Abstract
During the postliberalization process, flexible network governance emerged as an alternative model for steering the institutional arrangements that govern the market, while recurrent patterns of behavior in the market decreased. Centralized network governance in mobile telecommunications was no longer effective; greater flexibility was needed in working with the private sector in order to elicit its continued cooperation, coordinate efforts, and negotiate interests. As competition among incumbent players grew and advanced mobile technology (e.g., IMT-2000) appeared, flexible network governance emerged. The mobile industry’s competitive crisis, under the WTO regime, and the selection of the 3G technology standard are described as manifestations of the change toward flexible network governance. This study also focuses on the processes in which the interests of the state and private actors were structured in the mobile market and on how these interests and the relationship between them changed with liberal market development and the advancement of technology.
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Notes
- 1.
The U.S. government is able to take disciplinary actions, including the levying of retaliatory tariffs and a ban on the purchase of telecom equipment from Korea, unless an agreement with Korea is reached within 1 year after its designation of Korea as a PFC.
- 2.
Interview in 2001. In the early negotiations that ended in 1992, the United States brought the government procurement code onto the agenda and partially succeeded in imposing nondiscriminatory concessions on government procurement. Since then, Korea and the U.S. government have conducted annual meetings to observe agreements.
- 3.
The Reference Paper deals with the prevention of anti-competitive behavior, nondiscriminatory interconnection, nondiscriminatory universal service obligations, transparent licensing processes, and independent regulatory institutions (Takigawa 1998: 45).
- 4.
International trade in telecommunications takes two forms (Blouin 2000: 136): cross-border supply and commercial presence. Cross-border trade (i.e., international phone calls) is the most important mode of international transaction in telecommunications services. The second form of telecommunications services trade is through foreign investment to provide commercial investment to establish a commercial presence.
- 5.
In the WTO, the MIC stressed the importance of conflict resolution in trade through multilateral rules. Dispute Settlement Understanding in the WTO gave the MIC new leverage over the United States and other countries in trade disputes.
- 6.
Interview in 2001.
- 7.
This is not to say that technology caused either the deregulation or the ministry’s reorganization. The digital technology provided the technical possibility for the crisis of the existing telecom regime. Actors’ decisions, as influenced by the prevailing regime, played a more determinant role.
- 8.
Interview in 2001.
- 9.
In Europe, the term Personal Communication Network (PCN) was coined for a system that was foreseen to bring universal mobility in communications. In contrast to Europe, the United States chose to use the term Personal Communication Service (PCS) to address the new technological concept. Similar to PCN, PCS was expected to be independent of local wired telephone networks, filling gaps in existing communication services and creating new markets.
- 10.
Interview in 2002.
- 11.
Telecommunications manufacturing in Korea had been carried out by chaebols. Since the early 1990s, the government encouraged them to specialize in self-chosen areas. Four chaebols (Daewoo, Hyundai, LG Group, and Samsung) chose to focus their activities in the telecommunications equipment and operator markets. Korean chaebols jointly developed the TDX public switching and CDMA mobile digital technologies in the late 1980s and early 1990s, respectively.
- 12.
In 1995, chaebols accounted for 16 percent of Korean GNP (Chang 2001: 8).
- 13.
KT, the primary operator in Korea, has faced international long-distance competition since DACOM entered the market in 1991.
- 14.
Remember that KT used to own a public mobile carrier, KMT, and had sold it to the SK Group in 1993. KT still had 13.4 percent ownership in SKT as of April 2001.
- 15.
The license allocated in Hansol was subsequently purchased in 2000 by KTF under the name KTF.
- 16.
By the end of 1997, LG Group had 55 sister companies with around 300 offices and subsidiaries in 120 countries. LGIC manufactured a wide range of telecommunications equipment in its divisions, such as mobile communications systems, including CDMA, PCS, and WLL, terminals and customer support equipment, switching and transmission systems, and information systems.
- 17.
LGT had 366,045 subscribers by the end of 1997, which had grown to about two million by the end of 1998. The company launched a CDMA wireless data access service in March 1998.
