Abstract
From the beginning of philosophical interest in laws and explanation, the emphasis was on laws as playing a fundamental role in explanations. This was evident in Aristotle (if one understands that his reference to four kinds of causes should be understood as his interest in four kinds of explanations.) In our time, the emphasis was very clear in C. Hempel and P. Oppenheim’s seminal essay (Cf. Chap. 1).
It is a great pleasure to dedicate this chapter to Pat Suppes. It it is based upon “Laws, Accidental Generalities, and the Lotze Uniformity Condition”, in Conceptual Clarifications, Tributes to Patrick Suppes (1922–2014),EDS. Jean-Yves Beziau, Decio Krause, Jonas R. Beccker Arenhardt, Individual authors and College Publications, D. Gabbay, 2015, pp. 175–186. I first came to know Pat’s work when I was a graduate student and came across a copy of his dissertation The problem of action at a distance (supervised by Ernest Nagel). It was a revelation. The combination of historical accuracy, formal precision, elegance and intrinsic interest had a profound influence on me. When I had a year fellowship to study philosophy anywhere I wanted, I made a bee-line directly to Stanford, then Harvard, and Cambridge. My early work on measurement, and later work in logic bear his imprint, if not his imprimatur. Thanks Pat for showing me the way.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Prentice Hall, 1966, p. 55.
- 2.
“Nailed to Hume’s Cross” in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, eds. J. Hawthorne and D. Zimmerman, Blackwell, 2008.
- 3.
Logic Part I, Cambridge University Press 1921, pp. 251–252. Reprinted by Dover Publications, N.Y. 1964a.
- 4.
Logic Part III, The Logical Foundations of Science, Cambridge University Press, 1924. P.6. Reprinted by Dover Publications NY, 1964b.
- 5.
My deep thanks to Elizabeth Leedham-Green, lately Cambridge University Deputy Archivist for finding the brochure, with its clear link to Lotze.
- 6.
Outlines of Logic and of Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. and trans. G. T. Ladd, Boston, MA: Ginn & Co., 1887.
- 7.
Although we do not assume that all explanations are deductive, our use of the relation “Exp “is similar to the use in logic of the relation of deducibility “├”, in that an existential statement is intended. “A, B ├ C” means that there is a deduction of C from premises A, and B. It is existential and does not refer to any particular deduction that does the job.
- 8.
Here, and in what follows, we use “⇒“to indicate logical implication, “⇔“for logical equivalence, and “→“for the material conditional.
- 9.
We have used the conditional [Fx → Gx] to indicate the form of the instances of a law that is conditional in form. This differs from the early discussions of confirmation in which instances were assumed to have the form Fx &Gx. That led to the unacceptable consequence that logically equivalent formulations of a law would not have the same instances. Here I follow Hempel’s later use of “instance” that blocks that consequence (Aspects of Scientific Explanation, the Free Press, 1965, p. 341, footnote 7.
- 10.
Chapter 2, footnote 7.
- 11.
“Explanation and Modality”, A. Koslow, typescript, and as a talk in Durham.
- 12.
This form of closure is weaker than it may appear. It does not require that if A implies B, then there is an explanation of A that is also an explanation of B. The explanations maybe different. Indeed the deducibility relation is a case where for different A, and B, such that A implies B, the closure condition holds. Nevertheless any specific proof (deduction) of A from some C will not be a proof (deduction) of B from C. We are not suggesting that explanations are proofs; only that they both satisfy the closure condition.
- 13.
Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, J. Hawthorne, T. Sider, D. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 2008.
- 14.
This is clear from private correspondence with Carroll.
- 15.
Scientific Explanation, Cambridge University Press, 1953.
- 16.
An account of Braithwaite’s notion of a deductive system, laws of deductive systems, and explanations of laws in a deductive system involves several conditions of the definite inclusion of one deductive system within another. A more detailed discussion of Braithwaite’s account is developed in Chapter 8, (IV).
- 17.
A good example of this kind of account of laws that stresses the deductive role that a law plays within a scientific theory, but is otherwise very different from Braithwaite’s is the richly detailed recent one of John T. Roberts in The Law-Governed Universe, Oxford University Press, 2008. Both are akin to, but different from our focus on laws that have a theoretical context, which we call the theoretical scenario for the laws, and which is discussed in the chapters which follow.
- 18.
The Structure of Science, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961, pp. 58–59.
- 19.
Philosophy of Natural Science, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966, p. 56.
- 20.
Though it is possible to accept these judgments, the argument that (U) is a law because it follows from laws is not a good argument. It is not generally true that every logical consequence of laws is also a law.
References
Braithwaite, R. B. (1953). Scientific explanation. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Carroll, J. (2008). Nailed to hume’s cross. In J. Hawthorne & D. Zimmerman (Eds.), Contemporary debates in metaphysics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hempel, P. (1966). Philosophy of natural science. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Hempel, P. (1965). Aspects of scientific explanation. New York: The Free Press.
Johnson, W. E. (1964a). Logic Part I. Cambridge University Press, 1921, Reprinted by Do-ver Publications, NY.
Johnson, W. E. (1964b). Logic, Part III, The logical foundations of science, Reprinted by Dover Publications, NY.
Koslow, A. Explanation and modality, Typescript.
Lotze, H. (1887). Outlines of logic and of encyclopedia of philosophy (ed. and trans. G. T. Ladd). Boston: Ginn & Co.
Nagel, E. (1961). The structure of science. New York: Harcourt, Brace &World, Inc.
Roberts, J. T. (2008). The law-governed universe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Professor Alberto Cordero for his enthusiasm and interest about the central idea of this essay early on, to Professor Hugh Mellor, to members of my CUNY Graduate Center seminar on scientific laws, to the audience of a 2014 conference of the Mind Society and the Aristotelian Association in Cambridge UK, and to two anonymous referees for helpful comments., and published in Conceptual Carifications, Tributes to Patrick Suppes (1922–2014), D. Gabbay, College Publications, Co. Uk, 2015.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Koslow, A. (2019). Laws and Accidental Generalities. In: Laws and Explanations; Theories and Modal Possibilities. Synthese Library, vol 410. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18846-7_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18846-7_7
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-18845-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-18846-7
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)