Abstract
Deterrent behaviors are currently observed among animals. Similarly, deterrence has spread in human societies long before the nuclear era. That seems to speak for deterrence’s efficiency, or to state things in the language of evolution, for its fitness. The literature contains many case studies about the effect of deterrence on evolution. This paper aims at extending these studies, providing a general framework for analyzing the fitness of deterrent behaviors through the combination of two approaches: Evolutionary Games and Games of Deterrence.
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Ellison, D., Rudnianski, M. (2009). Is Deterrence Evolutionarily Stable?. In: Pourtallier, O., Gaitsgory, V., Bernhard, P. (eds) Advances in Dynamic Games and Their Applications. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, vol 10. Birkhäuser Boston. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-4834-3_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-4834-3_18
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