- 18.
Given that SKT and Shinsegi were authorized to provide all types of cellular services, both firms were allowed by the government to provide PCS services. For example, SKT received 10 MHz of the higher-frequency spectrum to launch PCS services in 1997, with a network trial system in 1996. Initially, SKT tried to use PCS in urban areas and exploit the doubling of total frequency allocation (i.e., 10 MHz at each 800 MHz and 1.8 MHz) to raise capacity.
- 19.
This is based on the exchange rate of U.S.$1 = KW 1,000.
- 20.
The government abolished handset subsidies in June 2000. One of the reasons for this was to address the deteriorating balance of trade payments since domestic handset makers use a significant percentage of imported components from Japan and the United States.
- 21.
With the tremendous amount of subsidies, the service companies were running at a loss. Between 1997 and 2000, service providers had maintained a 30–50 percent subsidy of their total sale. The subsidy was prohibited in 2000.
- 22.
SKT used Samsung, Lucent, and LG Electronics for its 2G service. Meanwhile, KTF used Samsung, Lucent, and Hynix (previously Hyundai Electronics) for its IS-95B equipment. On the other hand, LGT has mainly used LE Electronics’ equipment for both 2G services.
- 23.
Interconnection issues for mobile cellular refer to the technical, financial, and commercial arrangements for connecting mobile networks to fixed-line as well as other mobile cellular networks. Interconnection payments form a large portion of a mobile company’s operating costs. The arrangements for interconnection pricing affect the relative amounts that fixed-line and mobile operators share. For example, SKT’s cellular network connects with PSTN networks such as Korea Telecom and Hanaro Telecom. These networks are connected to the international gateways of Korea Telecom, Onse Telecom, and DACOM. Interconnection revenues arose when KT or other mobile companies paid SKT for calls made between the PSTN and cellular networks as well as between the cellular networks.
- 24.
Interview with an expert in a company in 2001.
- 25.
This is based on the average exchange rate of U.S.$1 = KW 1,270 in 2001.
- 26.
For a more detailed explanation of the transition of interconnection charges, refer to Hwang (1999: 322–328).
- 27.
Interconnection between mobile networks (mobile-to-mobile, M–M calls) is typically less of an issue than between mobile and fixed operators (L–M or M–L calls). Interconnection pricing between two different mobile networks is often based on the sender-keeps-all principle.
- 28.
According to the 1997 plan, SKT received 65 percent of the charge made by the fixed operator to its customer. For PCS operators, the rate was set at 70 percent. For SKT, traffic coming in from the fixed-line network netted the company around KW 94 per minute, 65 percent of the KW 144 charged to the fixed-line customer. For a call from SKT going into the fixed network, SKT paid around KW 10.5 per minute (SKT, internal document).
- 29.
This is based on the SKT internal report “The Transition of Interconnection Charges” (2001).
- 30.
According to the ministerial order, a provider with more than 30 percent market share was subject to the MIC’s approval (Hwang 1999: 108–109). This decision resulted in tariff regulation only on KT in wired service (local, long-distance, and international telephone) and SKT in the wireless market.
- 31.
Although the development of digital technology sparked the transformation of the industry and its governing regime, it would be a mistake to argue that the technological advancements were the only cause of the ensuing changes in governance.
- 32.
For an assessment of the WTO agreement on telecommunications services, refer to Fredebeul-Krein and Freytag (1997).
- 33.
Before 1997, every telecom service carrier, including mobile carriers, had no alternative but to rely on KT’s local network to reach telephone end users. This made it possible to prevent possible abuses and anti-competitive behavior of other carriers by using its exclusive position as the owner of the network.
- 34.
Under the Subsidies Agreement in the WTO, a subsidy was prohibited if it was contingent on export performance (export subsidies) or on the use of domestic over imported goods (import substitution subsidies) (http://www.wto.org, “WTO subsidies agreement”).
- 35.
Under the agreement, actions can only be taken against subsidies that are “specific.” A specific subsidy is one that is only given to one company, or to a special group of companies. Hence, if the government does not designate a special industry or firm, the problem of “specificity” does not occur.
