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Towards the Development of a Parliamentary Oversight Index

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Anti-Corruption Evidence

Part of the book series: Studies in Public Choice ((SIPC,volume 34))

Abstract

Our research presents a new comparative framework to assess ex post oversight capacity of national legislatures. When used in conjunction with Wehner’s index (Political Stud 54:767–785, 2006), on ex ante legislative oversight, the research provides a comprehensive assessment of parliamentary oversight of the budget process. By considering parliament’s role and highlighting oversight tools and mechanisms with enabling and contextual factors, the Parliamentary Oversight Capacity Index (POCI) measures cross-national variations in legislative oversight based on survey data from the IPU and the World Bank. The index builds upon and extends previous research undertaken by Stapenhurst (Legislative Oversight and Curbing Corruption: Presidentialism and Parliamentarialism Revisited. Unpublished PhD thesis. Canberra, Australian National University, 2011) and Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (Quaderni di Scienza Politica IX(1):175–188, 2014).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    His decision to construct such an index was based on comparative case studies which found that while oversight tools alone do affect the level of corruption, the context is also important.

  2. 2.

    Legal provisions for oversight; political will; and trust in parliament.

  3. 3.

    Autonomy of the Speaker, the Clerk; administration; budget, recruitment; number of sitting days; research services.

  4. 4.

    Oversight committee; Executive appointments; dismissal/impeachment; n0-confidence; summon Executive; questions; interpellations; motions for debate; missions; Auditor General; Ombuds.

  5. 5.

    They used the Control of Corruption index instead of the Corruption Perception Index as the dependent variable, believing that the former is synthesis measure of several other measure of corruption and is regarded as more robust.

  6. 6.

    r = 0.62; p <0.001; N = 55

  7. 7.

    Statutes (r = 0.39; p <0.01), Practices (r = 0.53; p <0.001), and Resources (r = 0.50; p <0.001).

  8. 8.

    In all, the indirect effects that pass through this capacity was found to represent an increase of 0.083 standard deviations in the corruption control index and that the direct effects of corruption control’s explanatory factors equal 0.897 standard deviations. The total of the indirect and direct factors is therefore 0.982 standard deviations, an increase of 0.085 that is attributable to parliamentary oversight capacity. Taking parliamentary oversight capacity into account therefore increases the combined effect of the determinants of corruption control by 9.5%.

References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada

    Rick Stapenhurst

Authors
  1. Rick Stapenhurst
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Correspondence to Rick Stapenhurst .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada

    Rick Stapenhurst

  2. African Centre for Parliamentary Affairs, Accra, Ghana

    Rasheed Draman

  3. Culver City, CA, USA

    Brooke Larson

  4. University of Westminster, London, UK

    Anthony Staddon

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Stapenhurst, R. (2020). Towards the Development of a Parliamentary Oversight Index. In: Stapenhurst, R., Draman, R., Larson, B., Staddon, A. (eds) Anti-Corruption Evidence. Studies in Public Choice, vol 34. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14140-0_2

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