Abstract
Two components of all that I argued for in my three papers of 1966 and 1968 had an immense impact on subsequent philosophy, not via my publications, but via subsequent publications of others. As a result, my work was ignored and forgotten. The outcome was that the overall theme of my three papers has been ignored by subsequent philosophy, and still is ignored, to the detriment of work on the mind-body problem and the philosophy of physics up to 2017, as I reveal in this chapter. First, my refutation of Hume on causation was taken up by others, but in what I can only regard as a debased form, in that this work on causation and physical essentialism appeals to a dubious notion of “natural necessity” and not to logical or analytic necessity, which is what I employ in my 1968 paper. Despite inspiring some of this subsequent work, my 1968 paper has been ignored and forgotten. Second, my argument that physics cannot predict experiential facts such as “I see a red rose” had an enormous impact via its exposition by Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson in papers published eight and twenty years after mine. The result was that my earlier work was ignored – and still is ignored. In this chapter I discuss recent contributions to The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on topics related to the mind-body problem, and show that aspects of my work of 1966 and 1968 are still ignored, to the detriment of work in this field. I conclude by giving a brief account of more recent work of mine on the mind-body problem and the more general human world/physical universe problem, also ignored by the main body of work in this field in philosophy.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
In my 1966 paper I formulated the problem like this: “To what extent, in what sense, may the discoveries of physics legitimately conflict with our ordinary common sense views about the world based on our ordinary experience?”: Maxwell (1966, p. 295).
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
Bas van Fraassen entirely overlooks this solution to the problem too in criticizing those who argue for laws that are metaphysically necessary in van Fraassen (1989). Brian Ellis, who knows of my 1968 paper on necessary connections, ignores the point too. During the course of arguing that the laws of nature are necessary metaphysically, Ellis pours scorn on the idea that laws could be necessary analytically. This would imply, he remarks, “that the laws of nature are not discovered, but stipulated”: see Ellis (2001, p. 33).
- 7.
This pattern of initial neglect and subsequent misrepresentation in the work of others that greeted my 1968 paper refuting Hume is a pattern that has greeted much of my early work on the metaphysics of science – as we shall see in what follows.
- 8.
By hard-line physicalism I mean the doctrine that physicalism is true and the whole truth, so that nothing but the physical exists. For a critical survey of diverse attempts to solve the mind-body problem – or the more general physical universe/human world problem – see Maxwell (2001a, ch. 4).
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
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Dehaene (2014, pp. 259–266).
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
This is a general feature of philosophy. All too often, solving a philosophical problem involves transforming the problem to be solved – to the extent, even, of pursuing an aim diametrically opposed to that which has been pursued hitherto fore. Radically improve the problem, and it is easily solved. Here, the problem “How can we understand the profound mystery of the experiential, granted that that part of science reducible to physics tells us nothing about it?” needs to be transformed into “What precisely does physics seek to tell us about the world?”.
- 16.
This even more graphically illustrates the point that, often, 99% of solving a philosophical problem involves adopting an aim that is the very opposite of the one that has hitherto been sought, as a result radically transforming the problem to be solved.
- 17.
I made this suggestion towards the end of Maxwell (2011a).
- 18.
From the outset I have pursued philosophy in this spirit – and put myself at odds with most of my colleagues as a result (no doubt part of the reason for the neglect of my work): see my first three papers discussed in the previous chapter, and see especially Maxwell (1974, 1976a, 1976b, 1980, 1984). I argue explicitly that philosophy should be reformed so that it takes, as its basic task, to tackle our fundamental problem of thought and life imaginatively and critically (that is, rationally), in Maxwell (2001a, pp. 3–6), and subsequently in Maxwell (2014b, especially ch. 2; 2017b). I was in part inspired to do so by the example of Karl Popper who also, from the outset, tackled serious, fundamental problems of thought and life rationally, especially in his first four books: Popper (1959, 1961, 1962, 1963); see also Popper (1976).