- 36.
The restriction on foreign ownership was based on the Foreign Capital Inducement Act, which was under the jurisdiction of the MOFE.
- 37.
The IMF memorandum deals with three major areas: macroeconomic policy, financial sector restructuring, and corporate sector restructuring. The final section postulates liberalization of trade and capital, restructuring corporate governance, labor market reform, and enhancement of transparency of the government’s economic data.
- 38.
Debt-to-equity ratios for major chaebols reached an average of 300 percent in 1996 (The Weekly Chosun, January 1, 1998:98–99).
- 39.
Interview in 2001.
- 40.
This liberalization commitment is offered to all service providers from any member nation of the WTO on a nondiscriminatory basis. The Most Favored Nations (MFN) rule in the WTO requires a country to offer the same level of benefits to all members of the WTO (Choi and Lee 2000). However, MFN does not forbid countries from undertaking competition policy measures whose practical impact may vary from carrier to carrier.
- 41.
In 2001, the foreign share limit on telecom service providers, such as SKT, was capped at 49 percent. In August 2001, the foreign ownership of SKT was 46.5 percent.
- 42.
In addition to offering cellular and iridium global mobile satellite services, SKT launched the 011 wireless data service in August 1998 and the 011 Cybernet service in April 1999. This allowed Internet and email access via the cellular handset. The company inaugurated its NETSGO multimedia online service with Internet access in August 1998. SK formed a new subsidiary, SK Telelink, in June 1998, which began offering international phone service in that year. In partnership with AT&T, MCI WorldCom, and KDD, SK Telelink claimed to offer international services up to 64 percent cheaper than those of other operators in Korea (http://www.sktelelcom.co.kr).
- 43.
Packet-based technologies are superior to circuit-switched networks for data transmission, as they offer always-on, spectrum-efficient, and higher-speed mobile connectivity.
- 44.
The transmission speed of the earlier IS-95A service was 9.6–28 kbps, but this speed went up to 14.4–64 kbps with the IS-95B service, and to 144 kbps with the IS-95C service. IS-95C allowed higher graphics content, with color LCD screens available, as well as higher transmission speed.
- 45.
The dial-up industry includes Chollian (DACOM), Edunet, Hitel, Nownuri (Thrunet), Unitel, and Netsgo. Netsgo, part of SKT, has been competing not just with other ISP carriers such as Chollian and Unitel but also against pure portals such as Daum and Yahoo! The intense competition and lack of growth in this market resulted in poor business prospects, largely as a result of the huge migration of customers to broadband service.
- 46.
SKT, for example, positioned the mobile commerce card as an all-purpose card for use in conducting financial transactions and serving as an ID, transportation, and medical card. SKT entered into an alliance with leading financial companies, including Korea Exchange Bank, LG Capital, and Samsung Card, to provide mobile commerce card services. The mobile commerce card has greater transaction storage capacity than the current magnetic-strip cards. SKT subscribers were able to use their handsets for mobile commerce more efficiently with the card.
- 47.
WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) is a license-free protocol for wireless communications that enables the creation of mobile telephone services and the reading of Internet pages from a mobile phone. It was first developed by Ericsson, Motorola, and Nokia (ITU 1999: 28).
- 48.
In June 1999, for example, LGT introduced its EZ Internet service, based on the WAP platform, providing Web Personal Information Manager (PIM) services and allowing users to access Internet Web sites using its WAP phones.
- 49.
This is based on the exchange rate of U.S.$1 = KW 1,160 in 1999.
- 50.
As of June 2000, SKT had taken a 52.6 percent stake in Shinsegi Telecom. Vodafone was the next-largest shareholder, with an 11.7 percent stake. Other minority shareholders of Shinsegi included Samsung SDI, LG Electronics, and Qualcomm.
- 51.
The Fair Trade Commission officially approved the acquisition of Shinsegi, on condition that the combined market share of SKT and Shinsegi would be lowered to below 50 percent by June 2001. This was the condition recommended to the FTC by the MIC in 2000. Failure to meet this condition would result in a maximum fine of KW 11.3 billion (about U.S.$1 million) per day until the condition was met.
