Abstract
A consistent theme in Chaps. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 was the importance of political will in effective oversight. Despite its importance, however, there is very little understanding of what political will is and how it is to be fostered. This Chapter argues political will is best understood as consisting of three elements: motivation, volunteerism and organizational culture. Motivation is primarily about the individual MP and his/her particular reasons for tackling issues of corruption. Parliaments must ensure that MPs are not micro-managed and are trusted to exercise autonomy in how to achieve their oversight objectives. Parliamentarians, however, are providing a service not merely doing a job; as a result, an element of volunteerism also needs to be fostered and maintained. Common and successful ways of doing so are through the allocation of desirable roles (e.g., committee chairmanships) and public recognition. There are implications for the organization of parliaments: firstly, they must provide a working environment in which MPs can exercise autonomy in achieving their goals; secondly, the leadership within parliament must act by example, conducting oversight openly but also publicly recognizing and rewarding the oversight activities of individuals and committees. Although this Chapter focusses primarily on MPs, it is recognized that the parliamentary culture extends beyond parliamentarians to include parliamentary staff. Thus, the relationship between the two is also vital to robust oversight.
This chapter summarises some of the key points in the article “Legislators and Political Will” and ties them into the country case studies presented herein. The article was written by the authors and Rick Stapenhurst, and was published online by Public Integrity on December 17, 2018. It can be viewed at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/10999922.2018.1511669?scroll=top&needAccess=true#metrics-contentby.
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Notes
- 1.
The success or failure of oversight to the outcomes is omitted as even intentions cannot always counterbalance external factors and, therefore, failure does not negate the existence or influence of motivation.
- 2.
The UK Parliament has attempted to address the problem of MPs policing themselves by appointing an equal number of lay members on the Standards Committee to ensure an independent and external perspective to the Committee’s deliberations.
- 3.
Incentives are not included in this Chapter as incentives form part of formal tools used to enforce democratic processes. Here, the concern is with the approach which individual MPs take to those formalized processes.
- 4.
The wider political context in Guernsey and Jersey is significant. First, a broad culture of volunteerism and honorary service already forms part of both islands which makes the introduction of lay members in parliament less controversial. Second, there is no party-political apparatus in both places and candidates stand for election as independents. This immediately removes the possibility of partisan politics playing a role on the two PACs.
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Thompson, G., Staddon, A. (2020). Motivation of MPs and Political Will. In: Stapenhurst, R., Draman, R., Larson, B., Staddon, A. (eds) Anti-Corruption Evidence. Studies in Public Choice, vol 34. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14140-0_9
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