Abstract
The relationship of a genetic counselor and his patients is a delicate, complex and important one. Treating as it does subjects of great moment—the prevention of crippling diseases, even life and death themselves—it commands growing public interest and scrutiny, especially as the counselor’s predictive skills increase. It involves not only parents but geneticists, physicians, ministers, and others, in more lengthy and careful contemplation of the conception and birth of a child than occurs in any other type of “planned parenthood.” Its highly charged subject matter and deeply involved participants open it to the internal and external pressures which encumber all significant decisions. Yet when we look at the moral and legal rights of the participants in genetic counseling, the picture before us begins to grow less distinct, and we inevitably see only the sharp features, outlined in black and white and not the interesting shadings of gray.
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References
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Our discussion has focused solely on the rights and duties relating to liability for negligent advice. Time does not permit an exploration of the myriad other rights and duties which arise from the geneticist-patient relationship or of the limitations (and their remedies, if any) which are placed on the exercise of these rights and duties by internal and external constraints. Some exploration of these problems especially concerning informed consent, appears in my “Law of Genetic Therapy” in The New Genetics and the Future of Man, M. Hamilton, editor, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans (1972), and see Hans Jonas, “Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects,” 98 Daedalus 219 (1969)
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© 1976 Plenum Press, New York
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Capron, A.M. (1976). Legal Rights and Moral Rights. In: Humber, J.M., Almeder, R.F. (eds) Biomedical Ethics and the Law. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-2223-8_28
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-2223-8_28
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