Abstract
This chapter focuses on Fukuzawa’s masterpiece, An Outline of a Theory of Civilization. Keeping a more academic audience in mind, Fukuzawa tried in this work to theorize his understanding of “progress” and the difference between “barbarism” and “civilization.” In addition to introducing the idea of progress, which did not yet exist in East Asia, Fukuzawa identified ideal progress with his liberal vision of the completion of individual autonomy. The work left an enduring impact on early Meiji politics by attacking the prevailing belief in retaining the “Japanese spirit” while selectively accepting the technological novelties of Western civilization, represented by the slogan “Japanese spirit, Western practice.” Fukuzawa, instead, suggested that Japan should accept liberalism as the foundation of modernization and retain the practical side of the Japanese tradition.
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Notes
- 1.
Fukuzawa Yukichi, Fukuzawa Yukichi Zenshū [Complete collection of Fukuzawa Yukichi] vol. 1 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1969), 60.
- 2.
Fukuzawa also said that he used a larger font in its publication in order to help old Confucians easily recognize the writing. See ibid.
- 3.
Ibid. As a leader of Satsuma domain, Saigō was one of the most important and respected figures in the Meiji Restoration. After resigning from the Meiji government, Saigō became a symbol of reactionary resistance against the “tyrants” in the Meiji government, which pushed a rapid Westernization in all social realms. Although Saigō was a reactionary figure who loved the traditional samurai spirit, Fukuzawa respected his patriotism, while criticizing his misguided means to the patriotic ends. See Zenshū, vol. 20, 168–174.
- 4.
See chapter 8, “Pathways to Freedom: Rights, Reciprocity, and the Cosmopolitan Sensibility” in Stephen Eric Bronner, Reclaiming the Enlightenment (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).
- 5.
Maruyama Masao, Bunmeiron no gairyaku wo yomu [Reading An Outline of a Theory of Civilization] vol. 1 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1986), 98. Emphasis by Maruyama. All quotations of non-English sources without the translator’s name are my translations.
- 6.
Stephen Eric Bronner 2004, 18.
- 7.
Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. Fritz C.A. Koelln and James P. Pettigrove (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951), 5. Quoted in Stephen Eric Bronner 2004, 18.
- 8.
In East Asian languages, “Yao-Shun era” is still an idiomatic expression for the “good old past” in prosperity and peace. Legend says that people of the Shang dynasty under Yao and Shun did not even remember their rulers’ names, because it was so peaceful and perfect that no one had to think about politics.
- 9.
Yukichi Fukuzawa, An Outline of a Theory of Civilization, trans. by David A. Dilworth & G. Cameron Hurst III, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 143–144.
- 10.
Ernst Bloch, “Nonsynchronism and the Obligation to Its Dialectics,” New German Critique, 11 (1977): 22–38.
- 11.
Fukuzawa, Civilization, 17–18.
- 12.
Ebina Danjō, one of the most influential Christian preachers in Meiji Japan, openly said, “The core idea of Christianity is pure fraternity, and the core idea of our nation’s foundation is loyalty to the king and patriotism. They are one and the same.” Ebina Tanjō, “Chūkun aikoku to hakuai” [Patriotic Loyalty to the King and Fraternity], Rikugō Zasshi, 161 (1894) 12, quoted in Han Sang-il, Jaeguk ui siseon: Ilbon ui jayujuyi jishikin Yoshino Sakuzo wa Choseon munjae [Perspective of the Empire: Yoshino Sakuzo, A Japanese Liberal and the Korean Question] (Seoul: Saemulgyeol Chulpansa), 78. Regarding the influence of Christianity in Meiji Japan, see Irwin Scheiner, Christian Converts and Social Protest in Meiji Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).
- 13.
In philosophical terms, Ogyū Sorai, one of the most brilliant Confucian scholars in the seventeenth century, indeed challenged the traditional notion of the harmonious “nature” ideologized by Zhu Xi in twentieth-century China. Even Ogyū, however, never doubted the legitimacy of the feudal order under the Zhou dynasty, or, naturally, the Tokugawa shogunate. See Maruyama 1974.
- 14.
Fukuzawa, Civilization, 17–18. See the quote above.
- 15.
