Theory of Moves and the Persian Gulf War

Abstract

The behavior of Saddam Hussein is one of the more puzzling aspects of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf war. Key officials within and outside the Bush administration believed that once Hussein saw the overwhelming military force assembled against him, he would leave Kuwait and save his army and country from destruction. Prior to the doubling of U.S. forces, which began on November 8, a plausible interpretation of the goal of the United States might have been simply to defend Saudi Arabia and deter further Iraqi aggression. After that date, the elements of coercive diplomacy which the U.S.-led U.N. coalition implemented, obviously aimed to force Iraq to withdraw completely. Why did Hussein not withdraw from Kuwait before the January 15 deadline? Why, after witnessing the destruction caused by the five weeks of air war, did he choose to stay in Kuwait and face the invading armies of the U.N. force?