural injunctions [khiṭāb] signify that God is Omnipotent and All-Knowing, even though “the manner of its signifying [wajh dalālatihī] is based on God’s being …. Al-Mughnī, vol. XVII, p. 8.
- 33.
Ibid., fol.144a: 6 ff.: “ijrā’ al-ʿilla … taṣḥīḥuhā….”
- 34.
Or perhaps the last “chapter” or sort of question used in speculation.
- 35.
al-Maqdisī , al-Bad’, p. 50, line 11 ff.; trans. 46, line 9 ff.
- 36.
Ibid., 30, line 12 ff.; trans. 27, line 12 ff. Cf. Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.138b: 17 ff.: “He said that the meaning of dalīl and dāll was like that of ʿalīm and ʿālim in that the former derives from dalāla and just as ʿālim derives from ʿilm , so too does ʿalīm (derive from it). He said that dalāla is a sign (ʿalāma) whereby the signifier (al-dāll) indicates the significatum (madlūl ). This sign can be an indication (ishāra), effect (athar ), or a legal qualification that necessitates another (ḥukm muqtaḍā).”
- 37.
al-Maqdisī , al-Bad’, p. 31, line 14 ff.; trans. 28, line 18 ff. Cf. van Ess’s discussion of this passage in “Logical Structure,” p. 36.
- 38.
al-Maqdisī , al-Bad’, p. 35, line 11 ff.; trans. 32, line1 ff. al-Maqdisī’s reasoning here is reminiscent of Aristotle’s distinction between proof and cause in APo. 89 b21 ff.
- 39.
al-Maqdisī , al-Bad’, p. 34, line 1 ff., 36, lines 10–11. Cf. Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.139a: 5 ff. al-Ashʿarī calls this process istishhād . al-Fārābī discusses this procedure and identifies it with induction (istiqrā’) and applying the cause to the effect (ijrā’ ḥukm al-ʿilla fī al-maʿlūlāt a method used by “our contemporaries.” This method he says is of no use in establishing the judgment (ḥukm) although it is of use in destroying it. The method is not suited to jurisprudence since there such a strict procedure is deleterious. al-Fārābī, “Kitāb al- qiyās al-ṣaghīr,” ed. M. Türker, Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih Cografya Fakültesi Dergisi 16 (1958) pp. 269 ff.; cf. p.282, line 11 ff. and 286, line 7 ff. Aristotle APr. Book II.24.
- 40.
Al-Maqdisī , al-Bad’, p. 34, line 1 ff.; trans. 30, line 24 ff. Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.140a: 8 ff. al-Ashʿarī gives several examples of this, one of which is that it “… is when a thing that is known (fī al-shāhid) has some attribute (ṣifa ) due to some cause and that there exists no sign (dalīl ) that a “thing given this attribute” (mauṣūf) “in the unknown” has it for any other reason that this very cause; then, it must necessarily be judged that everything “in the unknown” that has this attribute has it on account of that cause.”
- 41.
Al-Maqdisī , al-Bad’ 28, lines 13–14; Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol. 139b: 10–16.
- 42.
Ibid., fol.151a: 18 ff. This passage is the only direct quotation from Ibn al-Rīwandī’s work. It is difficult to know exactly where this argument appeared in his work. It would seem possible that he had a chapter on arguing from the shāhid to the ghā’ib. One thing, however, is clear: the issues treated in the book were theological. Cf. ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī, Uṣūl al-Dīn (Istanbul: Maṭbaʿat al-Daula, 1928), p. 30, line 9 ff.; p. 36, line -1 ff. R. Frank, Beings and their Attributes (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1978), pp. 12–13.
- 43.
Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.140a: 7 (ṭard al-ʿilla fi al-maʿlūl) . Cf. above note 37.
- 44.
Al-Maqdisī , al-Bad’, p. 32, line 1 ff.
- 45.
Ibid., 29, line -1 ff.
- 46.
Van Ess, “Logical Structure,” pp. 37–9.
- 47.
Cf. M.F. Burnyeat, “The origins of non-deductive inference”, in Science and Speculation, ed. J. Barnes, J. Brunschwig, M. Burnyeat, M. Schofield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) p. 212–7 and note 58 referring to M. Frede, Die Stoische Logik (Gőttingen, 1974) note 49, pp. 81–2.
