Abstract
Although few people are well informed about the progress of fusion, many are aware of ITER’s delays. Commissioning of the tokamak was first scheduled for 2016. The ITER Council postponed that date to November 2019 and in 2015 the date of First Plasma was rescheduled for December 2025 with D–T operations by the end of 2035. Similarly, the ITER budget is quadruple its original size (according to the latest estimates the construction alone will cost more than EUR20 billion, although as we will see the concept of “cost” here is meaningless). In fact, ITER is exposed to every possible potential cause of delay you could imagine such as technological showstoppers, design changes of the machine and buildings, late signature of contracts, manufacturing difficulties, late deliveries, quality problems, detection of nonconformities, underestimated risks, and contingencies. You could argue that most of the big technological projects of recent years have accumulated operational delays and budget increases. However, such an attitude is not acceptable when dealing with public money. A better approach would be to address program-specific management issues and risks at all stages of production. These are two areas that the ITER Organization failed to address until one or two years ago. Everybody is ready to accept that the unprecedented complexity of ITER and its first-of-a-kind nature may cause delays in manufacturing and construction—let alone the financial and political context. However, with more than 100 tokamaks operating in the world it can hardly be said that ITER is “first-of-a-kind.” So, does the problem lie in its management?
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
This was particularly true of France’s European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) nuclear plant. Originally scheduled for 2012 commissioning of the EPR was postponed to the end of 2019. Initially estimated at EUR3.4 billion the cost of the reactor has almost tripled after being readjusted in 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2018 to be (currently) EUR10.9 billion.
- 2.
Most of these emails and letters are available on ASN’s website at https://www.asn.fr/L-ASN/ASN-en-region/Division-de-Marseille/Activites-de-recherche/Site-de-Cadarache/Iter/(rub)/106342.
- 3.
1 IUA is defined as the equivalent purchasing power of USD1000 as of January 1989.
- 4.
Since Europe contributes 45.6% of the cost of construction simple cross-multiplication allows us to find the total cost: 100 * 6.6/45.6 = EUR14.5 billion. However, this calculation would only be relevant if ITER was built entirely in Europe, which is obviously not the case. As the ITER Organization explains on its website: “Because multiple members are collaborating to build ITER, each with responsibility for the procurement of in-kind hardware in its own territory with its own currency, a direct conversion of the value estimate for ITER construction into a single currency is not relevant,” https://www.iter.org/faq#collapsible_5.
- 5.
Using the previous formula: 100 * 13.6/45.6 = 29.8.
- 6.
1 kIUA = 1000 IUA. Today (2019) the conversion factor of the ITER Unit Account is 1 IUA = EUR1749.84 (as set by the ITER Organization). The conversion factor is updated every year and takes into account changes in the cost of living in the seven member countries.
- 7.
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council [2].
- 8.
However, according to IEA data the construction cost of ITER represents up to twice the world’s current annual public spending on energy research estimated at USD21.6 billion in 2017, https://www.iea.org/tracking/tcep2018/innovation/tracking-rdd/.
References
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council (2017) EU contribution to a reformed ITER project COM (2017) 319 final. European Commission, Brussels. https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/eu_contribution_to_a_reformed_iter_project_en.pdf
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council (2010) ITER status and possible way forward COM (2010) 226 final, European Commission, Brussels. https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/ba4e3187-f032-4443-8e4a-2eef5e7c5812/language-en
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Claessens, M. (2020). Why So Many Delays and Cost Overruns?. In: ITER: The Giant Fusion Reactor. Copernicus, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27581-5_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27581-5_8
Published:
Publisher Name: Copernicus, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-27580-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-27581-5
eBook Packages: EnergyEnergy (R0)