Abstract
The overall aim of this book is to develop an account of the nature of the reasons for scientific realism. So far, our aims have been negative or defensive: they have been to show that the (sceptical) arguments against the rationality of realism are (mostly) flawed. In this chapter we begin task of exploring the arguments that have been advanced for realism.
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Notes
- 1.
See J. J. C. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism (Routledge, 1963), Hilary Putnam, Matter, Mathematics and Method, p. 73) Richard Boyd “On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism” in Erkenntnis, 19, pp. 45–90., Alan Musgrave “The Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism” in R. Nola (ed), Relativism and Realism in Sciences, (Dordrecht, Kluwer), Jarrett Leplin A Novel Argument for Scientific Realism, (OUP, 1997), Stathis Psillos, Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks the Truth (London, Routledge, 1999.)
- 2.
Again, we here overlook the difficulties associated with the principle of indifference.
- 3.
One influential account of this sort is developed in H. Jeffreys Theory of Probability (Oxford, Clarendon, 1961). His initial account applied to laws expressed as differential equations. He argued that, given that some candidate laws expressed as differential equations can all account for some body of data D, the more complex the differential equation, the less likely it is that it should be the correct law. The complexity of the differential equation E is given by K = a + b + c, where a = the order of the differential equation, b = its degree and c = the absolute value of the coefficients in it. Then, Jeffreys argued, the probability that E is correct is given by 2−K.
- 4.
See H. Akaike “Information Theory and an Extension of the Maximum Likelihood Principle” in Petrov, B. N. and Csaki, F. 2nd International Symposium on Information Theory, Armenia, 1971, Akademiai Kiado, pp. 267–281.
- 5.
See Gideon E. Schwarz “Estimating the dimension of a model” in Annals of Statistics 6 (2), pp. 451–464. (1978).
- 6.
The argument given assumes that either both properties are observational or both are theoretical. It is, of course, possible, that one is observational and the other is theoretical. However, it is plain that this would not help us to establish realist claims. If one of them (Pb, say) is theoretical, then the question would arise: how can we establish its values. And: if we cannot, we can use criteria such as AIC to establish the mostly likely relationship between the variables.
- 7.
See K. Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Section 43.
- 8.
See Michael Friedman “Explanation and Scientific Understanding” in The Journal of Philosophy 71 (1974), pp. 5–19.
- 9.
See W. Derske On Simplicity and Elegance (Eburon Press, 1992). Similar ideas, relating aesthetic value to simplification or unity of complexity (together with intensity), were developed by Monroe Beardsley in Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (Harcourt, Brace and World, 1958).
- 10.
See David Lewis Counterfactuals (Basil Blackwell, 1973), p. 87 A similar sentiment was once expressed by Elliot Sober “What is the Problem of Simplicity?” in Zellner, A., Keuzenkamp, H. McAleer, M. Simplicity, Inference and Modelling (Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 13–31.
- 11.
See Elliot Sober Ockham’s Razors (Cambridge University Press, 2015). On pp. 144–145 Sober does say that the Akaike Information Criterion may have some relevance for what the realist is trying to do, but he makes no claim scientific realism can be established in this way.
- 12.
This definition comes from K. Mainzer Symmetries of Nature (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1996).
- 13.
That such a justification can be given is defended in the present author’s Explaining Science’s Success: How Scientific Knowledge Works (Acumen, 2014).
- 14.
That coherence with other theories is a desideratum of scientific theories has been defended by, for example, Larry Laudan Progress and Its Problems (Routledge and Kegan Paul), 1977.<?spieprPar65?>
- 15.
Peter Lipton Inference to the Best Explanation (Routledge, 1991).
- 16.
See for example Peter Lipton “Is Explanation a Guide to Inference? A Reply to Wesley C. Salmon” in G. Hon and S. S Rakover (eds) Explanation: Theoretical Approaches and Applications, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), pp. 93–120.
- 17.
See for example Lipton (1991), pp. 158–184, pp. 188–189.
