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Why Reforms of Public Service of Russia Are Cyclic: An Institutional Explanation from a Liberal Perspective

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Dimensions and Challenges of Russian Liberalism

Part of the book series: Philosophy and Politics - Critical Explorations ((PPCE,volume 8))

Abstract

From 1992 until the present, Russia has seen two cycles of public service reform. These cycles clearly demonstrate the shortcomings of Russian community of experts in the area public administration. Both cycles began with government statements, responding to a “public request” for the creation of a professional and effective public service. A phase of limited reform followed in both cases, where low-quality, even flawed, administrative procedures were developed. At this stage, the expert community expanded in number, but—paradoxically—its role weakened. Final “bureaucratization of reform” (i.e. realization of the final stages of reform in every cycle by the bureaucracy itself) resulted in the curtailing of experts’ participation. Thus, reform became an instrument to increase the weight of influence at the very the top levels of the bureaucracy and to strengthen the power of the political and administrative elite. In this way, both cycles came to an end more or less in failure, although not a total debacle. The chapter claims that the weakness of Russia’s expert community underlines this cyclical reform cycle. The community of experts in the area of public service reform, as will be shown, is not able to act jointly to support the reform mission. Effective communication among experts working in governmental bodies and outside government (i.e. expert organizations), we argue, is not properly organized. The Russian expert community in the area of public service reform, in other words, does not act like a “guild of professionals”, guided by the liberal principles of open and transparent administration, and effective and citizen-oriented public service. The success in Russian public service reform (including exit from continuous reform cycles) is possible, as we will argue, only in the presence of certain conditions, which rest on an understanding of liberalism as a social phenomenon. We call this “guild liberalism”, or the existence of groups with professional competencies and abilities to change the Russian system of governance in a liberal direction by applying their expertise and by direct participation in reform decision-making. First, the expert community—as a part of civil society—must become rather creative, mature and solid if it is to protect the reform process and keep it on track to achieving its goals. Secondly, top bureaucratic managers must not be the leaders and main stakeholders of the public service reform process. To conclude, we will argue that liberalism in Russia, as social phenomena at the level of professional expert groups, is not completely dead and has the chance to be restored.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Vladimir Ya. Gel’man, “Rossiya v institutsional’noy lovushke”, Pro et contra 14, no. 4–5, 2010; Vladimir Ya. Gel’man and Andrey V. Starodubtsev, “Vozmozhnosti i ogranicheniya avtoritarnoy modernizatsii: Rossiyskiye reformy 2000–kh godov”, Politiya 4, no. 75, 2014, pp. 6–30.

  2. 2.

    Aleksandr V. Obolonsky, “Why Is It So Difficult to Reform Russian Officialdom?”, in Russian Officialdom from Alexander the Third to Putin (Loughborough: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 301–316; Vladimir B. Slatinov, “Reforma Rossiyskoy gosudarstvennoy sluzhby v institutsional’noy lovushke”, in Upravleniye v 21 veke: Traditsii i innovatsii (Moskva, Izdatel’stvo MGU, 2011), pp. 33–42; Gennadiy L. Kupryashin, “Institutsional’nyye lovushki i krizisy gosudarstvennogo upravleniya”, Gosudarstvennoye upravleniye. Elektronnyy vestnik 60, 2017, pp. 94–121 (http://e-journal.spa.msu.ru/vestnik/item/60_2017kupryashin.htm)

  3. 3.

    This concept precisely captures the essence of the current situation. It is remarkable that it was offered by the curator of the internal political bloc of the Kremlin “in zero years”. See Vladislav Yu. Surkov, Odinochestvo polukrovki (14+), Rossiya v global’noy politike, 9 April 2018 (http://www.globalaffairs.ru/global-processes/Odinochestvo-polukrovki-14–19477). For the discussion on the problem of “a special way” of Russian development, see: Aleksandr V. Obolonsky, «Osobyy put’» strany. Mify i real’nost’ (Moskva: Mysl’, 2018).

  4. 4.

