Abstract
In this chapter, different types of international environmental problems are analyzed from the perspective of elementary game theory. For the case of reciprocal environmental spillovers, as foremost climate change, the basic strategic interactions between countries are described in a simple binary game model. It is shown that different game types may occur and how the type of the game may be transformed if, e.g., the abatement costs are changing or fairness motivations become relevant for the countries. It is moreover explained how in repeated games international cooperation can be stabilized by means of various threat strategies. Finally, factors are highlighted that are favorable for making international cooperation on environmental problems successful in the real world.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Althammer, W., & Buchholz, W. (1993). Lindahl-equilibria as the outcome of a non-cooperative game: a reconsideration. European Journal of Political Economy, 9(3), 399–405.
Arce, D. G., & Sandler, T. (2005). The dilemma of prisoners’ dilemmas. Kyklos, 58(1), 3–24.
Barrett, S. (2003). Environment and statecraft. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Buchholz, W., & Peters, W. (2005). A Rawlsian approach to international cooperation. Kyklos, 58(1), 25–44.
Buchholz, W., Peters, W., & Ufert, A. (2014). Spielräume für uni- und multilateralen Klimaschutz. Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik und Umweltrecht, 37(3), 326–344.
Buchholz, W., Peters, W., & Ufert, A. (2018). International environmental agreements on climate protection: A binary choice model with heterogeneous agents. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 154, 191–205.
Cramton, P., MacKay, D. J. C., Ockenfels, A., & Stoft, S. (Eds.). (2017). Global carbon pricing – the path to climate cooperation. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Dannenberg, A., Sturm, B., & Vogt, C. (2010). Do equity preferences matter for climate negotiators? An experimental investigation. Environmental and Resource Economics, 47(1), 91–109.
Danziger, L., & Schnytzer, A. (1991). Implementing the Lindahl voluntary-exchange mechanism. European Journal of Political Economy, 7(1), 55–64
DeCanio, S., & Fremstad, A. (2013). Game theory and climate diplomacy. Ecological Economics, 85(C), 177–187.
Dieperink, C. (2011). International water negotiations under asymmetry, Lessons from the Rhine chlorides dispute settlement (1931–2004). International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 11(2), 139–157.
Dixit, A. K., Skeath, S., & Reiley Jr., D. H. (2015). Games of strategy (4th ed.). New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Finus, M. (2001). Game theory and international environmental cooperation. Cheltenham, UK/Northampton, UK: Edward Elgar.
Guttman, J. M. (1978). Understanding collective action: Matching behavior. American Economic Review, 68(2), 251–255.
Lange, A. (2006). The impact of equity-preferences on the stability of international environmental agreements. Environmental and Resource Economics, 34(2), 247–267.
Lange, A., & Vogt, C. (2003). Cooperation in international environmental negotiations due to a preference for equity. Journal of Public Economics, 87(9–19), 2049–2067.
Maggi, G. (2016). Issue linkage. In K. Bagwell & R. W. Staiger (Eds.), Handbook of commercial policy (Vol. 1, pp. 513–564). Amsterdam et al.: Elsevier.
Murdoch, J., & Sandler, T. (1997). The voluntary provision of a pure public good: The case of reduced CFC emissions and the Montreal Protocol. Journal of Public Economics, 63(3), 331–349.
Nagase, Y., & Silva, E. C. D. (2007). Acid rain in China and Japan: A game-theoretic analysis. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 37(1), 100–120.
Nordhaus, W. (2013). The climate casino – risk, uncertainty and economics for a warming world. New Haven, CT/London: Yale University Press.
Nordhaus, W. (2015). Climate clubs: Overcoming free-riding in international climate policy. American Economic Review, 105(4), 1339–1370.
Nyborg, K. (2018). Reciprocal climate negotiators. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 92, 707–725.
Peinhardt, C., & Sandler, T. (2015). Transnational cooperation – an issue-based approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pittel, K., & Rübbelke, D. (2012). Transitions in the negotiations on climate change: From prisoner’s dilemma to chicken and beyond. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law, and Economics, 12(1), 23–39.
Posner, E. A., & Weisbach, D. (2010). Climate change justice. Princeton, NJ/Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American Economic Review, 83(5), 1281–1302.
Sandler, T. (2017). Environmental cooperation: Contrasting international environmental agreements. Oxford Economic Papers, 69(2), 345–364.
Selten, R. (1978). The chain store paradox. Theory and Decision, 9(2), 127–159.
Stern, N. (2015). Why are we waiting? the logic, urgency, and promise of tackling climate change. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Sunstein, C. (2007). On Montreal and Kyoto: A tale of two protocols. Harvard Environmental Law Review, 31, 1–65.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Buchholz, W., Rübbelke, D. (2019). International Environmental Problems. In: Foundations of Environmental Economics. Springer Texts in Business and Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16268-9_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16268-9_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-16267-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-16268-9
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)