- 18.
See Lipton (1991), esp. pp. 59–60.
- 19.
See Lipton (1991), p. 122.
- 20.
See Lipton (1991), pp. 80–90.
- 21.
One point to note is that although the “cadaverous matter” was not visible, it was not altogether undetectable by the unaided senses. It had a putrid smell, and Semmelweis recommended washing the hands with calcium hypochlorite because this proved to be the most effective method of removing the smell. So, Semmelweis’s explanation did not postulate something entirely unobservable to the unaided senses. But Scientific Realists surely want to be able to say we can have good reason for postulating the existence of something that is not detectable to any of the unaided senses. However, this point is perhaps is of no great relevance in this context since, plausibly, Semmelweis’s explanation would still have been a good one even if the cadaverous matter had not had a detectable smell.
- 22.
See P. Kitcher “Real Realism: The Galilean Strategy” in The Philosophical Review, 110, (2001), pp. 151–197.
- 23.
In Philosophy and Scientific Realism, p. 47, J. J. C. Smart notes that the way in which a detective might put various pieces of evidence together to arrive at the hypothesis that a burglar was responsible for a crime bears some similarity to the way a scientist forms hypotheses. Smart’s passage is sometimes seen as an early statement of the “no miracles” argument. But Smart can perhaps also be seen as getting as something similar to Kitcher’s Galilean strategy. If the detective’s activities have led to the hypothesis that there is a burglar, and it turns out that there really was a burglar, the we have evidence that the detective’s methods have led us to truths. And if the methods of the scientists are similar to those of the detective, then would thereby have reason to believe the methods of the scientist also leads us to truths.
- 24.
That this defence of IBE can be represented as an Eddington inference was pointed out to me by a referee for this series.
- 25.
Authors who have emphasised the importance of novel predictive success include Alan Musgrave “The Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism” in Robert Nola (ed) Relativism and Realism in Science, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 229–252. Jarrett Leplin A Novel Defence of Scientific Realism Oxford University Press, 1997, Stathis Psillos Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks the Truth, Routledge 1999.
- 26.
This point is made in Musgrave “The Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism” in Nola.
- 27.
See Jarrett Leplin A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism (Oxford University Press, 1997).
- 28.
See Leplin op cit., p. 77.
- 29.
Leplin seems to allow this in his discussion of underdetermination and empirical equivalence. See Leplin, op cit., p. 155.
- 30.
See for example, John McDowell “Physicalism and Primitive Denotation: Field on Tarski” in Erkenntnis, 1978, v.13, pp. 131–152. and Michael Levin “What kind of explanation is truth?” in J. Leplin Scientific Realism (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984), pp. 124–139.
- 31.
Deployment Realism is developed in Stathis Psillos Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks the Truth (Routledge, 1999). A form of deployment realism is also advocated in Wright, J. Science and the Theory of Rationality (Avebury, 1991).
- 32.
Psillos, op cit, p. 108.
- 33.
See Larry Laudan “A Confutation of Convergent Realism” in Jarrett Leplin (ed), Scientific Realism, (University of California Press, 1984), pp. 218–249., esp. p. 225.
- 34.
This point is made in Philip Kitcher The Advancement of Science (Oxford University Press, 1993) pp. 144–149.
- 35.
See T. Lyons “Scientific Realism and the Pessimistic Meta-Modus Tollens” in Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science edited by S. Clarke and T. Lyons (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), pp. 63–90. See also G. Doppelt “Empirical Success or Explanatory Success: What Does Current Scientific Realism Need to Explain?” Philosophy of Science 72 (2005), pp. 1076–1087.
- 36.
See, for example, Doppelt op cit, also Doppelt, G. “Reconstructing Scientific Realism to Rebut the Pessimistic Meta-Induction” in Philosophy of Science, 74, (2007) pp. 96–118. In the opinion of the present author, deployment realism would seem to get in to difficulty with cases such as the caloric theory of heat, phlogiston and Rankine’s theory of heat. For an opposing point of view, see M. Alai “Deployment vs Discriminatory Realism” in New Thinking about Scientific Realism, http://www.philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10551/
- 37.