- 52.
The OECD reported that telecom carriers’ revenues increased 20.44 percent annually between 1992 and 1997. In 1997, 38.35 percent of total revenues were from the mobile sector (OECD 1999).
- 53.
In the past, chaebols’ financial position and importance in the Korean economy forced the Korean state “into the role of lender of last resort” for the financial problems of the chaebols because the bankruptcy of a chaebol “would threaten not only the financial but the economic stability of the country” (Woo-Cumings 1991: 149).
- 54.
The process of licensing 3G service was first published in an article, “Political Economy of IMT-2000 Technology Standard Disputes” (Jho 2003b).
- 55.
SKT and its subsidiary invested KW 985.2 billion in March 2001 for a 61.6 percent stake in SKT-IMT2000.
- 56.
In the paired two-way spectrum, W-CDMA would be used to provide wide-area cellular coverage and high-mobility services. In the one-way unpaired spectrum, TD-CDMA would be used to provide low-mobility, local, and in-building types of services. Ericsson and Nokia developed the W-CDMA standard and are its main proponents, while Alcatel, Siemens, and Nortel are the main supporters of TD-CDMA. The two groups agreed that they would not be able to come to a consensus without compromise and have formed an alliance proposing their joint recommendation via the ETSI to the ITU. Although these five firms were the main proponents of the two different technologies, the consensus decision was based on a proposal submitted by a larger group of manufacturers, including Bosch, Italtel, Motorola, and Sony.
- 57.
As WTO agreements were finalized in 1997, it was difficult for the government to mandate a technology standard because of possible conflicts with other countries.
- 58.
Interview in 2002.
- 59.
In wireless telecommunications equipment, Korean companies production and design of CDMA Samsung achieved the top position in the worldwide CDMA market accounting for more than 50 percent of market share. In the combined market of CDMA and GSM of 2002, Samsung ranked 4th in worldwide phone sales (Lee and Lee 2004). By 2003, Korea had become a market leader in the CDMA telecom markets.
- 60.
Meanwhile, LGIC [LG Information and Communications, later LG Electronics (LGE)], which boosted research efforts on W-CDMA, tried to persuade the MIC and telecom carriers to adopt the W-CDMA technology.
- 61.
Manufacturers, in general, did not want to take a strong public position that could jeopardize their existing and future business relationships in domestic and international markets. However, potential opportunities for manufacturers in Asian and American markets affected a country’s choice of standard. It was clear that Samsung had a good presence in the CDMA market, exporting CDMA handsets and networks to 2G international markets. The technology standard in the Korean 3G market had important implications for other countries that were the main targets for Korean manufacturers. Samsung and LGIC wanted to expand their share of the growing Asian market with China’s potential market.
- 62.
The strain between SKT and KT was acute; each company tried to force the other to take CDMA2000. In an interview in 2000, a high-level official in KT said, “Should at least one company need to adopt CDMA2000 for the sake of national interest, it should be the one that has the most extensive infrastructure in the CDMA technology and that has more than 50 percent share of the mobile telecom [market],” in a clear reference to SKT. An official at SKT stated, “As far as technology standards are concerned, we are firm on W-CDMA. If the government needs to have a company adopting CDMA2000, it should use a state-owned company, meaning Korean Telecom” (interview in 2000).
- 63.
Interviews in 2002.
- 64.
For example, as of September 2000, Japan Telecom, NTT DoCoMo in Japan, Suomen 2G, Alands Mobiltelefon in Finland, BT Cellnet, Vodafone in the United Kingdom, TIM, Andala Hutchison, Wind in Italy, and Airtel in Spain have chosen W-CDMA as their technology standard for 3G services (Ericsson Korea Ltd. 2000: 518).
- 65.
