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Introduction: Constitutional Myths

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Constitutional Mythologies

Part of the book series: Studies in Public Choice ((SIPC,volume 23))

Abstract

Human societies function correctly, at least in part, because the individuals who belong to them share some common beliefs about their origins, foundations and, as far as social sciences and political economy is concerned, how interactions are organized. These beliefs that are also called “myths” are therefore fundamental. They perform one or several functions – namely allowing societies to exist and to be ordered – that are independent from their empirical validity. We do not mean that such beliefs are and have to be “wrong” to be efficient. But rather that their importance does not come from the fact that they would be “exact” or “true.” Certainly, when these beliefs have emerged, myths may have been related to specific events. But it does not necessarily matter, for their efficiency or for their effectiveness, whether or not myths are actually related to historical facts. Thus, foundational “myths” – these stories that explain the origins of societies – tend to become widely held and, at the same time, might be false.

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Correspondence to Alain Marciano .

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© 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC

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Marciano, A. (2011). Introduction: Constitutional Myths. In: Marciano, A. (eds) Constitutional Mythologies. Studies in Public Choice, vol 23. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-6784-8_1

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