If I truthfully say ‘a kowhai tree has yellow flowers’ to a group of friends, that fact is then commonly known among them. This indeed works for propositions about facts, such as in the example, but it is a mistaken intuition that whatever you announce is thereafter commonly known: it does not hold for certain epistemic propositions.
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(2008). Public Announcements. In: Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Studies In Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, And Philosophy Of Science, vol 337. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5839-4_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5839-4_4
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