Psillos op cit, appeals to simplicity, coherence, consilience and related criteria to here justify a preference for one theory over another.
- 38.
See Psillos op cit, pp. 107–108. This position is also defended in Wright, J. Science and the Theory of Rationality (Avebury, 1991).
- 39.
One novel predictive success of phlogiston was its prediction that heating the calx of mercury would result in the creation of an “air” that supported combustion more vigorously than does ordinary air.
- 40.
See Hutchison (2002), pp. 94–95.
- 41.
A reader of an earlier draft of this chapter objected that it is highly implausible to say that, for example, the phenomena available at the time Rankine was working could have been explained by the theory we now believe to be true, since many of the concepts – specifically, quantum-theoretic concepts – were not available to any theorist working at the same time as Rankine. However, it seems to me that this objection relies on an ambiguity of the expression “could have been explained by”. Of course, as a matter of practical fact, no one working at the time of Rankine could have come up with a modern quantum-mechanical explanation. But still, an explanation using modern concepts would logically entail descriptions of the phenomena with which Rankine is concerned. Rankine’s phenomena are “explainable by” modern theory simply in the sense that (descriptions of) Rankine’s phenomena are logically entailed by modern theory. The fact that no one at the time of Rankine would have been able to come up with our modern explanation is irrelevant.
- 42.
Avogadro’s Number of a given type of molecule is one “mole” of molecules of that type. Unhelpfully, however, a “mole” of a given type of molecule is standardly defended in textbooks as Avogadro’s Number of those molecules. A more helpful way of explaining Avogadro’s Number is as follows: one gramme of hydrogen is said to contain Avogadro’s Number of hydrogen atoms. Similarly, 12 grammes of carbon-12 contain Avogadro’s number of carbon atoms. If an element has atomic weight N. then N grammes of that element contain Avogadro’s Number of atoms of that element. The value of Avogadro’s Number is about 6.022 × 1023.
- 43.
I think this is part of the ordinary, lay person’s conception of an atom. Of course, perhaps the “collapse of the wave packet” shows that in some sense the discreteness of a photon is somehow a by-product of the operations we perform on it, and does not exist independently of us.
The relation that the quantum theoretic “collapse of the wave-packet” due to the influence of the observer has to the issues presently under consideration seems to me to be very complex. However, I think it is fair to say that that the “core” content of “There exist atoms” or “There exist molecules” is something like: “There exist tiny bits of matter, with the properties that bits of matter generally have, and which are responsible for certain observable effects.” Perhaps atoms and so on are subject to certain “weird” quantum theoretic effects. But then, so are all bits of matter, although the detectability of those effects at the level of things like tables and chairs may be much less. If all bits of matter are subject to these effects, then the assertion that there are bits of matter too small to see, and with the same properties as bits of matter we can see, remains unaffected.
- 44.
See Mixture and Chemical Combination and Related Essays by Pierre Duhem, edited and translated with an Introduction by Paul Needham, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, v 223, (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), p. 92.
- 45.
For a discussion of the notion of contrastive confirmation see Jake Chandler “Contrastive Confirmation: Some Competing Accounts” Synthese (2013), v190, pp. 129–138.
- 46.
For a general survey, see James Ladyman “Structural Realism” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N Zalta (2014) http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/structural-realism/
- 47.
I take it this is the position of John Worrall “Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?” in Dialectica vol 43 (1989), pp. 99–124.
Bibliography
Hutchison, K. (2002). Miracle or mystery: Hypotheses and predictions in Rankine’s thermodynamics. In S. Clarke, & T. Lyons (2002) (pp. 91–120).
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Wright, J. (2018). Realism and Inference to the Best Explanation. In: An Epistemic Foundation for Scientific Realism. Synthese Library, vol 402. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02218-1_4
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