Managing (non) quality and the risk consequences have generally assumed that the underlying uncertainty faced by firms, individually and collectively, is neutral! In other words, uncertainty and risk are not motivated while issues relating to information, information and power and parties’ intentionalities are mostly neglected. Supply chains however are beset by multiple parties interacting with broadly varying motivations, information and power asymmetries. In addition, there may be conflicting and competitive objectives as well as environments (in the form of governments, other supply chains and interest groups) that render the management of quality in supply chains far more strategic. This raises many problems that are specific to supply chains and require particular attention.
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(2007). Quality and supply chain management. In: Supply Chain Games: Operations Management And Risk Valuation. International Series In Operations Research & Management Science, vol 113. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-72776-9_8
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