- 48.
ʿaqaduhū must be in the sense of iʿtaqadahū. Vajda translates “la faussete de sa construction,” in “Études,” p. 14, lines 7–8. But see Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol. 143 a: 15, “ka-naḥwi man ʿurifa min iʿtiqādihī wa-madhhabihī.”
- 49.
Al-Qirqisānī , al-Anwār, p. 471, line 6 ff. Vajda, “Études,” pp. 13–4. For the lst question, Vajda refers to Aristotle Topics 110a29 ff. and APr. 40b17,55. However, there may be a Stoic influence. Van Ess has pointed out the relation between Stoic reasoning from signs (“Logical Structure,” pp. 26–9, 33–4). Here we are reminded of the criterion of connectedness, sunartēsis, that stipulates that x cannot be a sign for y if y, the signified, exists without it. See Philodemus, On Signs, ed. P. and E. de Lacy (Naples, 1978) in Philodemus: On Methods of Inference, (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1978), Vol. I, 1–19, p. 156, and 210. The de Lacys also refer to Galen XVIII B 640, 643–5. Cf. al-Qirqisānī , al-Anwār, p. 358, line 10 ff. Doubt and Dogmatism, ed. M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat, and J. Barnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), index s.v. sunartēsis.
- 50.
On this division, see below on juristic dialectic.
- 51.
The Arabic word “dalīl” is notoriously difficult to translate, because it is used here as evidence, indication, sign or proof.
- 52.
The Arabic words literally mean branches or branch out of and therefore are translated as “ramification” rather than consequence(s).
- 53.
al-Qirqisānī , al-Anwār, p. 472, line 7 read: al-mushārika lahū fihā. Cf. al-Maqdisī, al-Bad’, p. 34, line 1. The reference is to analogical reasoning.
- 54.
al-Qirqisānī , al-Anwār, p. 472, line 8 read: taqaʿu bi-tilka mas’alatun lāzimatun.
- 55.
Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.145b: -1 ff.: “He may ask him to apply it. This can occur as a sort of trick or on account of Q’s inability to dispute P’s cause, or his ignorance, or because he treats him lightly, or in order to annex to his cause some opinion that does not hold, or in order to force R, in the process, to reject evidence of the senses or intellect.” The above point may have been part of Ibn al-Rīwandī’s treatment.
- 56.
al-Qirqisānī , al-Anwār, p. 471, line 16 ff. Vajda, “Études,” pp. 14–5.
- 57.
Cf. above note 50 and compare the language of his four questions with that of al-Ashʿarī in notes 28–31 above.
- 58.
Al-Kātib does not list the questions but he does mention them. Cf. al-Burhān, p. 225, line -2 (mā al-madhhab ); p. 227, line 8 ff. (ṭard al-ʿilla) ; p. 226, line 3 ff. (ṭalab al-ʿilla) .
- 59.
Ibid., p. 235, lines 5–8; al-Kātib criticizes Ibn al-Rīwandī for arguing both sides of the question. But this criticism may be directed against his books in which he put plausible arguments in the mouths of opponents of Islam (in order to refute them?). Cf. J. van Ess, “Ibn al-Rīwandī or the making of an image,” al-Abḥāth 27 (1978): 5 ff.
- 60.
al-Qirqisānī , al-Anwār, p. 472, line 13 ff. Vajda, “Études,” p. 16; at 16, line 7 read ḥajr for ḥasm. The distinction is also mentioned in Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol. 143b: 2ff. There it occurs after discussion of the “third question.” There is a curious parallel for this term in Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis Topicorum libros octo commentaria, ed. M. Wallies, “CAG” vol. 2, pt. 2 (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1891), p. 540, line 10: ou gar apokleiei (!) hē proeirēmenē erōtēsis tēn toiautēn apokrisin.
- 61.
Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, al-Manṭiq, p. 51, line 5 ff. Aristotle De Int. 20b26–7.
- 62.
See the references in H. Lausberg, Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik 2 vols. (Munich: M. Hueber, 1960), vol. 1, pp. 380–1.
