The certification of software for use in safety-critical systems is a requirement in many domains: defence, aerospace, rail, nuclear. However, there is still significant variance in the practice of software safety assurance across these different domains. This paper compares two quite different approaches (software safety case development under the UK Defence Standard 00–56, and software assurance under the civil aerospace guidance document DO-178B.) The paper highlights both the similarities and differences between these approaches. Ultimately, we consider whether there are any circumstances under which they can be considered to be compatible.
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Kelly, T.P. (2008). Can Process-Based and Product-Based Approaches to Software Safety Certification be Reconciled?. In: Redmill, F., Anderson, T. (eds) Improvements in System Safety. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84800-100-8_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-84800-100-8_1
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