Immanuel Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” in Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History, trans. David L. Colclasure, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006) 17.
- 16.
Fukuzawa, Civilization, 27.
- 17.
Ibid., 26–27.
- 18.
Maruyama Masao also agrees with the view that Fukuzawa was the first to interpret the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods in a positive way. See Maruyama, Bunmeiron no gairyaku wo yomu, vol. 1, 140–141.
- 19.
There is a grain of truth in this claim. The failure of the Qin Empire was generally explained by its exclusive reliance on severe laws uncoupled with the efforts to implement an ideological foundation. Carl Schmitt made a similar claim in his critique of Hobbes’s reliance on positive laws. See Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol, trans. George Schwab (London: Greenwood Press, 1996).
- 20.
Fukuzawa, Civilization, 27–28. Emphasis added.
- 21.
Laozi’s Tao Te Ching (daodejing in modern pinyin) is included in David Boaz’s The Libertarian Reader (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997).
- 22.
- 23.
Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).
- 24.
This sentence is my translation of the italicized sentence in the following quotation. I retranslated it to convey a more literal nuance.
- 25.
Fukuzawa, Civilization, 176, emphasis added.
- 26.
Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, trans. by Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1971), 80.
- 27.
See Immanuel Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” 17.
- 28.
Fukuzawa, Civilization, 18–19. My translation added in brackets.
- 29.
See Stephen Eric Bronner, “A Teacher and a Friend: Henry Pachter,” in Imagining the Possible: Radical Politics for Conservative Times (New York: Routledge, 2002).
- 30.
Fukuzawa, Civilization, 19–20.
- 31.
Roland Quinault, “Gladstone and War,” in William Gladstone: New Studies and Perspectives, ed. Roland Quinault, Roger Swift, and Ruth Clayton Windscheffel (London: Routledge, 2012), 237–238.
- 32.
Fukuzawa, The Autobiography of Yukichi Fukuzawa, trans. Eiichi Kiyooka (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007) 129–130.
- 33.
Fukuzawa, Civilization, 242.
- 34.
This is certainly an unfair statement. The real base of the People’s Rights Movement was much broader than the privileged samurai class, as Fukuzawa himself was aware. It seems that Fukuzawa’s criticism was mostly directed to the later leaders of the Liberal Party, the most influential and privileged members of the People’s Rights Movement. For a more balanced understanding of the People’s Rights Movements, see Irokawa Daikichi, The Culture of the Meiji Period, trans. by Marius B. Jansen (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 151–195.
- 35.
Ibid., 254–255.
- 36.
See ibid., 248.
- 37.
Li Zehou, a renowned Chinese thinker, should be credited for the earliest use of a similar slogan, “Western essence, Chinese practice.” See Li Zehou, Zhongguo xiandai sixiangshi lun (History of Modern Chinese Thoughts) (Beijing: Xinhua Shudian, 1987), 311–342.
- 38.
Donald Keene, Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 193.
- 39.
Originally, the slogan “Japanese sprit, Western practice” was a modification of “Japanese sprit, Chinese practice” (wakon kansai). The “Japanese spirit” (yamato damshii) was often identified with nationalist sentiment, especially after the establishment of “national studies” (kokugaku) in the eighteenth century. See Victor Koschmann, The Mito Ideology, Discourse, Reform, and Insurrection in Late Tokugawa Japan, 1790–1864 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
- 40.
Li Zehou, Zhongguo jindai sixiang shilun [The History of Early Modern Chinese Thoughts] (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1979) 80–81.
- 41.
Fukuzawa, Civilization, 20–22.
- 42.
Ibid., 28.
- 43.
See Li Zehou, Zhongguo xiandai sixiangshi lun, 311–342.
- 44.
Another attempt to justify scientific rationality against postmodern attacks can be found in Meera Nanda, Prophets Facing Backward: Postmodern Critiques of Science and Hindu Nationalism in India (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003).
- 45.
See Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, trans. by Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). Also see Habermas, “Chapter IV. From Lukacs to Adorno: Rationalization as Reification,” in The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, trans. by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), 366–399.
- 46.
