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Counterexamples to Commonly Held Assumptions on Unit Commitment and Market Power Assessment

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Engineering IT-Enabled Sustainable Electricity Services

Part of the book series: Power Electronics and Power Systems ((PEPS,volume 30))

Abstract

This chapter revisits two commonly accepted assumptions about the economics of deregulated electricity markets. It first disproves that, in theory and under the condition of perfect information, decentralized and centralized unit commitment (UC) would lead to the same power quantities traded and the same optimal social welfare. It then shows that a generator owner’s optimum bid sequence for an auction market is generally above marginal cost, even where absolutely no abuse of market power is involved.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This result concerns short-term supply optimization for a given demand and does not consider long-term investment issues.

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Acknowledgments

This work was partially supported by a Rotary Ambassadorial Scholarship, a fellowship from the MIT graduate student office, a DOC scholarship from the Austrian Academy of Sciences, and by NSF IIS-0915054.

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Correspondence to Wolfgang Gatterbauer .

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Gatterbauer, W., Ilić, M. (2013). Counterexamples to Commonly Held Assumptions on Unit Commitment and Market Power Assessment. In: Ilic, M., Xie, L., Liu, Q. (eds) Engineering IT-Enabled Sustainable Electricity Services. Power Electronics and Power Systems, vol 30. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-09736-7_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-09736-7_10

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