Abstract
In recent feminist moral psychology, anger has been defended as an appropriate response to sexist oppression. Most of these defenses of anger stress the instrumental value of discrete episodes or bouts of anger. In light of these defenses of anger, I take up the question of how one might defend what I call a virtue of appropriate anger under grossly non-ideal circumstances. I argue that defending a virtue of appropriate anger under grossly non-ideal circumstances is not at all straightforward. I consider one recent and promising defense of the virtue of appropriate anger (the Eventual Flourishing Account) and argue that this account conflicts with our considered judgments about when the character trait of appropriate anger is a virtue. Moreover, I argue that the Eventual Flourishing Account does not provide a fully adequate characterization of the kind of anger partially constitutive of the virtue of appropriate anger. I sketch an alternative justification of the virtue of appropriate anger (the Appropriate Attitude Account) that stresses this trait’s non-instrumental value. I close by arguing that the Appropriate Attitude Account offers a better understanding and justification of the virtue of appropriate anger than the Eventual Flourishing Account.
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Acknowledgments
An early version of this paper was presented at Minnesota I.C.E, and I benefited from the comments of all my fellow participants. I am grateful to Michelle Mason for the invitation and for her helpful suggestions. I also received a great deal of beneficial feedback from the audience at the Society for the Study of Africana Philosophy. Finally, I would like to thank Lisa Tessman and Katja Vogt who each provided extremely helpful written comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
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Bell, M. (2009). Anger, Virtue, and Oppression. In: Tessman, L. (eds) Feminist Ethics and Social and Political Philosophy: Theorizing the Non-Ideal. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6841-6_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6841-6_10
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