Abstract
In this chapter, I elaborate on Patočka’s concept of the care of the soul. Starting from Patočka’s affirmative presentation of Aristotle’s criticism of Plato, I question the Platonic idea of caring of the soul and develop an alternative notion, putting emphasis on action in the world. Connecting the concept of the soul with that of the movement of existence, I demonstrate the impossibility of identifying the care of the soul/existence with the third movement, whether exemplified by philosophical theory or political action. I elucidate how, or in what sense, the three movements of existence can be interpreted as three souls. Finally, putting emphasis on Patočka’s rather implicit reinterpretation of the self (auto) in the very definition of the soul as self-movement (autokineton), and following both Aristotle’s and Arendt’s emphasis on action, I outline such a concept of the care of the soul where the soul is identifiable, paradoxically, with the very caring.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
This chapter is a reworked version of the paper “Patočka’s Care of the Soul Reconsidered: Performing the Soul through Movement,” Human Studies, 40(2), 2017, 233–247.
- 2.
Cf. Karfík (1993).
- 3.
Of course, Patočka tackles this question in many of his studies, perhaps most famously in “Negative Platonism” from the 1950s (see Chap. 6).
- 4.
- 5.
Accordingly, Foucault does not “return” to the subject: he is writing “a history of reflexive practices, rather than practices which target a substantial entity called ‘the self’” (cf. O’Leary 2002: 120).
- 6.
See, for example, Cajthaml (2014).
- 7.
For a more detailed analysis of Patočka’s approach to Plato, see Karfík (2008: 101–129).
- 8.
In this sense, the movement of the soul is the movement of concentration. The concentricity of this movement is also visible in Patočka’s emphasis on Plato’s discovery of the soul’s inwardness: in Plato, “the being of the soul for itself and in itself became explicit for the first time … The soul has its own real, essential life as an inner life. The soul received its inwardness, the human being itself became inward” (Patočka 1988a: 266; my translation).
- 9.
Let me emphasize that Patočka usually presents Plato’s ideas as providing the concept of the care of the soul.
- 10.
Recently, Ivan Blecha (2015) emphasized the importance of Aristotle regarding Patočka’s concept of the care of the soul.
- 11.
Of course, Patočka emphasizes, following Plato, that a philosopher must return to this world, i.e. perform the vertical movement also the other way round. In Aristotle’s concept, however, there is no place transcending this world the philosopher can return from.
- 12.
I cannot discuss here the question whether there are three different souls in the human being, or whether these souls are only (inseparable) parts of one soul.
- 13.
- 14.
And also by history, which is to be addressed in the next chapter.
- 15.
Arendt’s notion of freedom, presupposed by this concept of action, has theological connotations: “With the creation of man, the principle of beginning came into the world itself, which, of course, is only another way of saying that the principle of freedom was created when man was created but not before” (Arendt 1958: 177).
- 16.
It is also worth mentioning that, as Dana R. Villa puts it, “[f]rom Arendt’s point of view, the self that precedes action, the biological or psychological self, is an essentially dispersed, fragmented, and plural self; it is a self whose lack of appearance deprives it of both unity and reality” (Villa 1995: 90).
- 17.
This problem will also be examined in more detail in the next chapter.
- 18.
Patočka’s concept does not pre-empt the incorporation, in analysing each of the movements, of non-phenomenological approaches to the human being. Psychoanalytic and Marxist approaches especially can be inspiring regarding the first and second movements respectively. In the case of the third movement, one might consult, besides others, other interpretations of Patočka’s favoured myth of the God-man, Deus homo. This would be interesting also regarding Patočka’s late emphasis on sacrifice.
- 19.
As Patočka puts it, “that Being not only is but also appears, that is the soul” (Patočka 1988a: 282).
- 20.
Recently, Michael Staudigl (2015) offered an inspiring and thoughtful re-reading of Patočka’s concept of the movement of existence seeking to outline a phenomenological anthropology that articulates selfhood in a non-foundational way.
References
Arendt, Hannah. 1958. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1961. Between Past and Future. New York: Penguin Books.
