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CTBT Negotiations and the Split-the-Difference Principle

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Focal Points in Negotiation

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Abstract

This chapter discusses the negotiations that led to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The treaty includes provisions on potential testsite inspections. The authors show that focality and salience played a role at multiple levels in the negotiations concerning inspections. Many of the positions initially put forth by parties to the negotiations were salient. Moreover, as negotiations progressed, two of these acquired particular prominence: a simple majority (50%) and two-thirds majority. In the end, the number agreed upon was the middle between these two solutions, a principle that in itself can be seen as a focal point solution that respects the moral plausibility of the outcome.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    On the CTBT, see Hansen (2006), Johnson (2004), Melamud et al. (2014), McKinzie (1997). Hopmann (2014) offers a good summary of the aims of the treaty.

  2. 2.

    Salience is used here to denote the known conspicuity of an outcome or proposal, focality stands for a unique conspicuity that is common knowledge.

  3. 3.

    For the history of the nuclear non-proliferation movement in relation to CTBT, see Hansen (2006: Chap. 1), Corden (2014).

  4. 4.

    Hansen (2006: 13).

  5. 5.

    Whether the nuclear non-proliferation regime should be considered a success story is open for debate, depending on whether one chooses to highlight the many countries that currently use atomic energy without developing nuclear weapons, or to emphasize the fact that there is a small number of countries that nonetheless acquired nuclear weapons in spite of it.

  6. 6.

    Hansen (2006: 85).

  7. 7.

    On Russia’s changing rationales for concluding the CTBT, see Fenenko (2014).

  8. 8.

    On OSI, see (Hansen 2006: 34), Melamud (2013), and Melamud et al. (2014), part II.

  9. 9.

    On the Western ‘red light’ position, see Hansen (2006: 41).

  10. 10.

    On verification of tests by member states, see Hansen (2006: 36).

  11. 11.

    Hansen (2006: 41).

  12. 12.

    See Hansen (2006: 93) and Ramaker (2014).

  13. 13.

    Hansen (2006: 93).

  14. 14.

    See Hansen (2006: 41) and Zartman and Lendorfer (2014).

  15. 15.

    Hansen (2006: 40) and Ramaker (2014).

  16. 16.

    On China’s role in the CTBT and OSI negotiations, see Hansen (2006: 38) and Zartman and Lendorfer (2014: 128).

  17. 17.

    Iran had an issue with Israel’s affiliation with the Middle East group, a problem that was independent of the OSI agreement; see Hansen (2006: 42) and Zartman and Lendorfer (2014: 130) for further details.

  18. 18.

    For the UN stage of the negotiations, see Hansen (2006: 44) and Ramaker (2014). India’s attempts to block the CTBT in the UN and its final rejection of the treaty are analyzed by Möller (2014).

  19. 19.

    See Corden (1997) and McIntosh (2014).

  20. 20.

    For a more general analysis of strategic aspects of CTBT and OSI, see Hopmann (2014) and Zartman and Lendorfer (2014), and the conclusion by Melamud, Meerts and Zartman in Melamud et al. (2014).

  21. 21.

    On the potential ambiguity of seismic signals, see Hopmann (2014: 55).

  22. 22.

    The CTBT text prohibits “nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion” (Hansen 2006: 26). However, it remains vague what that exactly means. Is an explosion that involves (fissile) nuclear material, but is not caused by a nuclear chain reaction, contained in the category ‘any other nuclear explosion’?

  23. 23.

    For those who believe that in such a case clearly no OSI is called for, assume that Iran conducted the test. And if an OSI would be called for in the case of Iran, why not for the US or others? Are CTBT member states not juridical equals?

  24. 24.

    For US qualms about restrictions for the modernization of their nuclear arsenal, see Ferderber (1997) and McIntosh (2014: 155).

  25. 25.

    See McIntosh (2014).

  26. 26.

    See Black (1958) and Pattanaik (1971).

  27. 27.

    See the chapter by Sinisa Vuković on Montenegrin independence negotiations in this volume.

  28. 28.

    See Chapter 2 in this book.

  29. 29.

    See Farber (1981), Flood (1958), and Zartman and Berman (1982: 103).

  30. 30.

    See Kreps (1990: 131).

  31. 31.

    See Binmore (2007: 473, 482).

  32. 32.

    Young (2006).

  33. 33.

    Gaus (2011) argues that ethical meta-solutions should be taken seriously, and so do I with respect to negotiations in Schuessler (2018).

  34. 34.

    On tenacious moral disagreement and how to live with it, see, e.g., Feldman and Warfield (2010) and McMahon (2009).

  35. 35.

    This has also given rise to the idea of meta-bargaining, i.e. formal bargaining concerning the choice of a specific bargaining solution, see Naeve-Steinweg (1997) and Van Damme (1986).

  36. 36.

    See Thompson (2001: 52).

  37. 37.

    See Hansen (2006: 39).

  38. 38.

    See Möller (2014).

  39. 39.

    However, it should also be noted that one of the crucial reasons for the compromise no longer applied when these stakeholders had to decide whether to ratify the treaty or not: at that time, the prospect of tying India to the outcome was no longer present.

  40. 40.

    For the terminological distinction between salience and focality in the present context, see Chapter 2.

  41. 41.

    See the Chapter by Brown and Zartman in this book.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Freelance Researcher, CTBTO - Retired, Levahim, Israel

    Mordechai Melamud

  2. Department of Philosophy, University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth, Germany

    Rudolf Schuessler

Authors
  1. Mordechai Melamud
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  2. Rudolf Schuessler
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth, Bavaria, Germany

    Rudolf Schuessler

  2. Department of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden

    Jan-Willem van der Rijt

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Melamud, M., Schuessler, R. (2019). CTBT Negotiations and the Split-the-Difference Principle. In: Schuessler, R., van der Rijt, JW. (eds) Focal Points in Negotiation. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27901-1_6

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