Meera Nanda pointed out the universal resistance to utilitarian, instrumental rationality in the cultural realm and its disastrous effect on the intellectual community of India. “To some extent, this disjunction between technological modernization and cultural conservatism is a normal part of modernization. … Industrialization of the techno-economic sphere does carry over a more functional, instrumental rationality into other spheres of social life. But the cultural realm is not moved solely by the drive for utility, or for class interests, for that matter. On the contrary, its affective and existential dimensions actively resist the utilitarian drive.” Nanda, 3.
- 47.
Fukuzawa, Civilization, 99–100.
- 48.
This attitude of carefully watching the language in fear of provoking political repression was also found in the Frankfurt School’s well-known commitment to “Aesopian language.” “The School … had no party affiliation, still less any solidarity with the Soviet Union. … What the Frankfurt School did have, though, was a long-term commitment to Aesopian language, that is, words or phrases that convey an innocent meaning to an outsider but a hidden meaning to those in the know.” Stuart Jeffries, Grand Hotel Abyss: The Lives of the Frankfurt School (London: Verso, 2016), 196–197.
- 49.
This means wu˘lún, the Confucian virtues that regulate five types of relationships. Fukuzawa essentially equated the Confucian moral codes of five relationships to the Ten Commandments of Christianity, as equally unnecessary in knowledge accumulation.
- 50.
Fukuzawa, Civilization, 109–110.
- 51.
See Robert Ellwood, Japanese Religion (New York: Routledge, 2016), 27–31.
- 52.
On the extraordinary figure who founded “national studies” in Japan, see Shigeru Matsumoto, Motoori Norinaga, 1730–1801 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
- 53.
See Maruyama, Bunmeiron no gairyaku wo yomu, vol. 1, 168.
- 54.
For the debate about the national polity after the Allied occupation, see Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson, Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State under MacArthur (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 177–180.
- 55.
Fukuzawa, Civilization, 30.
- 56.
Maruyama, Bunmeiron no gairyaku wo yomu, vol. 1, 164. The definition of nationality in Mill’s writing comes in the very first sentence of chapter XVI. “A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others—which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves, or a portion of themselves, exclusively.” John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Rockville: Serenity Publishers, 2008), 179.
- 57.
Fukuzawa, Civilization, 30–34.
- 58.
Fukuzawa, Civilization, 36–37. My translation is added in brackets.
- 59.
As noted earlier, Fukuzawa dedicated a whole chapter in his autobiography to describing his experiences with the threat of assassination. He explained that threats to scholars who studied Western knowledge peaked from 1862 to 1874. Civilization was written in 1874 and published in early 1875. See Fukuzawa, Autobiography, 225–238.
- 60.
Fukuzawa, Civilization, 83–88.
- 61.
This situation is often summarized as a debate between the “academic faction” (kōza ha, or “feudal” group) and the “labor-peasant faction” (rōnō ha). The latter understood the Meiji Restoration as a bourgeois revolution while the former denied it. See Germaine Hoston, Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
- 62.
Fukuzawa, Civilization, 231–232. Emphasis added.
- 63.
Maruyama Masao, “Fukuzawa Yukichi no tetsugaku” [Fukuzawa Yukichi’s philosophy], 112, quoted in Matsuda Kōichiro, “Kyomōni kakeru kotoha kanōka?” [Is It Possible to Bet on a ‘Fiction’?], Gendai Sisō, Maruyama Masao Tokushū (Modern Thought: a special issue for Maruyama Masao) (August 2014), 102–103.
- 64.
See Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2000), 377.
- 65.
Noel Perrin, Giving Up the Gun: Japan’s Reversion to the Sword, 1543–1879 (Boston: Nonpareil, 1979), 28.
- 66.
Maruyama Masao and Katō Shūichi, Honyaku to nihonno kindai [Translation and Japan’s Modernity] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1998), 14.
- 67.
For those who are not familiar with the Opium War, see Stephen R. Platt, Imperial Twilight: The Opium War and the End of China’s Last Golden Age (New York: Penguin Random House, 2018).
- 68.
Fukuzawa, Civilization, 252–253.
- 69.
Ibid., 31–32.
- 70.
Habermas argues that the crisis of late capitalism is not so much an economic crisis as a legitimation crisis, which comes from the contradiction between political democracy that promises equality and the economic reality that makes inequality prevalent. See Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975).
