Abstract
What is there to learn from the case of Breivik and the 22 July attacks, and what distinguishes him from other solo terrorists? Conclusions on this, and the value of conducting research on terrorist target selection and related operational issues, are clarified here. It is argued that such knowledge is of considerable importance, and particularly for scholars, students and practitioners in the fields of law enforcement, security, intelligence and terrorism studies. Furthermore, it is described why solo terrorism will continue to represent an unpredictable threat.
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Notes
When a new Government district has been raised in Oslo in ten years time, the total price tag after Breivik’s attacks will undoubtedly exceed the costs after the mentioned PIRA bombings in London. To learn more about these attacks and the Provisional IRA in general, see for example English, Richard (2004). Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA. London: Pan books.
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© 2016 Cato Hemmingby and Tore Bjørgo
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Hemmingby, C., Bjørgo, T. (2016). Conclusion. In: The Dynamics of a Terrorist Targeting Process: Anders B. Breivik and the 22 July Attacks in Norway. Palgrave Hate Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-57997-3_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-57997-3_9
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-84565-1
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-57997-3
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