- 19.
- 20.
This theme will be developed much further in Chaps. 3, 4 and 5 of the present book.
- 21.
I first suggested this control model in Maxwell (1984, pp. 175–8 and 259–75), and subsequently in Maxwell (1985a), where I stated “Enhancement of consciousness may well be associated with the development of subordinate control systems of the brain, facilitating imagination, planning, speech, and so on. The reasonable conjecture, in line with the evolutionary approach, is to associate consciousness in us with that neurological feature of our brain which most closely corresponds to that which achieves overall control in the simplest mammalian brain” (p. 20). The hierarchical control model was further elaborated and discussed in Maxwell (2001a, ch. 8), where I suggested that consciousness, construed as the master control system, be identified with the limbic system (or the mid brain more generally), and those parts of the brain with which the limbic system is in strong, two way interaction, moment by moment, as conscious awareness shifts from this to that.
- 22.
- 23.
In Maxwell (1984, pp. 175–8), I indicate how and why the capacity to imagine has survival value, and I suggest that we, and animals, may dream to exercise and develop the capacity to imagine. I even suggest that we sleep so that we may dream.
- 24.
Maxwell (1985a).
- 25.
See Maxwell (2001a, ch. 8).
- 26.
See Maxwell (1985a).
- 27.
See Dennett (1992) – see, for example, pp. 253–6.
- 28.
Nagel (1974).
- 29.
See my From Knowledge to Wisdom (1984), ch. 8, replies to objections 6 and 7, and chs. 9 and 10; Methodological Problems of Neuroscience (1985a); The Mind-Body Problem and Explanatory Dualism (2000b); The Human World in the Physical Universe (2001a); How Can Life of Value Best Flourish in the Real World? (2009a); Cutting God in Half – And Putting the Pieces Together Again (2010a); Reply to Comments on Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom (2010b); Three Philosophical Problems about Consciousness and their Possible Resolution (2011a); Arguing for Wisdom in the University; An Intellectual Autobiography (2012a); Global Philosophy: What Philosophy Ought to Be (2014a); In Praise of Natural Philosophy: A Revolution for Thought and Life (2017b), especially ch. 4 and 6; Our Fundamental Problem: A Revolutionary Approach to Philosophy (forthcoming).
- 30.
Jackson (1986).
- 31.
See note 42 of chapter one, and associated text.
- 32.
This is a generalization of the problem discussed in “Physics and Common Sense”. It is formulated in this way, and tackled in Maxwell (2001a). See also Maxwell (1984, ch. 10; 2010a, 2014b, chs. 2 and 3; forthcoming).
- 33.
See note 43 of chapter one.
- 34.
The great blunder is to allow the argument for the physical view of the universe to drive the experiential entirely out of the universe around us, so that it becomes confined to that minute part of the universe where its existence is very hard to deny: our brains. This process of driving out the experiential is to be resisted at the outset! The world around us as we experience it really does exist, even if it has aspects – physical aspects – of which we ordinarily know nothing.
- 35.
- 36.
My first three publications, Maxwell (1966, 1968a, 1968b) receive no mention at all. But nor do relevant subsequent publications that develop my approach to the mind-body problem and the human world/physical universe problem further: Maxwell (1984, 1998, 2000b, 2001a), to say nothing of subsequent publications: see note 29. All the Stanford Encyclopedia entries discussed were revised in 2015 or later.
- 37.
