Modeling Interactions in Complex Systems: Self-Coordination, Game-Theoretic Design Protocols, and Performance Reliability-Aided Decision Making

Abstract

The subject of this research article is concerned with the development of approaches to modeling interactions in complex systems. A complex system contains a number of decision makers, who put themselves in the place of the other: to build a mutual model of other decision makers. Different decision makers have different influence in the sense that they will have control over—or at least be able to influence—different parts of the environment. Attention is first given to process models of operations among decision makers, for which the slow and fast-core design is based on a singularly perturbed model of complex systems. Next, self-coordination and Nash game-theoretic formulation are fundamental design protocols, lending themselves conveniently to modeling self-interest interactions, from which complete coalition among decision makers is not possible due to hierarchical macrostructure, information, or process barriers. Therefore, decision makers make decisions by assuming the others try to adversely affect their objectives and terms. Individuals will be expected to work in a decentralized manner. Finally, the standards and beliefs of the decision makers are threefold: (i) a high priority for performance-based reliability is made from the start through a means of performance-information analysis; (ii) a performance index has benefit and risk awareness to ensure how much of the inherent or design-in reliability actually ends up in the developmental and operational phases; and (iii) risk-averse decision policies towards potential interference and noncooperation from the others.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States (U.S.) Air Force, Department of Defense, or U.S. Government.