- 71.
Fukuzawa, Civilization, 50–51.
- 72.
Ibid., 50–51.
- 73.
Maruyama, Bunmeiron no gairyaku wo yomu, vol. 2, 255.
- 74.
See Zenshū, vol. 5, 271. This matter will be discussed further in Chap. 5.
- 75.
“Contrary to the position that Weber himself takes, it follows that the validity of his methodology stands or falls with a solution to the problem of values. Varying an epigram that Weber draws from Schopenhauer, the conceptual apparatus of neo-Kantianism is not a taxi that one can stop at will.” Guy Oakes, “Rickert’s Value Theory and the Foundation of Weber’s Methodology,” Sociological Theory 6, no. 1 (Spring, 1988), 49.
- 76.
See V. I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), XXXI: 513–518.
- 77.
Maruyama says that he borrowed the idea from Lenin’s understanding of “spontaneity” and “class consciousness” in his What Is to Be Done. What this means is that the Orthodox Marxism of Kautsky only emphasized the “spontaneous” transformation of capitalism by its own contradiction, while dismissing the importance of political consciousness of the working class, which should be stimulated by the voluntary effort of the vanguard, especially in the context of the underdeveloped conditions in Russia. See Maruyama, Bunmeiron no gairyaku wo yomu, vol. 1, 45, and Vladimir Ilych Lenin, “What Is to Be Done? II. The Spontaneity of the Masses and the Class Consciousness of Social-Democracy,” in Essential Works of Lenin: “What Is to Be Done?” and Other Writings, ed. Henry M. Christman (New York: Dover Publications, 1966), 72–91.
- 78.
Maruyama, Bunmeiron no gairyaku wo yomu, vol. 1, 45.
- 79.
In addition to these examples, Meera Nanda criticized the “alternative science” in the ideology of Hindu nationalism. See Nanda, Prophets Facing Backward: Postmodern Critiques of Science and Hindu Nationalism in India (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003).
- 80.
Mencius was a renowned Confucian scholar in the Warring States Period, roughly around 400–221 bc. He was born about a hundred years after Confucius died and is generally regarded as Confucius’s academic successor. See the following: “almost two millennia before Locke, Chinese philosopher Meng-tzu preached similar ideas. According to his ‘Politics of Royal Ways,’ the king is the ‘Son of Heaven,’ and heaven bestowed on its son a mandate to provide good government, that is, to provide good for the people. If he did not govern righteously, the people had the right to rise up and overthrow his government in the name of heaven. Meng-tzu even justified regicide, saying that once a king loses the mandate of heaven he is no longer worthy of his subjects’ loyalty. The people came first, Meng-tzu said, the country second, and the king third. The ancient Chinese philosophy of Minben Zhengchi, or ‘people-based politics,’ teaches that ‘the will of the people is the will of heaven’ and that one should ‘respect the people as heaven’ itself.” Kim Dae Jung, “Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia’s Anti-Democratic Values,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 6 (November–December, 1994), 191. One of the passages in Mencius (Meng-tzu in Kim’s writing) that Kim refers to is the following: “The king Hsuan of Ch’i asked, saying, ‘Was it so, that T’ang banished Chieh, and that king Wu smote Chau?’ Mencius replied, ‘It is so in the records.’ The king said, ‘May a minister then put his sovereign to death?’ Mencius said, ‘He who outrages the benevolence proper to his nature, is called a robber; he who outrages righteousness, is called a ruffian. The robber and ruffian we call a mere fellow. I have heard of the cutting off of the fellow Chau, but I have not heard of the putting a sovereign to death, in his case.’” James Legge, The Work of Mencius (New York: Dover Publications, 2011), 167.
- 81.
Nishikawa Shunsaku, “Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901),” Prospects: the quarterly review of comparative education (UNESCO: International Bureau of Education), XXIII, no. 3/4 (1993), 493.
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Hwang, M. (2020). Progress for National Autonomy: An Outline of a Theory of Civilization (Bunmeiron no gairyaku). In: Fukuzawa Yukichi’s Bourgeois Liberalism. Critical Political Theory and Radical Practice. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21530-9_4
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