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Weakening Parliamentary Oversight, Increasing Corruption: Ghana

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Anti-Corruption Evidence

Part of the book series: Studies in Public Choice ((SIPC,volume 34))

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Abstract

After brief improvements early this decade, governance in Ghana appears to be deteriorating. While Ghana still ranks among the ten best performing African countries, its performance has weakened over the past decade, registering the eighth largest decline in overall governance of all African countries, with accountability and public management (along with national security, public safety and infrastructure) recording the largest declines (Mo Ibhahim, IIAG: Index Report. http://mo.ibrahim.foundation, 2016). As a result, corruption is increasing. Four factors explain the poor oversight performance of the Ghanaian Parliament: the executive cooptation of Parliament; the executive dominance of Parliament; an expanded space for corruption; and excessive partisanship within Parliament. To reverse these trends, Members of Parliament must shift their drive from private economic and political gain to the provision of public goods. This will require a reinvigoration of the current rule of law mechanisms to allow for the naming/shaming and prosecution of errant MPs, and strong citizen-led groups to demand and exact accountability from MPs.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The survey consisted of 40 questions, pertaining respectively to the political system, the government accountability to parliament, the presence/use of motions of censure, the parliament’s power of dismissal, the dispositions concerning the parliament’s dissolution, tools for parliamentary oversight, the presence of additional oversight bodies, the tools of budgetary oversight, the existence/implementation of a legislative code of conduct, and oversight on the implementation of the enacted legislation.

  2. 2.

    Without stable majorities in Parliament, the executive is required to bargain with the minority and forge mutually beneficial compromises. By implication, the executive will have to make concessions—and the minority is able to extract compromises that are otherwise inadmissible. Undoubtedly, this strengthens the oversight process (Wehner 2006) although it carries the risk of gridlock. Bargaining creates opportunities for oversight and enables the minority to hold the government accountable.

  3. 3.

    The data collected by WBI on PACs and that were used in Pelizzo and Stapenhurst show that in the 3 years from 1999 to 2002, the PAC met more than 50 times. That is more frequently than Botswana and Namibia and as frequently as the PACs from Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria and South Africa. The data presented in that paper also suggest that the PAC from Ghana is considerably more effective than its Namibian and Nigerian counterparts.

  4. 4.

    See “Speaker throws out motion to investigate Mahama’s Ford gift”, www.citifmonline.com, Thursday 1st September, 2016. Accessed December 18, 2016.

  5. 5.

    “Parliament divided over $60 million loan agreement”, citifmonline.com, November 2, 2016.

  6. 6.

    See “Martin Amidu accuses previous Parliaments of ‘endemic corruption’”, myjoyonline.com, 10-01-2017. Accessed 10 January, 2017.

  7. 7.

    Interestingly, the public disgust at the government prompted by the PAC’s public hearing led the government to order the termination of live broadcasts on the state-run television channel. Unfortunately, the proliferation of private TV and radio stations in the country permitted continuous live broadcasts of the hearings. The government reversed its order to terminate live broadcasts on the state-run TV channel and sought to associate itself with the decision to hold public hearings as further proof of its zero tolerance policy on corruption.

  8. 8.

    For details of the report see Ghana News Agency report entitled “PAC Recovers 40m from public servants” November 5, 2008 available online at www.ghanaweb.com.

  9. 9.

    PAC retrieved Ghc20b of state cash in 2014—Agyeman-Manu reveals, adomonline.com, 5 January 2015. Accessed November 12, 2016.

  10. 10.

    Parliament, Judiciary Deadlocked…Over Right To Prosecute Public Officers For Financial Malfeasance, peacefmonline.com: 2015-04-21.

  11. 11.

    Bagbin (2015).

  12. 12.

    IEA, “List of Most Corrupt Ghanaian Institutions: Police, The Presidency, Parliament, All Feature Prominently”, www.ieagh.org.

  13. 13.

    “Prof. Ayittey Blames Parliament for Corruption in Ghana”, www.ghananewsagency.org, November 7, 2013.

  14. 14.

    CHRAJ Mission Statement.

  15. 15.

    Formerly called the Serious Fraud Office (SFO).

  16. 16.

    Scott Morgenstern and Luigi Manzetti (2000).

  17. 17.

    Interpreted as preventing the introduction of any bill by MPs whose passage will result in a draw on public funds.

  18. 18.

    Which requires the majority of ministers to be appointed from parliament.

  19. 19.

    Strengthening Transparency, Accountability and Responsiveness in Ghana (STAR-Ghana) (2011).

  20. 20.

    See 2016 IIAG: Index Report, p. 33 at mo ibrahim foundation.

  21. 21.

    Westminster-style parliamentary system requires all ministers to be Members of Parliament.

  22. 22.

    Baffour Agyeman-Duah, “Curbing Corruption and Improving Economic Governance: The Case of Ghana” Unpublished Manuscript, p. 4.

  23. 23.

    Ibid.

  24. 24.

    See https://www.mak.ac.ug/documents/EPRCUDICPaper.pdf.

  25. 25.

    See http://www.graphic.com.gh/business/oil-gas/acep-cautions-government-over-oil-block-sale.html.

  26. 26.

    See http://www.africanelections.org/ghana/news_detail.php?nws=7300&t=AEP%20Explainer:%20Political%20Party%20Funding%20in%20Ghana.

  27. 27.

    See Huang, K. P. Social and Ideological Sources of Partisanship.

  28. 28.

    Justice Srem-Sai, “Parliamentary Oversight in Ghana – A Brief Review”, paper for Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Accra, Ghana.

  29. 29.

    Lindberg and Zhou (2009).

  30. 30.

    African Parliamentary Index (API) at www.parlcentafrica.org.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. African Centre for Parliamentary Affairs, Accra, Ghana

    Rasheed Draman

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  1. Rasheed Draman
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada

    Rick Stapenhurst

  2. African Centre for Parliamentary Affairs, Accra, Ghana

    Rasheed Draman

  3. Culver City, CA, USA

    Brooke Larson

  4. University of Westminster, London, UK

    Anthony Staddon

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Draman, R. (2020). Weakening Parliamentary Oversight, Increasing Corruption: Ghana. In: Stapenhurst, R., Draman, R., Larson, B., Staddon, A. (eds) Anti-Corruption Evidence. Studies in Public Choice, vol 34. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14140-0_3

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