- 63.
John of Damascus, Die Schriften des Joannes von Damaskus, ed. B. Kotter, 4 vols. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969-) vol. 1, pp. 134, lines 6–8; 172, lines 22–5 and Kotter’s references.
- 64.
An Anonymous Commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione ed. L. Taran (Meisenheim am Glan: A. Hain, 1978) p. 90, line 5 ff.
- 65.
Al-Fārābī, Sharḥ li-kitāb Arisṭū fī al-ʿibāra , ed. W. Kutsch and S. Marrow (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1960), p. 147, line 11. Cf. F. Zimmermann, al-Fārābī’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 142. Cf. above note 50.
- 66.
Of course, this only means that al-Fārābī probably follows Ammonius’s interpretaion.
- 67.
Ammonius, In Aristotelis De interpretatione commentarius, ed. A. Busse (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1897), in “CAG,” vol. 4, pt. 5, p. 203, line 12; cf. 199, line 19 ff. Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Topicorum commentaria, to Top. 101b23. In his commentary on the Topics al-Fārābī remarks, “Rhetorical and sophistical questions and objections are erroneously used in dialectic. Similarly, many people err in using epistemic questions in dialectical conversation although they are unaware of this….” al-Fārābī, fol.217a ff. MS.231 TE41, Bratislava, unpublished typescript of M. Galston. Aristotle, Ammonius, and al-Fārābī all speak of contradictory alterations. But the translator speaks of “two or more choices.” This mistake in translation left room for opponents of Aristotle’s logic to formulate their attack. The attack focuses upon the fourteenth chapter of Aristotle’s De Int. where Aristotle claims that the contradictory of any given statement is more contrary than the affirmation of the opposite of the original statement. That is to say the statement “John is just” is more contrary to the contradictory statement “John is not just” than it is to its proper contrary “John is unjust” where “unjust” is affirmatively predicated of John. This doctrine was subject to controversy among the philosophers; the theological attack has other grounds and far-reaching implications. On this attack, cf. Zimmermann, al-Fārābī, p. lxxxvi, cxxv. Van Ess, Frühe Muʿtazilitische Häresiographie, Zwei Werke des Nāshi’ al-Akbar (Beirut: F. Steiner, 1971), text 118, line 2 to 119, line 6. where at 118, line 12 read bi-ghairi juz’aihī. Cf. Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.143b: 9–11: Q can posit a restrictive question in which R cannot answer by affirming a “part” of what he mentioned in his question. This is as when Q asks about someone who is neither sitting nor standing, “Is he standing or sitting?” and the only answer would be to say “He is neither standing nor sitting….”
- 68.
Cf. the previous note and our chapter on philosophical dialectic below.
- 69.
Aristotle APo . 89b23 ff. Badawi , Arisṭū, vol. 2, p. 427 ff.
- 70.
Badawi , Arisṭu, p. 427, notes 1–3, 6. John Philoponus, In Aristotelis Analytica Posteriora commentaria, ed. M. Wallies, “CAG” vol. 13, pt. 3 (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1909), p. 336,line 4 ff. Themistius, Themistii quae fertur in Analyticorum priorum librum I paraphrasis, ed. M. Wallies, “CAG,” vol. 5, pt. 1 (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1900), p. 42, line 4 ff.
- 71.
Al-Kātib , al-Burhān, p. 225, line 15. Al-Māturīdī notes that disputation, munāẓara , concerns the essence (mā’īya ,hastīya) of a thing, in his Tauḥīd, p. 7, lines 7–8.
- 72.
For a detailed discussion see A. Altmann and S. Stern, Isaac Israeli , A Neoplatonic Philosopher of the Early Tenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 10 ff.
- 73.
