Abstract
To get a full understanding of the phenomenon of compliance costs, we need a sound theory about origin and functionality of regulations. Only if we understand where businesses regulation is coming from, what we want to achieve and by which means, we can combat unnecessary compliance costs of businesses.
A theoretical model about business regulation can be very helpful to understand and answer these questions about origin and functionality. From this model, it appears that different actors are playing an active role in this process of law making, each from their own perspective.
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Notes
- 1.
‘Man is born free, however he is handcuffed everywhere. What is it that legitimizes that?’
- 2.
It goes without saying that – mutatis mutandis – the same holds for citizens who earn their salaries by working as a public officer in the public sector as well as for the citizens who consume collective goods and services. In this context, government being an employer and producer is comparable to industries and trades.
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Nijsen, A. (2009). Origin and Functionalities of Regulation. In: Nijsen, A., Hudson, J., Müller, C., Paridon, K., Thurik, R. (eds) Business Regulation and Public Policy. International Studies in Entrepreneurship, vol 20. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-77678-1_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-77678-1_3
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