Abstract
Superficially similar to agents’ exploitation of an intervention is the well known pattern of goal displacement, whereby an instrumental value becomes a terminal value. Thus, it might be argued that a bureaucratic incumbent derives gratification from adherence to regulations and the exercise of delegated powers and competencies quite apart from goal achievement, suggesting a certain amount of self-serving exploitation of the role. Unlike exploitation, however, the presumed benefits of devoting oneself to the most efficient means are enjoined, while exploitation, as that term was used in the preceding chapter, denotes behavior that is largely optional and self-serving. In short, the bureaucrat’s compulsive attention to means is a positive requirement.
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© 1981 Plenum Press, New York
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Sieber, S.D. (1981). Goal Displacement. In: Fatal Remedies. Environment, Development, and Public Policy Public Policy and Social Services. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-7456-5_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-7456-5_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4684-7458-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-4684-7456-5
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