Abstract
Intention is, like the ability to act, a universal condition of responsibility. A person is not morally responsible for an act if he did not intend it. And if he did intend it, and was able to act otherwise, then he is responsible. It makes sense to hold persons responsible only for what they do intentionally; for we hold persons responsible in order to influence them, and our judgments of responsibility are designed to influence only their intentional action.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Copyright information
© 1962 Sidney Zink
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Zink, S. (1962). Intention. In: The Concepts of Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-81652-1_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-81652-1_9
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-81654-5
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-81652-1
eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)