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Optimally Incomplete Contracts

  • Chapter
The Allocation of Limited Entrepreneurial Attention

Abstract

One of the critical roles for the entrepreneur in successfully starting a new firm and introducing new products or services is to mobilize the necessary resources. These activities include hiring employees and lining up suppliers of intermediate goods and services. Both of these activities involve contracting with other parties. Therefore, the issues dealt with in the economics of contracting are of great importance to a theory of entrepreneurship. One of these issues is the implication of incomplete contracts. Although there is a vast literature on this topic, the approach of most of this literature is to assume that the contract already exists and that it is incomplete due to exogenous contracting costs, unforeseen contingencies or indescribable states.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Rutgers University, USA

    Sharon Gifford

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  1. Sharon Gifford
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© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Gifford, S. (1998). Optimally Incomplete Contracts. In: The Allocation of Limited Entrepreneurial Attention. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5605-3_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5605-3_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-7564-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-5605-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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