Cf. Abū Ḥaiyān al-Tauḥīdī , al-Muqābasāt, ed. T. Ḥusain (Baghdad: Maṭbaʿat al-Irshād, 1970), pp. 203 ff.: I asked Abū Sulaymān (the logician), “What is the difference between the methods of the theologians and that of the philosophers?” He replied, “It is evident to every discriminating person of sound mind, understanding, and education that their method is based upon measuring one expression against another (i.e., qiyās ) through the testimony of their “intellect” or without it at all. They rely upon jadal and what first comes to the senses, or what observation judges, or whatever notions combined with fancy and imagination occur to them…. All this is connected with fallacious reasoning (mughālaṭa ) and repelling and silencing the opponent with whatever happens to be at hand….” Cf. 205, line 13 ff. al-Fārābī, Risāla fī al-ʿaql , ed. M. Bouyges (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1936), p. 11, line 16 ff. Cf. above to note 17.
- 74.
Al-Qirqisānī , al-Anwār, p. 487, line 12 ff. cf. 68, line 9 ff. Vajda, “Études,” p. 40.
- 75.
See preceding note. Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.149b: 11 ff. ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Naẓar wal-maʿārif, ed. I. Madkour, al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tauhīd wal-ʿadl, vol. 12 (Cairo: Wizārat al-Thaqāfa wal-Irshād al-ʿĀmma, 1964?), p. 202, line 21 ff. Cf. al-Maqdisī, al-Bad’, p. 52, lines 5–6. N. Rescher, Dialectics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), pp. 84 ff.
- 76.
Al-Qirqisānī , al-Anwār, p. 487, lines 15–17.
- 77.
Al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-Khaṭāba , ed. Langhade and Grignaschi (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1971), pp. 45 to 51, line 12.
- 78.
Ibid., p. 45, line 9.
- 79.
Ibid., p. 47, line 3.
- 80.
Al-Qirqisānī , p. 470, line 14 ff. Vajda, “Études,” p. 13.
- 81.
Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.146A: 6–7. Cf. al-Qirqisānī , al-Anwār, p. 475, line 7 ff. Vajda, “Études,” p. 20. al-Kātib , al-Burhān, p. 229, line 3. al-Maqdisī, al-Bad’, p. 32, lines 13–4. (These last two sources are also given by Vajda in note 2 above, p. 20. For another discussion of this phenomenon, see van Ess, “Disputationspraxis,” pp. 42–4.
- 82.
Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad”, fol.146a: 13–16. al-Qirqisānī , al-Anwār, p. 475, line 9 ff., where the example is made more Jewish—believing in Moses and Aaron.
- 83.
Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.146a: 16–18. This passage also clears up the meaning of al-Maqdisī, al-Bad’, p. 32, line −2 ff: The person who has been subjected to muʿāraḍa must either reply or admit his inconsistency (read munāqaḍatihī); should he abstain from replying to the muʿāraḍa then R could abstain from answering any question since Q seeks information (read (mustakhbir) and the person subjected to muʿāraḍa must give information (al-muʿāraḍ mukhbir). Goldziher suggested reading mustajīb, mujīb in “Bemerkungen zu Huart’s Ausgabe des K. al-bad’ wal-ta’rīch von al-Balchī,” Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 54 (1900): 400.
- 84.
Al-Maqdisī , al-Bad’, p. 32, lines 11–12 reading wa-maʿnā al-muʿāraḍ (wa) al-muqābala ʿalā al-siwā wal-mumāthala. If the “wa” is not dropped then the last word does not fit in. Further, in the beginning he seems to promise to define muʿāraḍa (p. 8, line -3 ff.). Cf. al-Qirqisānī , al-Anwār, p. 476, line 11: al-taswīya .
- 85.
Al-Maqdisī , al-Bad’, p. 33, line 3 ff.
- 86.
Ibid., p. 33, lines 2–5. Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.146b: 15. al-Qirqisānī , al-Anwār, p. 478, line 18 ff. al-Juwaynī , al-Kāfiya, p. 421, lines 1–3.
- 87.
Al-Qirqisānī , al-Anwār, p. 479, line 6 ff.
- 88.
