Abstract
The authors contend that what can legitimately be owned in a free society is only rights to physical property, not to the value thereof. You are thus free to undermine the value of our property by underselling us, by inventing a new substitute for our property, and so on. But you cannot legitimately physically aggress against our property, even if its value remains constant despite your efforts.
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Notes
- 1.
See, for instance, Armen Alchian, Economic Forces at Work, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1977, pp. 131–132; notes Alchian: “although private property rights protect private property from physical changes chosen by other people, no immunity is implied for the exchange value of one’s property … Private property, as I understand it, does not imply that a person may use his property in any way he sees fit so long as no one else is ‘hurt.’ Instead, it seems to mean the right to use goods (or to transfer that right) in any way the owner wishes to long as the physical attributes or uses of all other people’s private property is unaffected. And that leaves plenty of room for disturbance and alienation of affections of other people.”
- 2.
The idea of property-in-values underlies, for instance, John Rawls’ “difference principle,” that is, the rule that all inequalities among people have to be expected to be to everyone’s advantage—regardless of how they have come about (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 60, pp. 75f, p. 83); and also Robert Nozick’s claim that a “dominant protection agency” has the right to outlaw competitors regardless of their actual behavior, and his related claim that “non-productive exchanges,” in which one party would be better off if the other did not exist, may be outlawed—again regardless of whether or not such an exchange involved any physical invasion (Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974, pp. 55f, pp. 83–86).
- 3.
On the concept of “praxeology,” and the systematic reconstruction of economic theory as a “logic of action,” see Ludwig von Mises, Human Action. A Treatise on Economics, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949 (3rd ed. Chicago: Regnery, 1966); idem, Theory and History: An Interpretation of Social and Economic Evolution, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957 (reprint: Auburn University, Alabama: The Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1985).
- 4.
See also Hans-Hermann Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989, ch. 7; idem, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993, part II; idem, ‘Man, Economy, and Liberty,’ Review of Austrian Economics, Vol. 4, 1990, esp. pp. 260–263. Hoppe, Hans-Hermann, Democracy – The God that Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy, and Natural Order, Rutgers University, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2001.
- 5.
A reduces his own wealth, too, apart from the psychic income gains that accrue to him, which is the reason he indulges his preferences in this manner.
- 6.
Gary Becker, Human Capital, New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1964.
- 7.
See Walter Block, ‘The Economics of Discrimination,’ The Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 11, 1992, pp. 241–254.
- 8.
One must also distinguish between discrimination on the part of a private property owner and that engaged in by the State. In the former case, as we have seen, the law of private property assures that value losses may be recovered by the “victim.” But this does not apply when government engages in discriminatory behavior. If the civil service shuns ugly secretaries, their wages will fall as a result. But this will not make them more attractive to the bureaucracy, since their access to coercive levies from the citizenry (e.g., taxes) shield them from any concern for profit. To the extent that the government engages in discrimination, then, the victims are in a far worse position than when this occurs in the private sector.
- 9.
See Murray N. Rothbard, Power and Market: Government and the Economy, Menlo Park, Cal.: Institute for Humane Studies, 1970; idem, For a New Liberty, Macmillan: New York, 1973; idem, The Ethics of Liberty, Humanities Press: Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1982; see also Walter Block, Defending the Undefendable, New York: Fleet Press, 1976.
- 10.
See Thomas Sowell, Race and Economics, New York: Morrow, 1983. See also Walter Block, ‘Economic Intervention, Discrimination, and Unforeseen Consequences,’ in: Walter Block/Michael Walker, eds., Discrimination, Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunity, Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1982, pp. 101–125; idem, Focus on Employment Equity: A Critique of the Abella Royal Commission on Equality in Employment (with Michael Walker), Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1985; Michael Levin, Feminism and Freedom, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1987. Epstein, Richard A., Forbidden Grounds: The Case against Employment Discrimination Laws, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.
- 11.
That wages tend to equal productivity levels is one of the best established propositions in all of economics. This result can be illustrated in our example. If the man’s productivity is $20 and his wage is higher than that, say, $25, the firm employing him will lose $5/hour. If they persist in this behavior, and especially if they apply it to other workers as well, they will go bankrupt. On the other hand, if the wage is below this level, say at $12, then a profit opportunity of $8 exists. Any competitor would be glad to woo these workers away from his present employer for, say, $12.25. But if one company offers that amount, another will up the ante to $12.50. Where will this bidding process end? As close to the productivity level of $20 as search and transportation costs will allow.
- 12.
See Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962, ch. 9; Ronald Hamowy, Canadian Medicine: A Study in Restricted Entry, Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1984. Henderson, David R., The Joy of Freedom: An Economist’s Odyssey, Financial Times, Prentice Hall, 2001, ch. 15.
- 13.
A similar situation took place with regard to Cuban doctors who fled Castro. The AMA placed obstacles in their way of attempting to practice medicine in the United States as well.
- 14.
See William Tucker, The Excluded Americans: Homelessness and Housing Policy, Chicago: Regnery-Gateway, 1990.
- 15.
See Bernard Siegan, Land Use without Zoning, New York: Lexington, 1972.
- 16.
See Anderson, William, Walter Block, Thomas J. DiLorenzo, Ilana Mercer, Leon Snyman and Christopher Westley, ‘The Microsoft Corporation in Collision with Antitrust Law,’ The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, Winter 2001, pp. 287–302.
- 17.
See Henry A. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, New York: Free Press, 1966; idem, ‘In Defense of Insider Trading,’ Harvard Business Review, 113, Nov./Dec. 1966. See also Walter Block and Robert McGee, ‘Information, Privilege, Opportunity and Insider Trading,’ Northern Illinois Law Review, December 1989, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 1–35.
- 18.
Another ‘market failure’ beloved by interventionists is ‘lack of perfect information.’ Let’s see if we have this straight. Too little information is no good, because it violates the requirement of perfect information. Too much information is problematic, because it is incompatible with the strictures against insider trading. How about ‘the same amount of information as everyone else?’ Aha. A lacunae in the theory. So far, to the best of knowledge of the present authors, this state of affairs has not been subjected to legal prohibition. But who knows? A theoretical breakthrough may be lurking in these intellectual thickets.
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Block, W.E. (2019). Property and Exploitation. In: Property Rights. Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28353-7_1
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