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Monopoly Leveraging, Path Dependency, and the Case for a Local Competition Threshold for RBOC Entry into Interlata Toll

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Regulation Under Increasing Competition

Part of the book series: Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series ((TREP,volume 30))

Abstract

One of the cornerstones of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (without which the Act probably would not have been passed) is Section 271.1 This Section establishes the criteria under which the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) will be allowed to enter (or, more accurately, reenter) the interLATA long-distance market. Specifically, under the 271 provisions, an RBOC’s reintegration within its certificated geographic territory is made contingent upon the satisfaction of four necessary preconditions.3

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Authors
  1. T. Randolph Beard
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  2. David L. Kaserman
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  3. John W. Mayo
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Research in Regulated Industries Graduate School of Management, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey, USA

    Michael A. Crew

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© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Beard, T.R., Kaserman, D.L., Mayo, J.W. (1999). Monopoly Leveraging, Path Dependency, and the Case for a Local Competition Threshold for RBOC Entry into Interlata Toll. In: Crew, M.A. (eds) Regulation Under Increasing Competition. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series, vol 30. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5117-1_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5117-1_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-7328-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-5117-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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