Abstract
This chapter summarizes the findings and highlights the possible limitations and extensions to the analysis presented here. Unequal distribution of abilities results in distortionary taxes, but their effect could be minimized by institutional arrangements that promote inter–generational cooperation. This book provides both theoretical and empirical justification for the idea that omitting the role of institutions results in misspecification of the causal link between inequality and growth. The book contributes to the existing literature by highlighting the role of fiscal institutions in enhancing economic welfare. The possible limitations of this analysis are the effects of the fiscal institutions, which are treated as exogenous, and the level of inter–generational cooperation, which depends on institutional features.
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Notes
- 1.
See Besley and Coate (1998) for a discussion of political failure in a dynamic context.
- 2.
For the Senate age requirement, see Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution; for the House of Representatives, see Article I, Section 2.
- 3.
For other aspects of bicameralism, see Tsebelis and Money (1997).
- 4.
See Maddex (1995).
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© 2012 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
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Lee, A.J. (2012). Conclusion. In: Taxation, Growth and Fiscal Institutions. SpringerBriefs in Business, vol 5. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1290-8_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1290-8_5
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