In June 2018 I could discover just three very brief references to my work (on time, analysis of knowledge, and wisdom), and one of them is only there because I contacted the editor, Edward Zalta. Around 2005, I noticed that the Encyclopedia had no entry on wisdom. I suggested to the editor that there ought to be such an entry, and referred to my extensive work on the urgent need to transform academic inquiry so that the basic aim becomes wisdom, to indicate that wisdom is a topic discussed by modern philosophers. Some time after the entry by Sharon Ryan appeared, I noticed that she said of my book From Knowledge to Wisdom (1984) that it argued that wisdom should be interpreted as knowledge. Very politely, I pointed out to Ryan that this was a grotesque mischaracterization of the basic thesis of my work. She apologized, and said the reference would be corrected when she revised the entry. During the course of writing the present book, I had another look at her entry on wisdom, and discovered that she now referred to my work in the following terms: “Nicholas Maxwell (1984), in his argument to revolutionize education, argues that we should be teaching for wisdom, which he sharply distinguishes from standard academic knowledge” (a sentence that is still placed under the heading “wisdom as knowledge”): See Ryan (2018). What Ryan says here does justice to what Robert Sternberg has argued over the years, but not to what I have argued. The “correction” has supplied another grotesque mischaracterization of my work. From Knowledge to Wisdom argues that we need urgently to bring about a revolution in academic inquiry as a whole so that the basic aim becomes to seek and promote wisdom, and not just acquire knowledge, as we shall see in a bit more detail towards the end of the present book. I have emailed Ryan again; perhaps when this book is published, her wisdom entry will represent my work in a slightly more accurate way.
- 38.
Stoljar (2017).
- 39.
Yalowitz (2014).
- 40.
Davidson (1970).
- 41.
Google scholar says Davidson’s 1970 article has been cited at least 2458 times, to be compared with the 12 citations of my 1968 article “Understanding Sensations”.
- 42.
It would seem to me that one might hope for correlations between (some) mental processes and brain processes, the latter characterized in an appropriate, simplifying way. Correlations between the mental and the physical would inevitably be horrendously complex.
- 43.
- 44.
- 45.
Tye (2017).
- 46.
Levine (1983).
- 47.
See Appendix, especially Part II, for reasons for rejecting Kripke on contingent and necessary identity. Part I of the Appendix, which first appeared in Maxwell (2000a, appendix 2), sets out to show that contingent identities with rigid designators are perfectly possible.
- 48.
Nida-Rümelin (2015).
- 49.
- 50.
Smart (2017).
- 51.
See Appendix, especially Part II.
- 52.
Van Gulick (2018).
- 53.
The additional difficulty that it is hard to see how electrons with mental qualities could all be indistinguishable from one another in the way predicted by quantum theory is not discussed.
- 54.
See Maxwell (2000b). The argument was expounded above in chapter one (see text associated with notes 29–32), and summed up in point (5) towards the end of that chapter.
- 55.
The theory is spelled out in a little more detail in Maxwell (2011a).
- 56.
Stubenberg (2018).
- 57.
In general, philosophy should try to aid the pursuit of knowledge and understanding in other fields, not create insurmountable barriers to such knowledge!
- 58.
- 59.
Bickle et al. (2012).
- 60.
See Maxwell (2000b, pp. 57–61; 2001a, pp. 111–2). What Paul Churchland calls “folk psychology”, to be replaced one day by scientific psychology, I call “person-to-person understanding” – Maxwell (1984, pp. 183–9) – or “personalistic understanding” – Maxwell (2001a, ch. 5), and I argue that, within the genuinely rational kind of inquiry of wisdom-inquiry, these modes of understanding would be recognized and treated as intellectually fundamental, fundamental even to science – as I argued very briefly in chapter one.
- 61.
Maund (2018).
- 62.
Kirk (2015).
- 63.
Robinson (2015).
- 64.
Kim (1993).
- 65.
- 66.
Maxwell (1968b, p. 127).
- 67.
Robb and Heil (2014).
- 68.
See Robb and Heil (2014).
- 69.
See Maxwell (1968b, 1984, 2000b, 2001a). This third “dovetailing together” requirement is, incidentally, glaringly at odds with Davidson’s anomalous monism. It is a consequence of the first two requirements, and thus not really an additional requirement. It is only possible for physical and personalistic explanations of one and the same person both to be true if there is a dovetailing together of the two explanations, to an astonishing extent.
- 70.