    Aleksandr V. Obolonsky (ed.), Gosudarstvennaya sluzhba: Kompleksnyy podkhod (Moskva: Delo, 2009); Vladimir Gelman (ed.), Authoritarian Modernization in Russia: Ideas, Institutions, and Policies (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017); Aleksandr V. Obolonsky, “The Crisis of the Bureaucratic State and the Failed Attempts to Overcome it in the Russian Public Service”, Croatian and Comparative Public Administration 4, 2017, pp. 569–591.

  5. 5.

    Jean Baudrillard, Simulacres et Simulation (Paris: Editions Gallilee, 1981).

  6. 6.

    Alexey G. Barabashev and Andrey V. Klimenko, “Russian Governance Changes and Performance”, Chinese Political Science Review 2, no. 1, 2017, pp. 22–39; Alexey G. Barabashev and Tatiana Kastrel, “Education in Public Administration in Russia: New Standards and Trends”, Croatian and Comparative Public Administration 1, 2013, pp. 105–122.

  7. 7.

    Aleksandr V. Obolonsky and Alexey G. Barabashev, “How to Clean Out the Augean Stable of Our Bureaucracy. Two Views”, Russian Politics and Law 52, no. 2, 2014, pp. 77–94.

  8. 8.

    Georgiy A. Borshchevskiy, “Politicheskiye faktory institutsional’nogo razvitiya gosudarstvennoy sluzhby”, Vestnik RUDN, seriya Politologiya 19, no. 4, 2017, pp. 403–411.

  9. 9.

    For literature review and additional sources and explanations of the cyclic essence of Russian public service reform see: A.G. Barabashev, Obzor issledovaniy, zatragivayushchikh izucheniye struktury i khoda sovremennoy reformy gosudarstvennoy sluzhby Rossii, 2018 (https://drive.google.com/open?id=1Zz4zcAr3LAZ0smtA0WyRR9NZ78z3SnNp); A.G. Barabashev and V.N. Prokofiev, Pochemu reformy gosudarstvennoy sluzhby Rossii yavlyayutsya tsiklicheskimi?, 2018 (https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qC99ov3AR8zVUcI8MkmqnbR-C1xNxr4l/view?usp=sharing)

  10. 10.

    Aleksandr Yu. Sungurov, “Rossiyskiye reformy, ikh izucheniye i obsuzhdeniye. Vmesto vvedeniya”, in Aleksandr Yu. Sungurov (ed.), Rossiyskiye reformy: vzglyad iz 2017 goda (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo Norma, 2018), pp. 9–10.

  11. 11.

    For studies of public sector reform in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, see Jan Meyer-Sahling, “Civil Service Reform in Post-communist Europe: The Bumpy Road to Depoliticisation”, West European Politics 27, no. 1, 2004, pp. 69–-101; Katarina Staronova and L. Stanova, Innovatsionnyye elementy reformy gosudarstvennoy sluzhby Slovakii, Sympa, August 2013 (http://sympa-by.eu/sites/default/files/library/amo-slovak_russian.pdf)

  12. 12.

    Tatyana V. Zaytseva (ed.), Reforma gosudarstvennoy sluzhby Rossii: istoriya popytok reformirovaniya s 1992 po 2000 god (Moskva: Ves’ mir, 2003).

  13. 13.

    The Blueprint for Reform of the Public Service of the Russian Federation (No. Pr-1496) was approved by the President on 15 August 2001 (http://base.garant.ru/189260)

  14. 14.

    Aleksandr Yu. Sungurov and Daniil K. Tinyakov, “Administrativnaya reforma i yeye proyekty v sovremennoy Rossii: byli li koalitsii podderzhki?”, Obshchestvennyye nauki i sovremennost’ 2, 2016, pp. 39–51.

  15. 15.

