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Parliamentary Oversight and Corruption in the Caribbean: Trinidad and Tobago and Grenada Compared

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Anti-Corruption Evidence

Part of the book series: Studies in Public Choice ((SIPC,volume 34))

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Abstract

The research results presented here cast doubt on previous research, which clearly indicated that contextual factors determined differences in parliamentary oversight (and hence corruption). Our results are rather inconclusive: on the basis of country size, population and economy, Grenada might be expected to have lower corruption, while on the basis of government and opposition parties, Trinidad & Tobago should have lower corruption; the other factors are indeterminate. Our results also cast doubt that the establishment or adoption of oversight tools is a determinant of corruption—both countries have a similar range of internal parliamentary oversight tools, namely, Public Accounts and other oversight committees, question time, and votes of no confidence—although, neither country’s parliament plays a role in Cabinet formation or dismissal. Both have a similar array of extra-parliamentary institutions, namely an Auditor, a number of anti-corruption agencies and Ombudsman. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that the key internal and external oversight tools and institutions are somewhat more effective—although still not particularly effective—in Trinidad & Tobago than in Grenada, with the exception of the anti-corruption agencies, which are considered somewhat more effective in Grenada. The evidence also indicates that facilitating factors are stronger in Trinidad & Tobago. Are these results peculiar to Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada, or are they generalizable to other small states, especially those in the Caribbean? Clearly, further research is needed.

This Chapter summarizes some of the main points made, and data used, by the authors, along with Louis Imbeau and Rasheed Draman, in the article “Parliamentary Oversight and Corruption in the Caribbean: Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada Compared” published in the Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 56, pp. 493–522. The article can be accessed at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14662043.2018.1444933.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    While the eight countries reported by Transparency International to have the lowest levels of corruption globally—namely Denmark, New Zealand, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Singapore and the Netherlands—are all ‘small’, the dispersion of ‘very small’ countries is greater, with Luxembourg ranking 11th, Iceland 14th, Bahamas 24th and Bhutan 27th.

  2. 2.

    A short-lived federation comprising Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, the Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago and the Turks and Caicos Islands.

  3. 3.

    Although they argue that larger numbers of political parties hamper effective accountability and give greater scope for corruption.

  4. 4.

    A proposal to amend the Constitution to ensure that there will always be a Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives was defeated in a referendum in November 2015.

  5. 5.

    The People’s Partnership in Trinidad is a political coalition comprising four political parties: the United National Congress, the Congress of the People, the Tobago Organization of the People, the National Joint Action Committee.

  6. 6.

    The loyalty that legislators have for the institution is quite clear in the case of PACs, whose success have been credited, above all, to parliamentarians’ ability to work in a non-partisan fashion (McGee 2002; Stapenhurst et al. 2005, 2014).

  7. 7.

    In Grenada, by the leader of the Opposition in the Senate.

  8. 8.

    Respondents noted that, even where the Auditor may be doing good work in ensuring financial probity and in uncovering cases of fraud and corruption, unless the PAC and the Government have the political will to correct the problems found, the impact will be limited.

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Staddon, A., Stapenhurst, R. (2020). Parliamentary Oversight and Corruption in the Caribbean: Trinidad and Tobago and Grenada Compared. In: Stapenhurst, R., Draman, R., Larson, B., Staddon, A. (eds) Anti-Corruption Evidence. Studies in Public Choice, vol 34. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14140-0_7

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