Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Veto Players, Agenda Control and Cabinet Stability in 17 European Parliaments, 1945–1999

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Reform Processes and Policy Change

Part of the book series: Studies in Public Choice ((SIPC,volume 16))

Abstract

European democracies have experienced significant cross-national and diachronic variations in cabinet duration. Empirically, this chapter seeks to offer some new insights into the institutional sources of such variations, especially with regard to partisan veto players and the role of government agenda powers. The main theoretical interest of this chapter is the extent to which, and in what way, veto player theory helps us to understand the dynamics of coalition politics. George Tsebelis’ veto player theory has not been employed comprehensively to explain variations in cabinet duration. Nevertheless, he himself suggests that core elements of veto player theory, combined with important features of governmental agenda powers vis-à-vis parliaments, might produce a parsimonious, innovative, theoretically consistent and empirically testable model of cabinet durability (including an innovative theoretical conceptualization of exogenous shocks). This chapter is predominantly empirical in character. The main body of the chapter derives five hypotheses from veto player theory, tests them using data from the Constitutional Change in Parliamentary Democracy (CCPD) dataset and finds strong evidence for the importance of the number of veto players as a crucial explanatory variable of cabinet survival (rather than the ideological distance between veto players). It also finds substantial evidence for the importance of agenda powers for the survival of minority cabinets.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  1. Bergman T, Müller WC, Strøm K (2005) Comparative parliamentary democracy: a project report. Eur Polit Sci 4(1):42–54

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. Box-Steffensmeier JM, Jones BS (2004) Event history modeling: a guide for social scientists. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  3. Box-Steffensmeier JM, Reiter D, Zorn C (2003) Nonproportional hazards and event history analysis in international relations. J Conflict Resolut 47(1):33–53

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Budge I et al (2001). Mapping policy preferences: estimates for parties, electors, and governments 1945–1998. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  5. Cheibub JA, Przeworski A, Saiegh SM (2004) Government coalitions and legislative success under presidentialism and parliamentarism. Br J Polit Sci 34:565–587

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Diermeier D (2006) Coalition government. In: Weingast BR, Wittman D (eds) The Oxford handbook of political economy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 162–179

    Google Scholar 

  7. Diermeier D, Merlo A (2000) Government turnover in parliamentary democracies. J Econ Theory 94:46–79

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Diermeier D, Stevenson RT (1999) Cabinet survival and competing risks. Am J Polit Sci 43: 1051–1068

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Diermeier D, Stevenson RT (2000) Cabinet terminations and critical events. Am Polit Sci Rev 94:627–640

    Article  Google Scholar 

  10. Dodd LC (1976) Coalitions in parliamentary government. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  11. Döring H (1995) Time as a scarce resource: government control of the agenda. In: Döring H (ed) Parliaments and majority rule in Western Europe. St. Martin’s Press, Frankfurt am Main: Campus/New York, pp 223–246

    Google Scholar 

  12. Epstein D, O’Halloran S (1994). Divided government and the design of administrative procedures, information and agency discretion. Am J Polit Sci 38(3):697–722

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. Ferris JS, Voia M-C (2009) What determines the length of a typical Canadian parliamentary government? Can J Polit Sci 42(2):881–910

    Article  Google Scholar 

  14. Frendreis JP, Gleiber DW, Browne EC (1986) The study of cabinet dissolutions in parliamentary democracies. Legis Stud Q 11:619–628

    Article  Google Scholar 

  15. Grofman B (1989) The comparative analysis of coalition formation and duration: distinguishing between-country and within-county effects. Br J Polit Sci 19(2):291–302

    Article  Google Scholar 

  16. Grofman B, van Roozendaal P (1997) Review article: modelling cabinet durability and termination. Br J Polit Sci 27(3):419–451

    Article  Google Scholar 

  17. Heller WB (2001) Making policy stick: why the government gets what it wants in multi-party parliaments. Am J Polit Sci 45(4):780–798

    Article  Google Scholar 

  18. Huber JD (1998) How does cabinet instability affect political performance? Portfolio volatility and health care cost containment in parliamentary democracies. Am Polit Sci Rev 92:577–591

    Article  Google Scholar 

  19. King G, Alt JE, Burns NE et al (1990) A unified model of cabinet dissolution in parliamentary democracies. Am J Polit Sci 34(3):846–871