    Administrative representatives of the state expert organizations, as a rule, justify this servile behavior on the ground that they have “the highest knowledge”; that is, that they have complex and deep understanding of social and political processes in comparison to those “irresponsible” experts who are guided by the logic of their research subject. They also claim to better, represent public policy than subject experts in the practical domain. See Sandra M. Nutley, Isabel Walter and H. T. O. Davies, Using Evidence. How Research Can Inform Public Services (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2007); and Richard Freeman, Steven Griggs and Annette Boaz, “The practice of policy making. Evidence & Policy”, Evidence and Policy: A Journal of Research, Debate and Practice 7, no. 2, 2011, pp. 127–136. Moreover, the management of government agencies believes in its right to dominate decision-making on the basis of the “public mandate”; in other words, they claim a greater legitimacy to make decisions than the representatives of expert organizations. Whatever outcomes within the public service, the senior bureaucrats always conclude that they have done their very best. In particular, they insist that the Russian cycle of public service reform simply reflects the normal course of development and that “reform attempts are generally successful”. Experts are urged to be optimists and to see changes in the best light so as “to help, to look for justification, but not to criticize”. In contrast, from the point of view of senior bureaucrats, external (academic) experts, including administrative representatives of expert organizations, are unworthy of having the right to vote in decision-making as they do not possess “the public mandate”, often try to “anticipate decisions” and also “impose” doubtful, unchecked theoretical suppositions on the established practices of the bureaucracy, which threatens the very institution of public service.

  16. 16.

    David Graeber, The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy (Brooklyn: Mellville House, 2015).

  17. 17.

    See the website of the Center of Strategic Research–Tsentr Strategicheskikh Issledovaniy (https://www.csr.ru/).

  18. 18.

    Artem Filipenok, Tsentr Kudrina predlozhil perevesti chinovnikov na «tsifrovoy mentalitet», RBK, 4 May 2018 (https://www.rbc.ru/economics/04/05/2018/5aeb3c439a794797cc22075b)

  19. 19.

    Khasmagomet A. Bekov, Opyt raboty Roskadrov (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo IPK Gossluzhby, 2006).

  20. 20.

    Obolonsky, “Gosudarstvennaya sluzhba”.

  21. 21.

    See the list of experts of the Center of Strategic Research (https://www.csr.ru/spisok-ekspertov/).

  22. 22.

    Mikhail Petrov, Vasiliy Burov, Mariya Shklyaruk, and Andrey Sharov, Gosudarstvo kak platforma. (Kiber)gosudarstvo dlya kiberekonomiki. Tsifrovaya transformatsiya, Tsentr Strategicheskikh Razrabotok, April 2018 (https://www.csr.ru/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/gosudarstvo-kak-platforma_internet.pdf)

  23. 23.

    Alexey G. Barabashev (ed.), Reforma gosudarstvennoy sluzhby Rossiyskoy Federatsii (2000–2003 gody) (Moskva, Izdatel’stvo GU VShE, 2006).

  24. 24.

    Barabashev and Kastrel, “Education in Public Administration in Russia”.

  25. 25.

    Yelena I. Dobrolyubova, Yelena N. Klochkova, and Vladimir N. Yuzhakov, Chislennost’ i oplata truda federal’nykh gosudarstvennykh grazhdanskikh sluzhashchikh v usloviyakh vnedreniya programmno-tselevykh i proyektnykh metodov (Moskva: Delo, 2018); Tatyana A. Zhuravleva, “Sistema oplaty truda i motivatsiya gosudarstvennykh grazhdanskikh sluzhashchikh: obzor mezhdunarodnoy praktiki”, Gosudarstvennoye upravleniye. Elektronnyy vestnik 64, 2017, pp. 331–345 (http://e-journal.spa.msu.ru/uploads/vestnik/2017/vipusk__64._oktjabr_2017_g./pravovie_i_polititcheskie_aspekti_upravlenija/zhuravleva.pdf); Vladimir N. Yuzhakov, Yelena I. Dobrolyubova, Oleg V. Aleksandrov, Lyudmila N. Tatarinova, and Yelena V. Maslennikova, Praktika i perspektivy razvitiya mer material’nogo stimulirovaniya gosudarstvennykh grazhdanskikh sluzhashchikh (Moskva, Izdatel’stvo Delo, 2016), p. 224; Tatyana V. Zaytseva, “Material’noye stimulirovaniye gosudarstvennykh grazhdanskikh sluzhashchikh v usloviyakh ogranichennogo byudzhetnogo finansirovaniya”, Voprosy gosudarstvennogo i munitsipal’nogo upravleniya 4, 2016, pp. 179–196; Mikhail A. Chekin, Oplata sluzhebnoy deyatel’nosti gosudarstvennykh grazhdanskikh sluzhashchikh Rossii: Istoriya, praktika, eksperimenty, perspektivy (Moskva: NIU VShE, 2014); Andrey V. Klimenko and Nikolay N. Klishch, “Mozhno li sekonomit’ na byurokratii?”, Voprosy gosudarstvennogo i munitsipal’nogo upravleniya 3, 2013, pp. 90–109; Yevgeniy N. Tishchenko, “Sostav i sootnosheniye stimuliruyushchikh elementov oplaty truda gosudarstvennykh sluzhashchikh v Rossiyskoy Federatsii i v zarubezhnykh stranakh”, Voprosy gosudarstvennogo i munitsipal’nogo upravleniya 4, 2012, pp. 160–168; Anastasiya A. Bozh’ya-Volya, “Organizatsiya otsenki rezul’tativnosti deyatel’nosti gosudarstvennykh sluzhashchikh s uchetom administrativnoy modeli”, Voprosy gosudarstvennogo i munitsipal’nogo upravleniya 3, 2011, pp. 62–73.