Al-ʿAskarī, al-Furūq, p. 55, line 20 ff. MS.804 (Lugha), Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣrīya [=MS.1279(Lugha), Alexandria and MS.258 Taimūr, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣrīya all read iʿtilāl. At the bottom of the page one should add: “fa-qul innahā muḥdatha li-anna ḥadathahā mutaṣauwar fī al-ʿaql fa-lā yutaṣauwar fī al-ʿaql mā lā ḥaqīqa lahū.” For al-ʿAskarī, see Sezgin, GAS 8, pp. 183–5. The method of muʿāraḍa is similar to that of the methodos kata sugkrousin of classical rhetoric, which consisted in placing the various charges of the plaintiff alongside one another and showing their inconsistency. R. Volkmann, Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer 2nd ed. (Leipzig: B. Teubner, 1885), p. 244, line 6 ff. Van Ess compares it with the methodos kata peritropēn in his “Disputationspraxis,” pp. 53–54. See also van Ess, “Logical Structure,” p. 41.
- 89.
On these questions cf. above.
- 90.
On this type of reasoning, see van Ess, “Logical Structure,” pp. 40–1. al-Qirqisānī , al-Anwār, p. 485, lines 18–19; al-Maqdisī, al-Bad’, p. 51, line 3.
- 91.
Al-Qirqisānī , al-Anwār, p. 484, line 20; al-Maqdisī, al-Bad’, p. 51, line 5. Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.154a: 11.
- 92.
Al-Ashʿarī, R. fī istiḥsān al-khauḍ fī ʿilm al -kalām , ed. R. McCarthy, The Theology of al-Ashʿarī (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1953), p. 94, line 2 ff. For other versions of this story see the Qur’ān commentary of al-Ṭabarī to 21/101.
- 93.
Al-Qirqisānī , al-Anwār, p. 484, line 20 ff.: “jaḥd al-ḍarūrāt wa-dafʿ al-mushāhadāt wal-mukābara wal-buht .” al-Maqdisī, al-Bad’, p. 51, lines 12–3: “jaḥd al-ḍarūra wa-dafʿ al-mushāhada .</Emphasis>” al-Kātib , al-Burhān, p. 242, line 1: “al-mukābara wa-jaḥd al-ḍarūra (correction in Vajda, “Études,” p. 35).” Al-Bāqillānī refers to certain opponents who don’t employ peevishness in disputation [mimman la yaʿtamid al-buht fi al-munāẓara wal-mudāfaʿa ].
- 94.
In J. P. Migne, Patrologia Graeco-Latina (Paris: Garnier, 1857–66), vol. 97, p. 1556b5-7 cf. 1553a2-3. Cf. Philoponus, In APr., p. 2, line 27: “hai koinai ennoiai ex hōn ho sullogismos aei alētheis kai autopistoi.” The concept of koinai ennoiai is Stoic. Cf. M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa 2 vols. (G öttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1948–9) vol. 1, pp. 56, 427. On these as criteria of truth, cf. M. Schofield, “Preconception, Argument, and God,” Doubt and Dogmatism, pp. 294–5. On Theodore, see J. Wansbrough, The Sectarian Milieu (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 106–8. C. Becker, Islamstudien, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1924–32), vol. 1, p. 445.
- 95.
Aristotle Top. 161b3-4.
- 96.
Ibid., 161b9; 160b2 ff. The term mukābara is used in the old translation of Aristotle SE 174a22 to translate to parapan anaiskhuntein Badawi , Arisṭū, vol. 3, p. 921, line -3.
- 97.
Alexander of Aphrodisias, Topicorum commentaria, pp. 559, line 5; 557, line 31 ff.
- 98.
Tamhīd, p. 122 lines 1–14; iḍṭirār, literally, “necessary”, that which cannot be otherwise, anangkē (Arist. Metaph. 1015b6).
- 99.
Tamhīd, p. 43.
- 100.
ʿAbd al-Jabbār attributes this technique to one of the early Islamic theologians, Abū l-Hudhayl. ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Faḍl al-iʿtizāl, ed. F. Saiyid (Tunis: al-Dār al-Tūnisīya lil-Nashr, 1974), pp. 259, line 8 ff.; 254, line 4, 258, line 5 ff.
- 101.
Al-Maqdisī , al-Bad’, p. 53, line -3 ff. al-Kātib , al-Burhān, p. 241, lines 3–6. Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” 155a: 11–3.
- 102.
Aristotle, SE 172b19, 25–8; Top. 111b32 ff.
- 103.
Alexander of Aphrodisias, Topicorum commentaria, p. 168, lines 3–5.
- 104.