Blecha, Ivan (2015). Patočkova péče o duši mezi Sókratem, Platónem a Aristotelem. Filozofia, 70/6, 409–419. Bratislava.
Burnyeat, Myles Fredric. 2006. The Truth of Tripartition. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1): 1–22.
Cajthaml, Martin. 2014. Europe and the Care of the Soul. Jan Patočka’s Conception of the Spiritual Foundations of Europe. Nordhausen: Traugott Bautz.
Cooper, John Madison. 1985. Plato’s Theory of Human Motivation. History of Philosophy Quarterly 22: 3–21.
Ferrari, G.R.F. 2007. The Three-Part Soul. In The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, ed. G.R.F. Ferrari, 165–201. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Findlay, Edward F. 2002. Caring for the Soul in a Postmodern Age. Politics and Phenomenology in the Thought of Jan Patočka. New York: SUNY Press.
Forti, Simona. 2015. The New Demons. Rethinking Power and Evil Today. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Foucault, Michel. 2009. Le Courage de la vérité. Le Gouvernement de soi et des autres II. Cours au Collège de France. 1984, ed. F. Gros. Gallimard/Seuil: Paris.
Heidegger, Martin. 1996. Being and Time. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: State University of New York Press.
Karfík, Filip. 1993. Jan Patočkas Deutung der Platonischen Bestimmung der Seele als Selbstbewegung. Listy filologické, 128–168. Praha.
———. 2005. What the mortal parts of the soul really are. Rhizai. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 2: 197–217.
———. 2008. Unendlichwerden durch die Endlichkeit. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
O’Leary, Timothy. 2002. Foucault and the Art of Ethics. New York: Continuum.
Patočka, Jan. 1988a. Europa und Nach-Europa. In Ketzerische Essais zur Philosophie der Geschichte und ergänzende Schriften, ed. K. Nellen and J. Němec. Vienna: Klett-Cotta.
Patočka, J. 1988b. Die Epochen der Geschichte (Skizze). In Ketzerische Essais zur Philosophie der Geschichte und ergänzende Schriften, ed. K. Nellen and J. Němec. Vienna: Klett-Cotta.
Patočka, Jan. 1991. Was ist Phänomenologie. In Die Bewegung der menschlichen Existenz, 424–452. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
———. 1996. Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History, ed. James Dodd. Trans. Erazim Kohák. Chicago and La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.
———. 1998. Body, Community, Language, World. Chicago: Open Court.
———. 1999a. Původ a smysl myšlenky nesmrtelnosti u Platóna. In Péče o duši II, ed. Ivan Chvatík and Pavel Kouba. Praha: Oikúmené.
———. 1999b. O duši u Platóna. In Péče o duši II, ed. Ivan Chvatík and Pavel Kouba. Praha: Oikúmené.
———. 2002. Nejstarší systematika nauky o duši. In Péče o duši III, ed. Ivan Chvatík and Pavel Kouba. Praha: Oikúmené.
———. 2009. Úvod do Husserlovy fenomenologie. In Fenomenologické spisy II, ed. Pavel Kouba and Ondřej Švec, 7–171. Praha: Oikúmené.
———. 2015. On the Prehistory of the Science of Movement. World, Earth, Heaven and the Movement of Human Life. In Dis-Orientations. Philosophy, Literature and the Lost Ground of Modernity, ed. Marcia Sa Cavalcante Schuback and Tora Lane, 65–73. London: Rowman and Littlefield.
———. 2016. The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem. In The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem. Trans. Erica Abrams, 1–114. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Staudigl, Michael. 2015. Human Existence and Vertical Life. A Study of Jan Patočka’s Phenomenological Anthropology. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy XIV: 312–329.
Szakolczai, Arpád. 1994. Thinking Beyond the East West Divide: Foucault, Patočka, and the Care of Self. Social Research 61 (2): 297–323.
Villa, Danna R. 1995. Arendt and Heidegger. The Fate of the Political. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Ritter, M. (2019). Performing the Soul Through Movement. In: Into the World: The Movement of Patočka's Phenomenology. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 104. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23657-1_11
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23657-1_11
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-23656-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-23657-1
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)