  26. 26.

    The 2018 data on income of the Ministry of Finance (https://www.minfin.ru/ru/om/anticorMK/korr-sved-imucsh/) and of the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Russian Federation (https://rosmintrud.ru/ministry/anticorruption/income) are online.

  27. 27.

    Tatyana V. Zaytseva, “Kadrovyy potentsial gosudarstvennoy organizatsii: metody komplektovaniya i professional’noy rasstanovki kadrov”, Voprosy gosudarstvennogo i munitsipal’nogo upravleniya 1, 2010, pp. 180–188.

  28. 28.

    Mintrud, Gosudarstvennaya grazhdanskaya sluzhba, Mintrud Rossii, 18 June 2013 (https://rosmintrud.ru/ministry/programms/gossluzhba)

  29. 29.

    Vadim N. Prokofiev, “Institut prezidentstva i politicheskiye partii, predstavlennyye v GD SF FS RF”, Konstitutsionnyye i munitsipal’noye pravo 2, 2018, pp. 32–43.

  30. 30.

    The establishment of such a council was approved in June 1993 but is currently inactive.

  31. 31.

    Andrew Graham, The Legitimacy, Powers, Accountability and Oversight of Public Administration in a Democratic State, School of Policy Studies–Queens University, November 2006, p. 2 (http://post.queensu.ca/~grahama/publications/BASISOFPUBLICADMIN.pdf)

  32. 32.

    Vladimir A. Sulemov, Gosudarstvennaya kadrovaya politika v sovremennoy Rossii: teoriya, istoriya, novyye realii (Moskva: Izd-vo RAGS, 2006); Natal’ya L. Ivanova and Oleg A. Vasil’yev, “Kadrovaya politika v gosudarstvennom upravlenii: problemy i poiski ikh resheniya”, Voprosy gosudarstvennogo i munitsipal’nogo upravleniya 2, 2011, pp. 171–186; Aleksandr V. Novokreshchonov, Gosudarstvennaya kadrovaya politika (Novosibirsk: SibAGS, 2016).

  33. 33.

    The work of the council should not be replaced by the activity of the senior authorities of ministries and departments, administrators of government bodies. The role of senior authorities must be severely limited. We insist, that the council should be a professional expert reform leader, not an organizational structure in which senior state managers rule. For this purpose, unlike the current arrangements, the head of such a council should be a representative of the expert community and not a government appointee.

  34. 34.

    The director of this agency should also be on the management board of the personnel council and should have a “soft veto” on the decisions (including draft laws) of state bodies pursuing narrow departmental interests.

  35. 35.

    William Easterly, The Tyranny of Experts. Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor (New York: Basic Books, 2013).

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Barabashev, A., Prokofiev, V. (2019). Why Reforms of Public Service of Russia Are Cyclic: An Institutional Explanation from a Liberal Perspective. In: Cucciolla, R.M. (eds) Dimensions and Challenges of Russian Liberalism. Philosophy and Politics - Critical Explorations, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05784-8_12

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