Abstract
Although there are a number of useful surveys of the literature on collective bargaining models already available [2], [3 ch. 2], [4, ch. 2], [13, sec. L] none of these is specifically concerned with the question of the role of information disclosure. This chapter therefore looks at the same field as earlier authors but with rather a different purpose in mind and consequently may give a slightly unusual emphasis to certain features of the models. In addition, we have found it necessary to refer to published results of empirical research from sources which may not be readily accessible to the person we imagine to be the ‘average’ reader. To these extents the contents of this chapter may have a certain novelty of appearance.
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© 1977 B. J. Foley and K. T. Maunders
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Foley, B.J., Maunders, K.T. (1977). Collective Bargaining Models and the Theoretical Role of Information. In: Accounting Information Disclosure and Collective Bargaining. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-81535-7_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-81535-7_4
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