First, the question “What role does the mental aspect of mental processes play in causing action?” needs to be replaced with the (almost equivalent) question “What role does the mental aspect of mental processes play in the causal explanation of action?”. Then, this latter question needs to be replaced by “What role does the mental aspect of mental processes play in that other, wholly authentic, irreducible mode of explanation, applicable to human beings, namely personalistic explanation?”.
- 71.
For references to this work see note 29.
- 72.
- 73.
This argument is spelled out in Maxwell (2001a, pp. 146–7).
- 74.
A head process is a process going on inside the head of a conscious person, leaving it open as to whether it is just a neurological process, or whether it is a conscious process as well.
- 75.
“Control” can have a merely purposive meaning; and it can also be interpreted as having a “personalistic” meaning, the presupposition being that sentience or consciousness is involved.
- 76.
It might be summed up like this. The mental aspect of a brain process that occurs in my brain is its control aspect, its role in my conscious control of my ensuing mental processes and actions. What I am aware of – if I am aware correctly – is that feature of the brain process that occurs in the true personalistic explanation of what I do. Implicit in holding that my brain process has such and such a mental aspect there is – given experiential physicalism – the presupposition that, as a result of the brilliant design of my brain, its state and function, the brain process in question interacts causally with other brain processes in just the way required for it to be the mental process I am aware of. In holding a brain process to have such and such a mental aspect, in other words, we implicitly require an extraordinary amount of brain design, state and functioning to be true, so that the mental-physical process in question can perform causally in the way required for it to have the control feature it must have, so that it can feature appropriately in the true personalistic explanation of what I do. Given all this, the question “What is the causal function of the mental aspect of a brain process?” seems astonishingly inept, and beside the point. A brain process B only has the mental aspect it does have because of its physical state and its occurrence in the context of complex physical conditions concerning brain design, functioning and states – all required for the brain process B to behave as it needs to, to have the control or mental features in question.
- 77.
First formulated in Maxwell (2010b). See also Maxwell (forthcoming, ch. 5).
- 78.
This paragraph and the previous two are taken from Maxwell (forthcoming, ch. 5).
- 79.
- 80.
Dennett (1995).
- 81.
In reality, many mutations would be required, over a period of time, to change legs into flippers (and to make other changes), mutations and changes in behaviour being incremental, during this time. These complications do not change the basic point that a change in purposive action is the key initial change, and this has nothing to do with anything genetic.
- 82.
Sexual selection, habitat selection, offspring selection, the role of predator/prey, are all acknowledged, but not interpreted as constituting purposive action of living things playing a part in the mechanisms of Darwinian evolution, purposive action thus having a vital role in the mechanisms of evolution.
- 83.
A basic task of Darwinian theory is to help explain how and why the pattern of purposive comprehensibility has become superimposed on the pattern of physical comprehensibility. In order to make this intelligible, Darwinian theory needs to exploit both kinds of patterns of comprehensibility – both modes of explanation, physical and purposive. This threatens to sabotage the capacity of Darwinian theory to explain how purposiveness has evolved in a purposeless universe (by presupposing the very thing to be explained). But as long as the principle of non-circularity is observed, this threat is kept at bay.
- 84.
There is a sense in which this unique-matching theory exploits an idea of David Chalmers – although I developed the idea in ignorance of Chalmers’ proposal. Chalmers has put forward a “principle of structural coherence” that asserts that, as far as human brains and states of consciousness are concerned, structural features of brain process space match structural features of conscious experience space: see (Chalmers, 1996, pp. 222–5). Michael Lockwood (1989, pp. 109–210) indicates a similar idea. The unique-matching theory is, in effect, an extension of, and a particular application of, Chalmers’ principle.
- 85.
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Maxwell, N. (2018). Chapter 2 Subsequent Work on Essentialism and the Mind-Body Problem. In: The Metaphysics of Science and Aim-Oriented Empiricism. Synthese Library, vol 403. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04143-4_2
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