Abstract
Chapter 2 concludes the first part of the book by considering an alternative view about the relationship between power and law. Here the main approach discussed is Hans Kelsen’s “pure theory”. As a matter of fact, Kelsen presents his own theory as a solution to the controversy, in so far as power is reconceptualised as an order of rules, a legal order, or more simply as “law”. In this sense, the opposition between law and power dissolves. However, such dissolution is only apparent, since on the one side the law is conceived as based on coercion and facticity and on the other hand whatever effective law is ennobled as “valid” system of law.
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Notes
- 1.
H. Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff. Kritische Untersuchung des Verhältnisses von Staat und Recht, 2nd ed., Tübingen 1928, p. 77.
- 2.
See G. Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, Berlin 1900, pp. 9ff., 25ff. and 47ff. Jellinek nonetheless distinguishes the social sciences from the natural sciences by arguing that the former are, as it were, individualizing (ibid., pp. 25–27).
- 3.
G. Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, p. 173.
- 4.
Ibid., p. 183.
- 5.
H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and the State, English trans. by A. Wedberg, Cambridge, MA 1945, p. 191.
- 6.
Ibid., p. 192.
- 7.
Ibid.
- 8.
See ibid.
- 9.
H. Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, English trans. by M. Knight, Berkely, CA and Los Angeles, CA 1967, p. 286.
- 10.
On the differences, as far as the conception of the State is concerned, between “pure theory” and “analytical theory of law”, see H. Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, in Harvard Law Review, vol. 55, 1941.
- 11.
H. Kelsen, Der soziologische und juristische Staatsbegriff, p. 83. Emphasis in original.
- 12.
H. Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analitical Jurisprudence, p. 64.
- 13.
H. Kelsen, Der soziologische und juristische Staatsbegriff, p. 83.
- 14.
Ibid., p. 80.
- 15.
It is not sufficiently clear whether for Kelsen the social dimension ought to be assimilated to the natural, causal one, and hence sociology to an empirical causal science. Even if he often seems decisively to assert this assimilation, there are nonetheless places in his work in which society is seen as a normative dimension, a world of Sollen and not of Sein, and in consequence social science is conceived of as a normative science. See e.g. H. Kelsen, Der Staat als Integration. Eine prinzipielle Auseinandersetzung, Wien 1930, pp. 6–7.
- 16.
On this, cf. H. Kelsen, Vorrede zur zweiten Auflage, in H. Kelsen, Der soziologische und juristische Staatsbegriff, p. v.
- 17.
H. Kelsen, Der soziologische und juristische Staatsbegriff, p. 133.
- 18.
Ibid., p. 185.
- 19.
Ibid.
- 20.
N. Bobbio, Dal potere al diritto e viceversa, in Rivista di filosofia, 1981, p. 356.
- 21.
See H. Kelsen, Op. ult. cit., p. 186.
- 22.
Ibid., p. 187. My emphasis.
- 23.
Ibid., My emphasis.
- 24.
Ibid., p. 136.
- 25.
“Political power”, writes Kelsen, “is the efficacy of the coercive order recognized as law” (H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and the State, p. 191). But who is the author of this recognition? And what does “recognition” mean in this context? One might well ask. And supposing an order were effective irrespective of its “recognition” on the part of the great mass of members of society?
- 26.
H. Kelsen, Der soziologische und juristische Staatsbegriff, p. 88.
- 27.
H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and the State, p. 26. My emphasis.
- 28.
On this see ibid., pp. 24–28.
- 29.
H. Kelsen, Der soziologische und juristische Staatsbegriff, pp. 86–87.
- 30.
See H. Kelsen, General Theory of the Law and the State, p. 28.
- 31.
H. Kelsen, Der soziologische und juristische Staatsbegriff, p. 87.
- 32.
Ibid., p. 90.
- 33.
H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1st ed., Wien 1934, p. 70.
- 34.
See H. Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, Wien 1978.
- 35.
Both quotations from R. De Stefano, L’accettazione della legge, Reggio Calabria 1977, p. 76.
- 36.
Both quotations from B. de Jouvenel, On Power, English trans. by J. F. Huntington, Boston, MA 1969, 3rd ed., the first from pp. 302–303, the second from p. 303.
- 37.
On this point see F. A. Hayek, The Results of Human Action but not of Human Design, in Id., Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, London 1967, pp. 96ff.
- 38.
Here I would refer to K. R. Popper, On the Theory of Objective Mind, in Id., Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach, Rev. ed., Oxford 1986, pp. 159–160.
- 39.