G. Bardy, “Les trophées de Damas,” p. 243, lines 12–5. In Syriac law, one cannot start a new trial before the old dispute has been settled. E. Sachau, Syrische Rechtsbücher. 3 vols. (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1907–14), vol. 3, p. 185.
- 105.
Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.154a: 3–7; al-Maqdisī, al-Bad’, p. 52, line 11 ff. Both authors use the example of a good horse.
- 106.
Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.154a: 9–11. There is partial parallel in Aristotle Top. 159a19-22. Aristotle says, “The business of the questioner is so to develop the argument as to make the answerer utter the most extravagant paradoxes that necessarily follow because of his position.” Topica, trans. W. Pickard-Cambridge, The Works of Aristotle, ed. W. Ross, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928).
- 107.
Al-Maqdisī , al-Bad’, p. 51, lines 14–17.
- 108.
Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.154a: 13–15.
- 109.
Ibid., fol.154a: 15. Cf. al-Baghdādī, al-Faqīh, vol. 2, p. 57, lines 1–6 where he mentions all of al-Ashʿarī’s signs in a slightly different order. At line 3, read an yuʿallila wa-lā yujrī (i.e., al-ʿilla fī maʿlūlātihā).
- 110.
Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.154a: 15–17. al-Qirqisānī , al-Anwār, p. 485, lines 14–18. al-Kātib , al-Burhān, p. 241, line -1. al-Maqdisī , al-Bad’, p. 51, line 12.
- 111.
Tamhīd, pp. 62–4.
- 112.
Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.154a: 18 entitles his chapter fī ādāb al-jadal . al-Qirqisānī treats these rules in two separate chapters, one on the adab al-jadal , and the other on duties that the disputant (mujādil) must obey.
- 113.
Ibid., fol.154a: 19–20.
- 114.
For a description of the practice see van Ess, “Disputationspraxis,” pp. 23 ff.
- 115.
Al-Kātib , al-Burhān, p. 232, lines 2–3.
- 116.
Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol. 154b: 5–7. al-Juwaynī ’s account in the Kāfiya shows many similarities in structure and language and is probably dependent upon it. Cf. al-Juwaynī , al-Kāfiya, pp. 529 ff.
- 117.
Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.154b: 9. Cf. al-Jāḥiz, Kitāb al-Bayān wal-Tabyīn, ed. ʿA. Hārūn, 4 vols. (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Khānjī, 1960–1), vol. 1, p.91, line 10 ff.
- 118.
Al-Kātib , al-Burhān, p. 240, line 7. Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.155a: 8–10. al-Qirqisānī , al-Anwar, p. 491, lines 2–8.
- 119.
Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.154b: 10–1. al-Qirqisānī , al-Anwār, p. 489, line 9
- 120.
Al-Qirqisānī , al-Anwār, p. 493, lines 9–15.
- 121.
Aristotle Topics , 155b7 ff.
- 122.
I.e. endoxa . Ibid., 159a20-24; cf. 101b5-10. Badawi , Arisṭū, vol. 3, p. 743, line 8 ff.; cf. vol. 2, p. 493, line 3 ff.
- 123.
Al-Qirqisānī , al-Anwār, p. 490, lines 7–10. Cf. al-Kātib , al-Burhān, 240, line 11.
- 124.
Al-Qirqisānī , al-Anwār, p. 492, line 15 ff. Ibn Fūrak, “Mujarrad,” fol.154b: 12–14.
- 125.
Al-Kātib , al-Burhān, p. 236, line 15 ff.
- 126.
Summarized by van Ess, “Disputationspraxis,” pp. 52–3.
- 127.
Cf. J. van Ess, Die Gedankenwelt des Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (Bonn: Selbstverlag des Orientalischen Seminars der Universität Bonn, 1961), index s.v. jadal , jidāl . al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī, al-Masā’il fī aʿmāl al-qulūb wal-jawāriḥ wal-makāsib, ed. A. ʿAtā (Cairo: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1969), pp. 140 ff.
- 128.
Quintilian, Inst. Or. , VI.iv.1 ff.
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Miller, L.B. (2020). Theological Dialectic (Jadal). In: Islamic Disputation Theory. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 21. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45012-0_2
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