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Local Ranking

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Structured Peer-to-Peer Systems

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Abstract

Intrinsically, P2P networks are anonymous, dynamic, and autonomous. Participants have natural disincentives to cooperate because cooperation consumes their own resources and may degrade their own performance. Consequently, each node selfishly attempts to maximize own utility lowering the overall utility of the system. Avoiding this “tragedy of the commons” requires incentives for cooperation. This chapter considers design principles for providing incentives for cooperation in resource sharing among nodes. Fair resource sharing needs differentiation based on the contribution/consumption each node has in the system. We state the problem of local ranking in a P2P resource sharing system with multiple resources. It provides rank-based differentiation of competing nodes and their resources. Introducing ranks rewards cooperating nodes and punishes defect behavior. In this chapter, we focus on ranking models with local knowledge only; the class of models with global system knowledge is discussed later in Chap. 10.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In general, u checks γa v  − b v for exceeding the threshold, where γ ≥ 1 is a design parameter; higher γ increases the overall system performance by sacrificing fairness towards high-capacity nodes [19].

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Helsinki Institute for Information Technology, Aalto University, Aalto, Finland

    Dmitry Korzun

  2. Department of Computer Science, Petrozavodsk State University, Petrozavodsk, Russia

    Dmitry Korzun

  3. Centre for Wireless Communications, University of Oulu, Oulu, Finland

    Andrei Gurtov

Authors
  1. Dmitry Korzun
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  2. Andrei Gurtov
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Summary of Part II

Summary of Part II

This part has discussed hierarchical routing schemes existing in recent DHT designs where the assumption that nodes are homogeneous in their roles is fundamental. Such DHT designs are traditionally known as flat, in contrast to a hierarchical DHT. The discussion argues that hierarchies are implicitly inherited in flat DHT designs. The approach uses three basic arrangement models and their combinations, leading to a variety of hierarchies. Based on an arrangement the nodes can be structured onto groups. Recursive application allows further structuring within groups. It is a crucial step in constructing global hierarchy.

We sequentially built a set of design principles; each provides a base for applying hierarchical schemes. Chapters 3–5 focused on principles aimed at efficient routing. They assume that the participating nodes are cooperative. The logical structure of the principles is depicted in Fig. II.1, where the evolution levels from pure flat designs and to pre-hierarchical designs go from the top to the bottom. Principles at the same level are complementary. Each evolution level introduces more hierarchies in a design, achieving requisite performance and scalability properties.

Fig. II.1
figure 4

The logical structure of principles for hierarchical routing schemes in DHT designs

Full size image

Then in Chap. 6 we moved to the complementary problem—cooperation in P2P systems. It is a very broad topic covering issues that are beyond what traditional distributed systems have encountered. We paid attention to the incentive problem, which is undoubtedly required for fair cooperation in anonymous, dynamic, and autonomous P2P networks. The corresponding principles introduce local ranks to effectively reward cooperating nodes and to punish defect behavior. It brings more security and resistance to the whole system even if the local knowledge problem limits each node with direct observations in its neighborhood.

Hierarchical routing schemes and incentive mechanisms complicate DHT designs, especially the overlay maintenance. It leads to overhead, additional vulnerabilities and other shortcomings. Nevertheless, we argued that, given application demands, a flat design can be extended with locally constructed hierarchies. The extension aims at attaining a tradeoff between the protocol complexity and the required efficiency.

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Korzun, D., Gurtov, A. (2013). Local Ranking. In: Structured Peer-to-Peer Systems. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5483-0_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5483-0_6

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