Abstract
The models π u act , π p act , and π n act that we have referred to in section 7.1 of part II as models that satisfy universal conditionals, high probability conditionals, and normic conditionals, respectively, can now be characterized more clearly: π u act is a universal model πu for the set W act of propositional variable settings associated with the actual domain D act of our cognitive agentβs sandbox area relative to the intended interpretation β act ; π p act may be presupposed to be one of the probabilistic models defined in section 9.2 for the actual probability measure Prob act on β(W act ); particularly, the infinitesimal II semantics seems to match our pre-theoretical intuitions concerning the vague notion of βhighβ probability, while the noninfinitesimal semantics highlights the practical dimension of the high probability. π n act may be assumed to be one of the normality models defined in section 9.3 for the actual normality order βΊ act of (states labelled by sets of) the worlds of W act ; the preferential and the ranked model semantics are perhaps the most adequate ones.
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Β© 2004 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Leitgeb, H. (2004). Further Consequences for Justified Inference. In: Inference on the Low Level. Applied Logic Series, vol 30. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2806-9_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2806-9_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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