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Implementation Theory

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Resource Allocation in Decentralized Systems with Strategic Agents

Part of the book series: Springer Theses ((Springer Theses))

Abstract

In this section we present key ideas and results from implementation theory that are relevant to the topics of the thesis.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In Chaps. 3 and 5, the social choice rule/goal correspondence is the social welfare maximizing correspondence and in Chap. 4 the goal correspondence is the Pareto correspondence.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Electrical and System Engineering, University of Pennsylvania, Walnut St, L475 Levine Hall 3330, Philadelphia, PA, 19104, USA

    Ali Kakhbod

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  1. Ali Kakhbod
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Correspondence to Ali Kakhbod .

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Kakhbod, A. (2013). Implementation Theory. In: Resource Allocation in Decentralized Systems with Strategic Agents. Springer Theses. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-6319-1_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-6319-1_2

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4614-6318-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-6319-1

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