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An Analytical Foundation of Rule Scepticism

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Legal Interpretation and Scientific Knowledge

Abstract

The essay distinguishes a few different senses of ‘interpretation’ and a few different kinds of ‘indeterminacy’ that are relevant for the law. In light of such distinctions, the author defends a ‘moderate’ approach to interpretive scepticism. Under this approach, interpretation has (conceptual, not factual) limits, in the sense that not every sentence claiming to be interpretive can be reasonably subsumed under the concept of interpretation. Interpreting consists not in ascribing just any meaning but in ascribing one meaning in the range of meanings admitted by (a) linguistic usage, (b) accepted interpretive methods and (c) juristic (‘dogmatic’) constructions. A limited concept of interpretation is essential in view of distinguishing between ordinary ascription of meaning to legal texts—i.e. adjudicative interpretation properly understood—and genuine ‘interstitial legislation’ by jurists and judges.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Cf. Guastini (2011, p. 15 ff).

  2. 2.

    This is a classical realistic stand, as pointed out by Leiter (2007, p. 61): ‘the Realists all embraced the following descriptive thesis: in deciding cases, judges react primarily to the underlying facts of the case, rather than to the applicable legal rules and reasons (the latter figuring primarily as ways of providing post-hoc rationales for decisions reached on other grounds)’. Cf. also Ross (1958, p. 152). The same view, however, is shared also by the ‘hermeneutical’ trend in legal interpretation. See, e.g., in Italian literature, Zaccaria (1995, 1996), Viola and Zaccaria (1999), Zagrebelsky (1992, 2008) and Marcenò and Zagrebelsky (2018).

  3. 3.

    No clear-cut distinction exists between what a rule-formulation means and what its meaning entails. Alchourrón and Bulygin (1971, p. 67 f): ‘The description of the law […] involves the operation which jurists refer to under the vague term ‘interpretation’ and which fundamentally consists in the determination of the consequences that can be derived from […] norms.’

  4. 4.

    A similar distinction is drawn by Aarnio (1983, p. 165). Cf. also Twining and Miers (1982, ch. 4), distinguishing between interpretation and application.

  5. 5.

    See Troper (1994, ch. XVIII).

  6. 6.

    Guastini (2000, p. 119 ff).

  7. 7.

    I borrow the phrase from Prieto Sanchís (1997, p. 33).

  8. 8.

    This is the opinion of the Italian constitutional court: Corte costituzionale, decision 1146/1988. The topic is by and large discussed in Guastini (2007, p. 325 ff).

  9. 9.

    Eco (2003, ch. X) and Marmor (2001, p. 76).

  10. 10.

    E.g., ‘The President of the Republic shall sign the ordinances and decrees deliberated by the Council of Ministers’ means that the President is under the obligation to sign; ‘The republic recognizes and guarantees the inviolable rights of man’ means that the constitutional provisions ascribing the mentioned rights are not liable to constitutional amendment; etc.

  11. 11.

    The distinction is inspired by Kelsen (1934, p. 80 f) and Kelsen (1960, p. 353 ff).

  12. 12.

    Kelsen (1960, p. 355): ‘Jurisprudential [i.e., cognitive] interpretation can do no more than exhibit all possible meanings of a legal norm. Jurisprudence as cognition of law cannot decide between the possibilities exhibited by it, but must leave the decision to the legal organ who […] is authorized to apply the law.’

  13. 13.

    Kelsen (1960, p. 354): ‘In the application of law by a legal organ, the cognitive interpretation of the law to be applied is combined with an act of will by which the law-applying organ chooses between the possibilities shown by cognitive interpretation.’

  14. 14.

    Kelsen (1960, p. 354): ‘By way of authentic interpretation (that is, interpretation of a norm by the law-applying organ), not only one of the possibilities may be realized that have been shown by the cognitive interpretation […]; but also a norm may be created which lies entirely outside the frame of the norm to be applied.’ Cf. also Kelsen (1950, p. xv).

  15. 15.

    Kelsen (1934, p. 80): ‘If “interpretation” is understood as discovering the meaning of the norm to be applied, its result can only be the discovery of the frame that the norm to be interpreted represents and, within this frame, the cognition of various possibilities for application. Interpreting a statute, then, leads not necessarily to a single decision as the only correct decision, but possibly to a number of decisions, all of them of equal standing.’

  16. 16.

    Kelsen (1960, p. 355): ‘The interpretation of law by the science of law (jurisprudence) must be sharply distinguished […] from the interpretation by legal organs. Jurisprudential interpretation is purely cognitive ascertainment of the meaning of legal norms.’

  17. 17.

    Kelsen (1960, p. 355 f): ‘An attorney who, in the interest of his client, propounds to the judge only one of several possible interpretations […], or a writer who in his commentary extols a specific interpretation among many possible ones as the only “correct” one, does not render a function of legal science, but of legal politics.’ See also Kelsen (1934, p. 82).

  18. 18.

    Kelsen (1960, p. 354): ‘The interpretation by the law-applying organ is always authentic. It creates law […].’ See also Troper (2001a, b, c, p. 85 ff).

  19. 19.

    See Corte costituzionale, decision 168/1963.

  20. 20.

    Guastini (2011, p. 155 ff).

  21. 21.

    European Court of Justice, July 15, 1964, Case 6/64, Costa. Cf. also European Court of Justice, March 9, 1978, Case 106/77, Simmenthal.

  22. 22.

    See article 16 of the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen: ‘Toute société dans laquelle la garantie des droits n’est pas assurée, ni la séparation des pouvoirs déterminée, n’a point de constitution.’

  23. 23.

    See, e.g., Zagrebelsky (1992).

  24. 24.

    Guastini (2011, p. 39 ff).

