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Abstract

This chapter provides an overview of LeT from their creation to the end of 2011. It describes the goals of the group, other groups in their ecosystem, the types of attacks they have carried out, the internal dynamics of the group, and the relations they have with the Pakistani military and civilian government. It also includes brief profiles of selected LeT leaders.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Throughout this book, we use the term “Jammu and Kashmir” to refer to that part of Kashmir administered by India. Likewise, Pakistan-administered Kashmir (or Azad Kashmir) is used to refer to that part of Kashmir currently controlled by Pakistan.

  2. 2.

    A short article describes the emergence of the Pakistani terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) from other groups and how these groups changed their names after one version of the group achieved sufficient notoriety to be classified as a terrorist group by the United States—http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/jaish_e_mohammad_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm.

    The shifting of names and use of front groups is common behavior for terrorist groups. Black September, the Palestinian terrorist group that carried out a number of high-profile attacks in the 1970s, most famously the attack on the Munich Olympics in 1972, was established by Fatah’s intelligence unit but did not make public statements in order to avoid tarnishing Fatah’s international image. (Karmon 2000).

  3. 3.

    Although the Indian government held both LeT and JeM responsible for the Parliament attack, the operatives convicted in Indian courts for their role in this attack were all members of JeM. It is possible that individuals affiliated with LeT were involved, but concrete proof has not been advanced in the open source (Tankel 2011a, b).

  4. 4.

    The story of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the alliance between the United States, Pakistan, and the Afghan resistance has been told in many places, including from a Pakistani perspective (Youssef and Adkin 1992).

  5. 5.

    This statement was not unique; in his 1999 interview with Jessica Stern, Saeed stated that the Sunni-Shia conflict was not important.

  6. 6.

    Rana reported that before January 13, 2002 (when JuD was banned in Pakistan for LeT’s role in the attack on India’s parliament) there were 1150 LeT/JuD offices in Pakistan. After the ban 116 offices continued to function. Other reports state that there are over 2000 LeT/JuD offices throughout Pakistan. See Rana, A to Z of Jihadi Organizations.

  7. 7.

    From 2001–2007 the Pakistani rupees was generally valued at about 60 to a US dollar so conversions are made at that rate. Public details about LeT financing are unlikely to be accurate, the purpose is to provide a glimpse into the scale and nature of LeT operations.

  8. 8.

    Fedayeen attacks are attacks in which the attackers expect to die, but unlike a suicide bombing, they do not die by their own hand but instead are killed in the fighting.

  9. 9.

    For one account of the rule of the Hindu dogras (see Schofield 1996 pages 49–117) which includes multiple accounts of British officials calling for the rulers of Jammu and Kashmir to institute reforms and foster development.

  10. 10.

    (Government of India 2008) Page 3 of the report describes the retrieval of GPS instruments and a Thuraya satellite phone. Page 12 of the same report describes the use of VoIP technology by the terrorists.

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Correspondence to V. S. Subrahmanian .

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© 2013 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Subrahmanian, V.S., Mannes, A., Sliva, A., Shakarian, J., Dickerson, J.P. (2013). A Brief History of LeT. In: Computational Analysis of Terrorist Groups: Lashkar-e-Taiba. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-4769-6_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-4769-6_2

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4614-4768-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-4769-6

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