As we know, this is Humpty Dumpty’s conception (see L. Carrol., Through the Looking Glass and what Alice Found There, London 1979, p. 79); for a critique see A. Flew, Thinking about Thinking. (Or, Do I sincerely want to be right) 5th ed., Glasgow 1985, pp. 76–77.
- 40.
M. Stirner, The Ego and Its Own, ed. by D. Leopold, Cambridge 1995, p. 176. Stirner has a drastically voluntaristic and imperativistic conception of law. He certainly reduces law to command: “People are at pains to distinguish law from arbitrary orders, from an ordinance: the former comes from a duly entitled authority. But a law over humane action (ethical law, state law, etc.) is always a declaration of will, and so an order” (M. Stirner, The Ego and Its Own, p. 174).
- 41.
K. von Clausewitz, On War, English trans. by M. Howard and P. Paret, Princeton, NJ 1976, p. 87.
- 42.
On war as antithesis of law and in general on the possible relations between war and law, cf. N. Bobbio, Diritto e guerra, in N. Bobbio, Il problema della guerra e le vie della pace, Bologna 1979, pp. 97ff.
- 43.
Cf. F. A. Hayek, Rechtsordnung und Handelsordnung, Karlsruhe 1967.
- 44.
F. E. Oppenheim, Dimensions of Freedom, New York, NY 1961, p. 100.
- 45.
Ibid., p. 91.
- 46.
E. Forsthoff, Der totale Staat, 2nd ed., Hamburg 1933, p. 34.
- 47.
T. Hobbes, Behemoth, ed. by F. Tönnies, p. 50.
- 48.
T. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by C. B. Macpherson, Part I, Chapter 26, p. 312.
- 49.
N. MacCormick, Legal Obligation and the Imperative Fallacy, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Second Series, ed. by A. W. B. Simpson, Oxford 1973, p. 106.
- 50.
Ibid.
- 51.
Ibid., p. 108. My emphasis.
- 52.
Ibid., pp. 108–109.
- 53.
Cfr. J. L. Austin, How to do Things with Words, 2nd ed., ed. by J. O. Urmson and M. Sbisà, Oxford 1982, pp. 12ff.
- 54.
N. MacCormick, Op. cit., p. 112.
- 55.
H. Kelsen, Der soziologische und juristische Staatsbegriff, p. 89. Cfr. H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, English trans. by A. Wedberg, New York, NY 1973, pp. 190–191: “‘Power’ is not prisons and electric chairs, machine guns and cannons; ‘power’ is not any kind of substance or entity hidden behind the social order. Political power is the efficacy of the coercive order recognized as law”.
- 56.
H. Kelsen, Der soziologische und juristische Staatsbegriff, p. 89, my emphasis. Kelsen could thus have subscribed to the following considerations by Cornelius Castoriadis: “Behind the monopoly of legitimate violence lies the monopoly of the legitimate word; the latter is in turn constituted by the monopoly of valid meaning. The master of meaning reigns over the master of violence. The voice of violence can ring out only in the havoc of the collapse of the edifice of instituted meanings. And in order for violence to intervene, it is further necessary for the word – the injunction of existing power – to conserve its power over ‘groups of armed men’. The fourth company of the Pavlovsky regiment, his majesty’s bodyguard, and the Semenovsky regiment were the most solid pillars of the Tsar’s throne – until those days of 26 and 27 February 1917 when they fraternized with the crowd and turned their arms against their officers. The world’s most powerful army will not protect you if it is not loyal to you – and the ultimate foundation of its loyalty is the imaginary belief in your imaginary legitimacy” (C. Castoriadis, Pouvoir, politique, autonomie, in Id., Le monde morcelé, Paris 1990, p. 123).
- 57.
On the importance of the psychological element in the area of legal phenomena, Kelsen lingers again in speaking of the reasons for compliance with norms. Cf. e.g. H. Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, pp. 31–32.
- 58.
Cf. H. Kelsen, Op. ult. cit., pp. 3ff.
- 59.
In this connection see O. Weinberger, Der Begriff der Sanktion und seine Rolle in der Normenlogik, in Grundprobleme der deontischen Logik, ed. by H. Lenk, Pullach bei München 1974, p. 105.
- 60.
There is strong criticism of voluntarism by the “early” Kelsen: see H. Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre entwickelt aus der Lehre vom Rechtssatze, 2nd ed., Tübingen 1923, pp. 97ff. and 189ff. For some traditional sound arguments against voluntarist theories see e.g. A. Falzea, Introduzione alle scienze giuridiche, Part One, Il concetto di diritto, Milano 1975, p. 96.
- 61.
H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and the State, p. 53.
- 62.
H. Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, p. 55. This centrality of sanction in Kelsen’s legal theory makes an intelligent commentator say that “the pure theory seems merely to develop and refine themes from Austin” (M. Barberis, Il diritto come discorso e come comportamento. Trenta lezioni di filosofia del diritto, Torino 1990, p. 184).
- 63.
On this distinction, cf. J. Searle, Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge 1969.
- 64.
Cf. A. Ross, Directives and Norms, London 1968, p. 87: “Not any disagreeable reaction is a sanction. The notion of a sanction is intimately connected with the feeling of disapproval. A merely external record of behaviour must lead to unacceptable results”.
- 65.
Cf. O. Weinberger, Op. cit., p. 93 and p. 108.
- 66.
Cf. N. MacCormick, Law as Institutional Fact, in N. MacCormick and O. Weinberger, An Institutional Theory of Law, Dordrecht 1985.
- 67.
Cf. E. Cassirer, Essay on Man. An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture, Garden City, NY 1953, p. 44.
- 68.
A. Flew, Thinking about Social Thinking. The Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Oxford 1985, pp. 24–25.
- 69.
Sometimes Kelsen seems to equate the sphere of society with that of nature, regarding only legal phenomena as normative ones. Cf. e.g. the last section of the first chapter in H. Kelsen, Reiner Rechtslehre, 1st ed., p. 9: “Indem man das Recht als Norm bestimmt und die Rechtswissenschaft (die eine von der Funktion der rechtssetzenden und rechtsanwendenden Organe verschiedene Funktion ist) auf die Erkenntnis von Normen beschränkt, grenzt man das Recht gegen die Natur und die Rechtswissenschaft als Normwissenschaft gegen alle anderen Wissenschaften ab, die auf kausal-gesetzliche Erklärung natürlicher Vorgänge abzielen”. See also H. Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, p. 89: “Psychology, ethnology, history, sociology are disciplines that gave human behaviour as their object so far as it is determined by causal laws, which means, so far as it occurs in the realm of nature or natural reality”. For the Austrian jurist sociology, then, does not have any different epistemological status from that attributed to the natural sciences. On the other hand, however, Kelsen introduces the category of “normative social sciences”, among which he includes ethics, theology and legal science, but not sociology.
- 70.
See, e.g. H. Kelsen, Causality and Imputations, in Id., The Pure Theory of Law, pp. 76ff., where Kelsen seems to adopt the thesis that upholds that “the dualism of nature as causal order and society as normative order”.
- 71.
See F. A. Hayek, The Results of Human Action but not of Human Design.
- 72.
D. Hume, Essays Moral Political and Literary, ed. by H. Green and T. H. Grose, vol. 1, London 1882, p. 445.
- 73.
Ibid., p. 110.
- 74.
Ibid., p. 446.
- 75.
Ibid., p. 447.
- 76.
Ibid.
- 77.
In this connection see P. Koller, Neue Theorien des Sozialkontrakts, pp. 12ff.
- 78.
D. Hume, Op. ult. cit., p. 453.
- 79.
Cf. N. Bobbio, La teoria dello Stato e del potere, in Max Weber e l’analisi del mondo moderno, Torino 1981, p. 236. The traditional political theory made the equation good government equals impersonal power and bad government equals personal power. “Personal power par excellence” writes Bobbio, “is the tyrant’s” (ibid.). Yet the entirely modern experience of bureaucratic and totalitarian regimes seems to refute the thesis that the impersonality of power is a characteristic of free political regimes. Hannah Arendt very appropriately defines the bureaucratic political form (which is very far from constituting a model of free society) as “the rule of nobody” (H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil, Harmondsworth 1983, p. 289).
- 80.
M. Bovero, Introduzione, in Ricerche politiche, ed. by M. Bovero, Milan 1982, p. xxi.
- 81.
Ibid., p. xxv.
- 82.
In this connection, cf. M. La Torre, Anarchismo, giusnaturalismo e positivismo giuridico, in Archivio giuridico ‘F. Serafini’, 1989, pp. 133ff.
- 83.
F. Müller and R. Christensen, Testo giuridico e lavoro sul testo nella Struktuirierende Rechtslehre, in Ars Interpretandi, 1997, p. 90.
- 84.
Cf. D. Farias, Per una definizione scientificamente utile di ideologia, in Id., Saggi di filosofia politica, Milan 1977, pp. 313ff.
- 85.
Cf. C. S. Nino, La validez del derecho, Buenos Aires 1985, Chapter 7.
- 86.
Cf. C. S. Nino, Derecho, moral y política. Una revisión della teoría general del derecho, Barcelona 1994, Chapter 3.
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La Torre, M. (2010). The Normativist View. In: Law as Institution. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 90. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6607-8_2
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