  25. 25.

    The kind of indeterminacy I have in mind (interpretive indeterminacy) is not to be confused with indeterminacy depending on the vagueness of the criteria of validity (so-called rule of recognition in Hart’s language). One thing is wondering whether a given text expresses a certain rule R or not; a different thing is wondering whether R (provided that it is actually expressed) is valid or not (e.g., whether it is compatible with the constitution or not).

  26. 26.

    One should take into account this remark when discussing the radical form of interpretive scepticism, such as the one defended by Troper (2001a, b, c, p. 69 ff), according to which no legal meaning exists before and independently of the ‘authentic’ interpretation of law-applying organs.

  27. 27.

    Ross (1958, p. 123 ff).

  28. 28.

    Alchourrón (1996). See also Twining and Miers (1982, p. 216 f) on ‘implied exceptions’; Schauer (1991, p. 115 ff); Guastini (2012, pp. 182–192).

  29. 29.

    The question was answered in the affirmative by Corte costituzionale, decision 6/1996.

  30. 30.

    Distinguishing between vagueness and open texture is not necessary for my present purposes.

  31. 31.

    The most extended inquiries on this subject are: Luzzati (1990) and Endicott (2000). Both elaborate a great number of significant distinctions that, however, are immaterial in the present context.

  32. 32.

    Cf. Grice (1989, p. 177).

  33. 33.

    Guastini (1997a).

  34. 34.

    A fourth, minor, reason for distinguishing between normative sentences and rules is that two different rule-formulations can express one and the same rule: see Schauer (1991, p. 62 f).

  35. 35.

    See Twining and Miers (1982, p. 218 ff), on the ‘puzzled interpreter’ and the ‘conditions of doubt’ in interpretation.

  36. 36.

    ‘The set of interpretive operations that can be legitimately performed on [legal] sources (to generate rules and principles of law)’: Coleman and Leiter (1995, p. 213).

  37. 37.

    Tarello (1974, p. 329 ff).

  38. 38.

    I am aware that the phrase ‘legal dogmatics’ is not familiar to Anglo-American jurisprudence. However, it is commonly used in continental juristic parlance as to refer to the literary products of legal scholars (textbooks, commentaries, etc.). Cf. e.g. Aarnio (1977, p. 266 ff); Alexy (1978); Bulygin (1986, pp. 193–210); Aarnio (1987, ch. 3); Peczenik (2005, ch. 1).

  39. 39.

    See, e.g., Ross (1958, p. 145 ff).

  40. 40.

    Kelsen (1950, p. xiii). Cf. Llewellyn (1950, p. 228 ff); Ross (1958, p. 148 ff); Tarello (1980, p. 341 ff); Diciotti (1999, esp. ch. V); Chiassoni (2007, ch. II).

  41. 41.

    Cf. Coleman and Leiter (1995, p. 214).

  42. 42.

    Twining and Miers (1982, p. 338 f).

  43. 43.

    Scarpelli (1982, p. 179 ff).

  44. 44.

    Benjamin Hoadley, Bishop of Bangor, quoted by Gray (1948, p. 102).

  45. 45.

    See Gray (1948, pp. 124, 170); Tarello (1974, esp. 265 ff, 389 ff). Troper (2001b). Cf. also Guastini (1992, esp. ch. VIII); Mazzarese (1991, p. 39 ff); Guastini (1996).

  46. 46.

    Troper (2001a, b, c, p. 35 ff); Troper (2005).

  47. 47.

    Kelsen (1960, p. 354).

  48. 48.

    Admittedly, outside legal-theoretical literature, one could mention the so-called Kripkenstein’s semantic scepticism: Kripke (1982). But Kripke’s argument, as I understand it, simply shows that ‘sentences that ascribe meanings are […] non cognitive’ (Coleman and Leiter 1995, p. 220). In my view, as far as adjudicative interpretation in the legal domain is concerned, this is true, but does not entails the no-prior-meaning thesis. Asserting that a rule-formulation is ambiguous (in a broad sense) is quite different from asserting that it has no meaning at all. For some criticism of semantic scepticism, see Coleman and Leiter (1995, p. 221 ff). For criticism of the ‘particularistic understanding of meaning’, see Schauer (1991, p. 55 ff).

  49. 49.

    Literal or plain meaning, one could say following A. Marmor, is a matter of understanding, not of interpretation. See Marmor (2005, p. 9 f); Marmor (2001, p. 73 ff). Nonetheless, it is important to stress that when someone ascribes a legal text its literal meaning (discarding other possible meanings) he/she does accomplish an act of adjudicative interpretation. Literal meaning has no privileged status among the various possible meanings of a legal text. See Chiassoni (2008, esp. 149 ff).

  50. 50.

    Guastini (1997a, b, p. 279 ff).

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  1. University of Genova, Tarello Institute for Legal Philosophy, Genova, Italy

    Riccardo Guastini

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  1. Lisbon Centre for Research in Public Law (CIDP) and Lisbon Legal Theory Group (LxLTG), University of Lisbon School of Law, Lisbon, Portugal

    David Duarte

  2. Lisbon Centre for Research in Public Law (CIDP) and Lisbon Legal Theory Group (LxLTG), University of Lisbon School of Law, Lisbon, Portugal

    Pedro Moniz Lopes

  3. Lisbon Centre for Research in Public Law (CIDP) and Lisbon Legal Theory Group (LxLTG), University of Lisbon School of Law, Lisbon, Portugal

    Jorge Silva Sampaio

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Guastini, R. (2019). An Analytical Foundation of Rule Scepticism. In: Duarte, D., Moniz Lopes, P., Silva Sampaio, J. (eds) Legal Interpretation and Scientific Knowledge. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18671-5_2

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