Abstract
Security of protocols for network communication has received considerable attention in recent years. We concentrate on ensuring the security of cryptographic protocols in distributed systems.
In a distributed system, beyond eavesdropping, a saboteur may impersonate another user or alter messages being sent. A saboteur who is also a user may send conflicting messages or use other illegal messages in order to uncover secret information.
The problem we address, in its most general form, is: “given a multi-party protocol which is provably secure when all the participants monitor every message being sent, can the protocol be modified to be secure in a distributed system?”
We use the Byzantine Agreement, Crusader Agreement, and other specific checks to improve protocols by making them secure in a general distributed network. We examine the trade-off between detection of faulty behaviour and the number of messages exchanged.
Part of this work has been done while the first author visited IBM Research Center, San Jose, California.
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Dolev, D., Wigderson, A. (1983). On the Security of Multi-Party Protocols in Distributed Systems. In: Chaum, D., Rivest, R.L., Sherman, A.T. (eds) Advances in Cryptology. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-0602-4_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-0602-4_15
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