    Article  Google Scholar 

  20. Laakso M, Taagepera R (1979) Effective number of parties: a measure with applications to Western Europe. Comp Polit Stud 12:3–27

    Google Scholar 

  21. Laver M (2003) Government termination. Annu Rev Polit Sci 6:23–40

    Article  Google Scholar 

  22. Laver M, Hunt WB (1992) Policy and party competition. Routledge, New York

    Google Scholar 

  23. Laver M, Schofield N (1990) Multiparty government: the politics of coalition in Europe. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  24. Laver M, Shepsle KA (1996) Making and breaking governments: cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  25. Lijphart A (1999) Patterns of democracy: government forms and performance in thirty-six countries. Yale University Press, New Haven

    Google Scholar 

  26. Lupia A, Strøm K (1995). Coalition termination and the strategic timing of parliamentary elections. Am Polit Sci Rev 89(3):648–665

    Article  Google Scholar 

  27. Müller WC (2008) Governments and bureaucracies. In: Caramani D (ed) Comparative politics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 189–216

    Google Scholar 

  28. Müller WC, Strøm K (2000) Coalition governance in Western Europe: an introduction. In: Müller WC, Strøm K (eds) Coalition government in Western Europe. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 1–31

    Google Scholar 

  29. Saalfeld T (2008) Institutions, chance and choices: the dynamics of cabinet survival in the parliamentary democracies of Western Europe (1945–1999). In: Strøm K, Müller WC, Bergman T (eds) Cabinets and coalition bargaining: the democratic life cycle in Western Europe. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 327–368

    Google Scholar 

  30. Saalfeld T (2009) Vetospieler, Agendakontrolle und Kabinettsstabilität in 17 europäischen Parlamenten. In: Ganghof S, Hönnige C, Stecker C (eds) Parlamente, Agendasetzung und Vetospieler: Festschrift für Herbert Döring. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, pp 93–115

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  31. Schleiter P, Morgan-Jones E (2009) Constitutional power and competing risks: monarchs, presidents, prime ministers, and the termination of east and west European cabinets. Am Polit Sci Rev 103(3):496–512

    Article  Google Scholar 

  32. Strøm K (1988) Contribution to “contending models of cabinet stability.” Am Polit Sci Rev 82:923–930

    Article  Google Scholar 

  33. Strøm K, Swindle SM (2002) Strategic parliamentary dissolution. Am Polit Sci Rev 96:575–591

    Article  Google Scholar 

  34. Tsebelis G (2002) Veto players: how political institutions work. Russell Sage Foundation, New York and Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ

    Google Scholar 

  35. Tsebelis G (2006) Coalition theory: a veto player approach. Unpublished manuscript, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA

    Google Scholar 

  36. van Roozendaal P (1992) Cabinets in multi-party democracies: the effect of dominant and central parties on cabinet composition and durability. Thesis Publishers, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

  37. Volden C (2002) A formal model of the politics of delegation in a separation of powers system. Am J Polit Sci 46(1):111–133

    Article  Google Scholar 

  38. Warwick PV (1994) Government survival in parliamentary democracies. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  39. Warwick PV (1999) Ministerial autonomy or ministerial accommodation? Contested bases of government survival in parliamentary democracies. Br J Polit Sci 29:369–394

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

I owe thanks to Simona Bevern, Simon Fink and the participants of the George Tsebelis Conference: Reform processes and policy change: How do veto players determine decisionmaking in modern democracies? (Mannheim Centre for European Social Research, May 14–16, 2009) for their helpful comments, which have improved this chapter. All remaining opacities and errors are mine.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Bamberg, Bamberg, Germany

    Thomas Saalfeld

Authors
  1. Thomas Saalfeld
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Thomas Saalfeld .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, 68131, Germany

    Thomas König

  2. Mannheim Center for European Research, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, 68131, Germany

    Marc Debus

  3. Dept. Political Science, University of Michigan, S. State St. 505, Ann Arbor, 48109-1045, USA

    George Tsebelis

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Saalfeld, T. (2011). Veto Players, Agenda Control and Cabinet Stability in 17 European Parliaments, 1945–1999. In: König, T., Debus, M., Tsebelis, G. (eds) Reform Processes and Policy Change. Studies in Public Choice, vol 16. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5809-9_6

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation