Abstract
One of Gordon Tullock’s contributions to economics was his decision in 1971 to publish in Public Choice a dense paper by a doctoral student that made the startling claim that it was possible to motivate people to report their preferences for public goods truthfully. Tullock reported that, while he did not understand the paper when he accepted it, he decided to publish it because if it was right, it was important. Here I report events surrounding the process by which that idea came to be understood by Tullock, by me, and by others.
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Notes
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Tideman, N. (2013). Tullock, Tideman, and the Origins of the Demand-Revealing Process. In: Lee, D. (eds) Public Choice, Past and Present. Studies in Public Choice, vol 28. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5909-5_10
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