Abstract
An ecosystem model, with exploiters and conservationists is examined in a game-theoretic set up. The Nash-equilibrium solution is derived for two conservation strategies: conservation of the resource and interference with the exploiters’ effort. I show that direct interference leads to a more effective conservation, whereas conservation of the resource, particularly when it is modeled as a rate, leads to de facto subsidy of the exploiters.
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© 1990 Birkhäuser Boston
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Cohen, Y. (1990). The Exploiters Conservationists Game: How to be an Effective Conservationist. In: Vincent, T.L., Mees, A.I., Jennings, L.S. (eds) Dynamics of Complex Interconnected Biological Systems. Mathematical Modelling, vol 6. Birkhäuser Boston. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-6784-0_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-6784-0_15
Publisher Name: Birkhäuser Boston
Print ISBN: 978-1-4684-6786-4
Online ISBN: 978-1-4684-6784-0
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