A fourth-generation telecommunications standard would be ten times faster and offer an even richer variety of wireless multimedia services than the current third-generation service. The technology would promise a data transmission speed of up to 20 Mbps, a speed at which services comparable to those on a standard PC can be provided. Under the proposed plan, the biggest steps are the introduction of unified mobile phone handsets that incorporate existing multiple standards. The government and the industry plan to introduce so-called multimode handsets that would enable consumers to use all radio frequencies with a single handset. For this service, network operators and equipment makers would have to adhere to a code of conduct setting common standards in such areas as batteries, antennas, and handsets.
- 66.
Interviews in 2002.
- 67.
For example, Telecel, a mobile operator in Zambia, converted its network from CDMA to GSM primarily because roaming was constricted, since all its neighbors were using the latter system.
- 68.
The revenues of the Korean mobile service companies are based on domestic subscribers in the market. Since they compete with each other to increase market share in the same Korean market, the Korean companies are threatened more by competition from their Korean rivals than from Western companies. The general pattern has been for Korean companies threatened by Korean rivals to form alliances with them. Forming alliances with foreign firms gave critical opportunities for the Korean firms to increase their subscriber base into the foreign market and thus increase their stock value.
- 69.
Interview in 2002.
- 70.
Interview in 2002.
- 71.
Interview in 2002.
- 72.
Interview in 2002.
- 73.
Although Hanaro desired to enter the 3G market with the CDMA2000 standard, it was generally agreed that it was not capable of pursuing its business in terms of technological capability and network operation experience.
- 74.
SKT merged with Shinsegi. SKT’s acquisition of Shinsegi Telecom served as the impetus for KTF to take over Hansol, which had problems of inferior subscriber quality and weak growth potential. KTF also merged with Hansol PCS in 2001 and moved from a disunified mobile system to what might be referred to as a duopoly. As a result, two vertically integrated telecom companies came to control the front market of mobile communications.
- 75.
Interview in 2002.
- 76.
The LG consortium, which was led mainly by LG Telecom, had a total of 1,049 companies, including Hanaro Telecom, Powercom, Thrunet, and 15 other operators, mobile handset makers and equipment manufacturers, such as LGE, Sewon Telecom, Hyundai Syscom, and Kisan Telecom, wireless content and Internet firms, distribution firms, network builders, and business base builders. In the end, SKT and KT opted for W-CDMA, while LG alone took up CDMA2000.
- 77.
Statistic was released by the Bank of Korea, accessed through the government website (http://www.itstat.go.kr).
- 78.
In January 2005, KT, SKT, and Hanaro Telecom were selected as the WiBro providers; however, Hanaro Telecom returned the license and therefore only KT and SKT provided the WiBro service. In October 2005, KT utilized the WiBro system established in Seoul to simultaneously provide high-speed Internet, broadcasting, and Internet phone services.
- 79.
In the United States, although research-focused agencies (NIH, NASA) exist, there is no central government department that is in charge of the R&D budget, and it is formulated based on a bottom-up structure.
- 80.
According to a Financial News article that included an interview with an anonymous former high-ranking official of the Korean Communications Commission, WiBro technology development was meant not to promote domestic service but to increase exports of related equipment and cell phones to the overseas market.
- 81.
The contents were researched and organized based on KCC (2010b).
- 82.
The user agreement approval system had been introduced to prevent unfair telecommunication service fees or conditions from being implemented by a dominant market provider and to protect the telecommunication service user because of the nature of the telecommunications industry, which makes it easy for oligopolies to be created. In addition, the service fees and conditions in the user agreements must be decided according to the existing Telecommunications Business Law, and this user agreement needed to be reported to the commission.
- 83.
However, there were benefits such as paying only the production costs of the network in regard to interconnection and facility provision payments.
- 84.
Wholesale provision is a policy that induces the key telecommunications service providers to provide their own telecommunications services or partially or fully support the facilities needed to provide the service when requested by another telecommunications service provider.
- 85.
A set of “pro-competitive principles” in the WTO created obligations for how national regulators would protect new entrants from anti-competitive behavior by incumbents with dominant market power.
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Jho, W. (2014). The Emergence of Flexible Network Governance under the WTO Regime. In: Building Telecom Markets. The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7888-1_6
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