Realist Objections to Humanitarian Intervention

Abstract

The issue of humanitarian intervention attracted considerable attention after the Cold War came to an end. Many believed that new possibilities of cooperation were opening up between the major powers, and humanitarian intervention was one of the items near the top of the agenda. Events since the Gulf War have not borne out that optimism, but nor have they shown it to be wholly misplaced: at worst they have demonstrated that if there is a genuine opportunity for increased international cooperation, then that opportunity has not yet been properly seized, and there is a need for more rigorous thinking about the conditions under which humanitarian intervention might be justified.¹ This paper is a contribution to that on-going debate. It argues that it would be morally desirable to legitimise a practice of humanitarian intervention, but that this should only be done in vivid awareness of the dangers inherent in such a practice. It maintains that there is an important battery of arguments contained in the realist tradition which are not always fully appreciated, and which count against sanctioning humanitarian intervention unless it is tightly constrained and properly regulated.

We would like to thank John Andrews, Ken Booth, John Cottingham, Roger Crisp, Brad Hooker, Robert Jackson, Justin Morris, and Howard Williams, as well as contributors to this volume (especially John Williams) for their helpful comments. Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the Seminar on International Political Theory at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and the Nuffield Political Theory Workshop, and were much improved by the comments received.