Abstract
This article deals with the influence of the structure of the Board of Directors, external and internal discipline and size on corporate performance in the economic and financial fields. By using firstly, self organising maps, and secondly, panel data, we highlight three main results. Firstly, our results suggest, from a sample of 136 firms, that the relation between the structure of the Board of Directors and performance is non-linear. Furthermore, one can observe that the least effective firms are those in which the proportion of outside directors is the highest. Secondly, variables of leverage, and stock turnover are the main explanatory variables of performance. Although leverage has a negative influence on performance (Opler, Titman 1994) conversely, stock turnover has a beneficial impact (Charreaux 1997). Thirdly, variables of concentration of ownership structure and size have a positive, but non-significant, influence on performance.
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Severin, E. (2003). Mechanisms of discipline and corporate performance: Evidence from France. In: Lesage, C., Cottrell, M. (eds) Connectionist Approaches in Economics and Management Sciences. Advances in Computational Management Science, vol 6. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3722-6_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3722-6_9
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