Abstract
Understanding involves the grasping of networks of ideas, which itself involves seeing connections and arriving at further conclusions and interrelations. To understand people, then, is to synthesize information in ways that allow a comprehensive and systematic vision of what is going on in someone else’s life. Instead of allowing for ignorance, understanding requires an open-mindedness that considers multiple ways of interpreting experiences and that defends views using reasons that others can accept. It also requires placing knowers in social situations, taking into account the relations of epistemic agents acting in the world. In the end, understanding involves learning to adopt different perspectives so that one can clearly see what it is like for others to live in the world around them.
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Notes
- 1.
It also begs the question about understanding one’s own social reality, but my emphasis here will be on understanding others.
- 2.
For a summary of much of this recent attention see Grimm et al. (2017).
- 3.
The precise nature of understanding is actually a matter of widespread discussion and debate. My own discussion is concerned specifically with the relationship of understanding to socially constructed ignorance, and as a result, I will not be able to do justice to all the variations of understanding. For more on the issue see Grimm et al. (2017).
- 4.
Of course, philosophers worry about what understanding has to do with fact, whether, that is, understanding is factive. For a summary of views on the factivity of understanding see Baumberger et al. (2017, 7–11).
- 5.
Also see Lynch (2016, 16).
- 6.
Kvanvig (2003) is focused on understanding objects and that something is the case rather than understanding, say, people or social situations. This is something that will make a difference.
- 7.
For a full discussion of the use of “grasping” in discussions of understanding see Baumberger et al. (2017, 12–17).
- 8.
As Baumberger, Beisbart, and Brun note, “the most prominent accounts [of understanding] analyze grasping in terms of suitable abilities” (2017, 13).
- 9.
For another overview on how grasping conditions should be explicated see Kelp (2015).
- 10.
For more on the notion of understanding as a cognitive achievement see Pritchard (2010).
- 11.
See especially, Elgin (2017, 83).
- 12.
Such failure of understanding is something rarely discussed explicitly, although it is addressed in a backhanded way by race and feminist theorists. What they “grasp” that more direct discussions of understanding do not is that something quite significant happens when we fail to understand others: we oftentimes don’t see them—or when we do see them, we observe facts about them, but we don’t actually achieve understanding.
- 13.
Of course, it is a sad fact that even in safe environments, women are often not safe.
- 14.
Whether there is a common thread is to those things we understand is less than clear. One theorist who thinks we can find a common thread is Grimm, who speaks of us understanding “subject matters (Fred understands quantum mechanics), or particular states of affairs (Jada understands why the cup spilled), or institutions (the U.S. House of Representatives), or other people (Jada herself), and so on” (2017, 214). In the discussion that follows Grimm’s list, however, there is no specific mention of how to understand other people. In fact, most discussion of “objectual understanding” tends to focus on theories and systems, even though people are said to be included in this form of understanding. For more on the types of understanding and what they may have in common see Baumberger et al. (2017, 4–6).
- 15.
Three distinct ways of conceiving of understanding boil down to: objectual, propositional, and interrogative. For a further discussion of these types see Baumberger et al. (2017, 5).
- 16.
What constitutes a “worthwhile perspective” will be a topic of discussion shortly.
- 17.
This contrasts with Forster’s assessment that scientists need to rely to a rigorous empirical process, absent Kant’s metaphysical theory. See Gray (2012, 401–404).
- 18.
A rather large skeptical problem enters at this point: I must use some principles that I make my own to evaluate the worth of other perspectives. The deck is, then, stacked against the white supremacist because my principles will not support such a viewpoint. I will address this problem, but not just yet.
- 19.
- 20.
See Zagzebski (2001, 244).
- 21.
See Elgin (2007, 34–35).
- 22.
For a detailed discussion of open mindedness, see Baehr (2011).
- 23.
- 24.
See Wittgenstein (1958, 226).
- 25.
For more on coming up with the realities for all humans see Nussbaum (1992).
- 26.
Kant was not the only one with contemporary critics. Immerwahr (1992) argues that Hume weakened the scope of his claims about the lack of civilization in “four or five different kinds of men” to apply only to negroes in response to criticism by James Beattie. In other words, Hume weakened his view, but remained insistent that “negroes are naturally inferior to whites” (1992, 483).
- 27.
Also see Mills (1997, 18).
- 28.
See Fricker (2007, 148).
- 29.
To make this argument as normatively convincing as possible, I need the concept of reasonableness, which is the subject of the following chapter. At this point, I offer a promissory note that such an argument will be forthcoming. For now, I simply assume that we have an obligation to attempt an understanding of the social reality of others even when we do not already understand.
- 30.
To be clear, I do not believe Mills thinks whites are in principle unable to understand non-whites. He would prefer we overcome white ignorance rather than simply lament it. I take it that Mills’ position on white ignorance has more of an emphasis on historical fact than in principle possibility. Regardless of Mills position, however, what I wish to consider is how such an understanding could come about.
- 31.
Even in racial theory, which is concerned greatly with oppression, there is little acknowledgement of gender issues.
- 32.
See Ruetsche (2004, 88).
- 33.
Riggs (2016) argues that open-mindedness and insightfulness provide a means to advancing understanding.
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Heikes, D.K. (2019). Toward a Genuine Understanding. In: Towards a Liberatory Epistemology. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16485-0_3
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