Abstract
The global need for security of key infrastructure with limited resources has led to significant interest in research conducted in multiagent systems towards game-theory for real-world security. As reported previously at AAMAS, three applications based on Stackelberg games have been transitioned to real-world deployment. This includes ARMOR, used by the Los Angeles International Airport to randomize checkpoints of roadways and canine patrols [16]; IRIS, which helps the US Federal Air Marshal Service [22] in scheduling air marshals on international flights; and GUARDS [17], which is under evaluation by the US Transportation Security Administration to allocate resources for airport protection. We as a community remain in the early stages of these deployments, and must continue to develop our understanding of core principles of innovative applications of game theory for security.
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Notes
- 1.
Or the attacker may be sufficiently deterred and dissuaded from attacking the protected target.
- 2.
Creating optimal Stackelberg defender strategies that increase the attacker’s difficulty of surveillance is an open research issue in the literature; here we choose to maximize unpredictability as the first step.
- 3.
In general these types of security games are non-zero-sum [21], though for Boston as a first step it was decided to cast the game as zero-sum.
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Acknowledgements
We thank the USCG offices, and particularly Sector Boston, for their exceptional collaboration. Thanks to Matt Johnson for technical assistance in the preparation of this chapter. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Commandant or of the U.S. Coast Guard. This research was supported by the United States Department of Homeland Security through the Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) under award number 2010-ST-061-RE0001.
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Shieh, E. et al. (2013). PROTECT in the Ports of Boston, New York and Beyond: Experiences in Deploying Stackelberg Security Games with Quantal Response. In: Subrahmanian, V. (eds) Handbook of Computational Approaches to Counterterrorism. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5311-6_20
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